* feat(amneziawg): add native AmneziaWG protocol backend
AmneziaWG (WireGuard plus DPI-resistant obfuscation) needs no Docker
here — it runs as a genuine kernel interface via awg-quick/awg, managed
the same way internal/mtproto manages mtg: one Inbound row is one
desired Instance, and a Manager reconciles running interfaces toward
the database every 10s (internal/web/job/amneziawg_job.go) plus
immediately after a client edit (applyLocalAmneziaWG).
Clients reuse model.Client verbatim (the same PrivateKey/PublicKey/
PreSharedKey/AllowedIPs fields WireGuard already uses), so bulk
operations, the QR/share-link modal and subscriptions come from the
shared inbound infrastructure instead of a parallel implementation.
internal/amneziawg owns the obfuscation param generator/validator
(ported from coinman-dev/3ax-ui, upgraded to AmneziaWG 2.0's S3/S4
padding and I1 signature packet) and the exec wrapper around
awg-quick/awg, with fingerprint-based reconcile (noop / reload-via-
syncconf / full restart) mirroring mtproto.Manager so a same-protocol
edit doesn't force an unnecessary interface bounce that would drop
every peer's connection.
Frontend and install.sh's DKMS/awg-tools setup are tracked separately;
this is backend-only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(amneziawg): add frontend support and fix a Go->Zod generator gap
Wires the amneziawg protocol through the panel UI the same way every
other protocol is registered: a Zod settings schema (nested
{server, clients}, matching the Go JSON exactly), the protocol enum,
the inbound-form's per-protocol fields component and its
tab-visibility allowlist, the default-settings factory, the client
schema dispatcher, and the sniffing-capability exclusion (no Xray
inbound exists for amneziawg, same as mtproto).
Client key/allowedIPs fields are reused rather than duplicated: since
AmneziaWG clients are wire-identical to WireGuard clients (same
model.Client fields), ClientFormModal renders one shared field block
for both, switching only the visible label by which protocol is
active. The private-key input also gets a live public-key sync via a
new useEffect, because unlike WireGuard's Xray-native inbound (which
re-derives its public key at runtime and never stores one),
AmneziaWG's server.publicKey is a real persisted field the Go backend
reads directly — free-typing a new private key without this would
silently save a mismatched keypair.
Adds a downloadable per-client .conf (amneziawgConfig.ts, mirroring
wireguardConfig.ts) with the obfuscation lines, and an
InboundOption.AwgServer field on the Go side so the config builder
gets the full server block in one round trip.
Along the way, running tools/openapigen surfaced a real bug: it
doesn't flatten anonymously-embedded Go structs the way encoding/json
does, so ServerSettings embedding Obfuscation20 produced a Zod schema
with a nested `obfuscation20` key that never matches the real wire
JSON. Fixed by un-embedding (flat fields + an accessor method) and
registering internal/amneziawg in the generator's own package list,
which had been silently emitting a dangling schema reference.
English and Russian translations are complete; the other 10 locale
files still fall back to English for the new keys.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(amneziawg): complete frontend parity for the Inbounds list page
The Clients page (form, CRUD, QR/config) already worked from the
prior commit; this closes the remaining gap on the Inbounds side and
in a couple of protocol allowlists that a plain search for existing
wireguard/mtproto handling turned up.
lib/xray/inbound-link.ts gets amneziawg-specific link/config builders
(genAmneziaWGLink/genAmneziaWGConfig, plus the *s fan-out variants)
mirroring the wireguard ones — AmneziaWG has no legacy peers-array to
fall back to, so these read settings.clients directly and add the
obfuscation lines every client must share with the server. Wired into
genInboundLinks generically, and into three consumers that call the
wireguard builders directly rather than through that dispatcher:
QrCodeModal, InboundInfoModal, and InboundsPage's bulk export.
ClientInfoModal, ClientBulkAddModal, and the bulk attach/detach modals
each had their own protocol allowlist that needed amneziawg added
alongside wireguard/mtproto.
Two real gaps surfaced by grepping every remaining 'wireguard' /
Protocols.WIREGUARD hit in frontend/src rather than trusting the
checklist was exhaustive:
- useInbounds.ts's TRACKED_PROTOCOLS gates the deactive/depleted/
expiring/online client counts shown per inbound on the list page;
without amneziawg those counts would silently read zero.
- inbound-tag.ts is an explicit client-side mirror of the Go backend's
port_conflict.go (the file says so itself: "Keep in sync"). It still
only special-cased wireguard for UDP, so an amneziawg inbound would
have fallen through to the TCP default and disagreed with the
backend's own port-conflict math.
Also finishes translating the AmneziaWG UI strings into the 11 locale
files that were still falling back to English (ar-EG, es-ES, fa-IR,
id-ID, ja-JP, pt-BR, tr-TR, uk-UA, vi-VN, zh-CN, zh-TW), matching
en-US/ru-RU key-for-key (26 new keys, verified by count in every file).
Not run anywhere: npm run typecheck / build. This machine has neither
Node nor npm, so nothing here has compiled — reviewed by hand plus
brace/paren balance checks and cross-referencing the generated Zod/TS
types. Treat this as needing a real typecheck before shipping.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(install): note that AmneziaWG kernel module install is still manual
Tracked separately (not yet ported into this script) — see
coinman-dev/3ax-ui's install_amneziawg for the reference approach
(ppa:amnezia/ppa). Also serves as a real, path-filter-matching change
to get the previous empty commit's CI trigger to actually fire —
release.yml's push trigger is paths-scoped and an empty commit changes
no files, so it never matched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(amneziawg): add a button to randomize obfuscation parameters
Mirrors the existing key-regenerate button next to the private key
field. Client-side randomization matches the ranges/constraints of
GenerateObfuscation20's "default" preset (internal/amneziawg/params.go)
closely enough for a form suggestion — the user can still hand-edit any
field afterward.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(install): auto-install the AmneziaWG DKMS module + amneziawg-tools
Ports install_amneziawg from coinman-dev/3ax-ui's install.sh, adapted to
this script's broader distro coverage and NONINTERACTIVE convention:
- Ubuntu/Debian/Armbian: ppa:amnezia/ppa (primary, tested path), with a
reachability pre-check for the Launchpad PPA host — often blocked by
hosting providers, especially Russian VPS — so a flaky network skips
the feature instead of hanging apt through several retries.
- Fedora/RHEL-family, Arch/Manjaro/Parch: best-effort fallback to plain
wireguard-tools (+ AUR amneziawg-dkms via yay/paru when available),
with a manual-install pointer.
- Everything else: manual-install pointer only.
Also installs ndppd and persists IPv4/IPv6 forwarding (for the future
IPv6/NDP phase, not yet wired into the panel) and adds a Secure Boot
warning at the end of the run, since a DKMS-built module is unsigned
and won't load while it's enabled — a common trap on cloud VPS images.
Never fatal: the panel installs and runs fine either way, an AmneziaWG
inbound just won't bring up its tunnel until the module is present.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(amneziawg): resolve all 3 real CI failures (typecheck/lint/codegen)
Found by checking the fork's Actions tab after the last two pushes —
the release build passed (it doesn't run these checks) but the
separate CI workflow caught three real issues:
- golangci-lint (noctx): every internal/amneziawg/manager.go exec.Command
call is now exec.CommandContext with a 30s timeout, so a hung
awg-quick/awg invocation can't block the reconcile job indefinitely
(mirrors internal/mtproto/process.go's own CommandContext usage).
- tsc --noEmit: frontend/src/schemas/client.ts's hand-maintained
InboundOptionSchema (used by the useClients hook, separate from the
auto-generated one in generated/) never got an awgServer field added
when the AmneziaWG frontend work was done — every read of
inbound.awgServer.* in amneziawgConfig.ts was typing as {}. Added
AwgServerOptionSchema, nested (not flattened like wg*) to match what
amneziawgConfig.ts already expects. Also guarded server.publicKey in
inbound-link.ts's genAmneziaWGLink against the schema's optional type.
- codegen staleness: frontend/public/openapi.json is produced by a Node
script (gen:api) this machine can't run; hand-applied the exact diff
the CI failure log already showed (amneziawg protocol enum entry,
ServerSettings schema, InboundOption.awgServer, one example payload),
verified as valid JSON.
Also confirmed independently by this run: install_amneziawg (previous
commit) installed and loaded the DKMS module successfully on both amd64
and arm64 CI runners. The two "Deploy Smoke Tests" failures are
unrelated to this change — this fork has only ever published the
dev-latest pre-release, and GitHub's /releases/latest API deliberately
excludes pre-releases, so the smoke test's no-argument install path
(which resolves "latest") has nothing to find. Not a regression; needs
an actual tagged release whenever that's wanted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(amneziawg): Phase 2a — IPv6 support + NDP proxy
Adds native dual-stack IPv6 to AmneziaWG inbounds, ported from
coinman-dev/3ax-ui's approach:
- ServerSettings gets ipv6Enabled/ipv6Subnet/ipv6ExternalInterface;
Instance carries the server's own IPv6 address (first host of the
subnet) alongside its IPv4 one.
- defaultAmneziaWGClients allocates an IPv6 host address per client
(second AllowedIPs entry) when the server has IPv6 enabled, reusing
allocateWireguardAddress — which needed a real fix along the way: it
always suffixed "/32" regardless of address family, which is wrong
for an IPv6 host address (needs /128). Now family-aware.
- generateServerConfig's PostUp/PostDown gains IPv6 forward-accept
rules, proxy_ndp sysctl, and one `ip -6 neigh add/del proxy` entry per
enabled peer with an IPv6 address — the lightweight per-client
method, not the ndppd-daemon whole-subnet method (not worth the
config-file-management complexity at this scale; ndppd itself is
still installed by install.sh in case that changes later).
- ValidateIPv6Subnet rejects a malformed subnet before save.
- Frontend: ipv6Enabled/ipv6Subnet/ipv6ExternalInterface fields on the
AmneziaWG inbound form, EN+RU translations, openapi.json/generated/*
regenerated (the latter via `go run ./tools/openapigen`, pure Go).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(amneziawg): fill in IPv6 fields missed by the Phase 2a commit
Two real gaps the CI caught (both new fields, both my miss):
- inbound-defaults.ts's createDefaultAmneziawgInboundSettings() built a
server object literal predating ipv6Enabled/ipv6Subnet/
ipv6ExternalInterface — AmneziawgServer's inferred type now requires
them (zod .default() fields are non-optional post-parse), so this
didn't typecheck at all.
- openapi.json's ipv6Enabled property was missing the description the
real generator attaches (the Go doc comment covering all three IPv6
fields is attached to the first one) — a one-line diff, but git
diff --exit-code doesn't care how small.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(amneziawg): Phase 2b — per-client port-forwarding
Admins can now set a per-client ForwardedPorts string (e.g. "80, 443,
8000-8100") that gets DNAT'd + FORWARD'd to that peer's tunnel address
via iptables rules in PostUp/PostDown, ported and simplified from
coinman-dev/3ax-ui's shared/portfwd.
Two decisions worth flagging for future readers:
- The iptables --comment tag on each rule is awg-fwd-<fnv32a(email)>,
not the raw client email. Email is admin/API-supplied free text that
ends up embedded in a shell-executed PostUp/PostDown line; a hash
can never carry a shell metacharacter through where raw
interpolation could.
- The reconcile manager gained a third fingerprint (portFwdFP, next to
the existing structural/peers ones). `awg syncconf` only touches the
WireGuard peer table — it never re-applies PostUp/PostDown iptables
rules — so a port-forward-only change has to force a full
awg-quick down+up bounce, same as a structural change, rather than
the lighter sync a plain peer add/remove can use.
Also fixes a real pre-existing bug found while wiring up IPv6 client
allocation in the previous commit's spirit: allocateWireguardAddress
always suffixed "/32" regardless of address family, which produced
invalid host bits for IPv6 (needs "/128").
ForwardedPorts flows through model.Client -> model.ClientRecord
(gorm column wg_forwarded_ports, auto-migrated) -> ToRecord/ToClient/
MergeClientRecord, mirroring the awgServer field's earlier lesson
that new fields need checking against a second, hand-maintained
persistence-layer struct.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(amneziawg): route a client's traffic through Xray via the Routing page
Every enabled AmneziaWG inbound gets its own Xray TPROXY bridge
automatically, with no toggle to enable first: a loopback
dokodemo-door inbound (sockopt.tproxy) tagged with the AmneziaWG
inbound's own real tag, so it's already selectable in the existing
Routing page's inbound-tag picker — the same trick the mtproto
sidecar's own bridge already relies on (InboundService.GetInboundTags
is a plain, protocol-blind SELECT over every inbound row's tag, no
dedicated UI plumbing needed).
internal/amneziawg's defaultPostUpDown TPROXYs every peer's traffic
into that bridge unconditionally; the bridge's port is derived
deterministically from the inbound's id (EgressPortForInbound) so the
kernel-side reconcile loop and the Xray-config generator never need to
negotiate a runtime value between them.
injectAmneziawgEgress never generates a routing rule itself — whether
a client's traffic goes anywhere beyond Xray's default routing is
entirely up to whatever rules the admin adds through the existing
Routing UI (pick the AmneziaWG inbound's tag as source, optionally a
specific peer's IP via that page's own Source-IP field, and an
outbound), exactly the same workflow as routing any other protocol.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(amneziawg): recover orphaned interfaces after an ungraceful exit
Two gaps left an AmneziaWG interface stuck outside the manager's
control after a crash (kill -9/OOM/panic skips StopAll):
- ensureRestart's teardown was gated on the in-memory `exists` map,
which is always empty on a fresh process, so a survived interface
never got interfaceDown before interfaceUp tried `ip link add`
against a name the kernel already had — failing forever and never
populating m.ifaces, so traffic accounting silently stopped and the
inbound could never be removed. Gate on isInterfaceUp instead, which
checks real kernel state rather than this process's own bookkeeping.
- An inbound deleted from the database entirely while the panel was
down has no entry in `desired` ever again, so it never reaches the
per-id cleanup loop in Reconcile (which only walks m.ifaces). Add a
one-time sweepOrphansLocked scan of configDir, mirroring
mtproto.Manager.sweepOrphansLocked, that tears down and removes any
leftover interface/config not in the current desired set.
Found by the automated review on MHSanaei/3x-ui#6105 (Finding 1).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* i18n(amneziawg): backfill IPv6/obfuscation/port-forwarding keys in 11 locales
Only en-US/ru-RU ever got these 9 keys as each AmneziaWG feature landed
(the regenerate-obfuscation button, then Phase 2a's IPv6 fields, then
Phase 2b's per-client ForwardedPorts) — the other 11 locale files were
never backfilled, so i18next has been silently falling back to English
for all of them since Phase 1. Cosmetic-only (never broke anything),
but now closed for every shipped locale.
* fix(amneziawg): resolve 7 Medium findings from the automated PR review
Each is independently reproducible; fixed together since one review pass
found all of them.
- manager.go: the shared "ip rule add fwmark" policy route had no
existence check, so it duplicated in "ip rule show" on every interface
bounce (which hostRulesFingerprint forces on any client add/remove/
re-IP). Now checked via "ip rule list | grep -q ..." first. (Finding 2)
- params.go: ExternalInterface, IPv6ExternalInterface, and subnetIp/
subnetCidr are interpolated unescaped into a shell-executed PostUp/
PostDown line, but only obfuscation and the IPv6 subnet were validated
before save. Added ValidateInterfaceName (a strict charset+length
pattern) and ValidateSubnetIPv4 (netip.ParsePrefix), wired into
normalizeAmneziaWGSettings. (Finding 3)
- amneziawg_job.go: IsAwgInstalled() existed but nothing ever called it,
so a host without awg/awg-quick (the Docker image, RHEL, Arch, a failed
install.sh PPA step) logged a reconcile failure every 10s forever. Now
checked once an inbound actually needs it, warning once instead of
spamming. (Finding 4)
- client_inbound_apply.go: the WireGuard/AmneziaWG credential
carry-forward (added so a metadata-only client edit doesn't rotate
keys) never covered ForwardedPorts, so a partial edit -- an API call or
Telegram-bot toggle that omits the field -- silently wiped a client's
port-forwarding spec. Carried forward and written back the same way the
key fields already are. (Finding 5)
- manager.go: hostRulesFingerprint keyed each peer on its IPv4 address
only, and structuralFingerprint omitted IPv6Enabled/IPv6ExternalInterface
entirely, so an IPv6-only change could pick the syncconf reload path
(which never re-runs PostUp, leaving a stale NDP-proxy entry) or be a
complete no-op. Both fingerprints now cover the IPv6 fields. (Finding 6)
- port_conflict.go: the AmneziaWG egress bridge (injectAmneziawgEgress)
binds 127.0.0.1:63100+id with no collision check anywhere, since it
isn't a database row the ordinary port-conflict query can see -- same
blind spot the reserved Xray API port already has its own check for.
Added the equivalent check for the AmneziaWG bridge port. (Finding 7)
- install.sh: install_amneziawg ran unconditionally for every install/
update, building a DKMS kernel module and enabling host-wide IPv4/IPv6
forwarding whether or not the feature is ever used. Gated behind a new
should_install_amneziawg (XUI_INSTALL_AMNEZIAWG=true/false, or an
interactive y/N prompt defaulting to no). Also replaced the deprecated
apt-key adv with a dedicated keyring + signed-by= on the Debian branch,
and guarded its sources.list appends against duplication on a retried
install. (Finding 8)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(amneziawg): make the Xray TPROXY bridge a per-inbound opt-in
Addresses Finding 10 from the automated PR review: an always-on TPROXY
bridge makes every AmneziaWG tunnel hard-depend on Xray being up (all
traffic, including DNS, drops whenever Xray restarts), and forces a full
awg-quick down+up bounce on any client add/remove/re-IP, permanently
losing the syncconf fast path.
Adds ServerSettings.RouteThroughXray (off by default):
- defaultPostUpDown only emits the TPROXY/policy-route rules when it's
on; a plain AmneziaWG tunnel now has zero Xray dependency out of the
box.
- structuralFingerprint covers it (toggling it changes whether PostUp/
PostDown contain any TPROXY rules at all -- structural, not a
per-peer host-rule). hostRulesFingerprint's IPv4 tracking is now
itself conditional on RouteThroughXray (and IPv6 tracking on
IPv6Enabled), so an instance that never uses either keeps the
syncconf fast path for a plain peer re-IP.
- injectAmneziawgEgress only creates a bridge for inbounds that opted
in; checkAmneziawgEgressConflict (the Finding-7 fix) now parses each
candidate through InstanceFromInbound so a non-routed inbound's port
is correctly never treated as reserved.
- New inbound-level Switch in the AmneziaWG form; the actual outbound
decision is still made entirely through the panel's stock Routing
page, same as before -- only whether the bridge exists at all is now
a choice.
Translation keys added to all 13 locales in the same commit this time,
not backfilled later (see Finding 9's lesson).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(amneziawg): resolve 4 Low findings from the automated PR review
- manager.go: serverAddress assumed subnetIp always ends in ".0"; a
base like "10.8.1.5" was used verbatim as the server's own address,
eventually colliding with peer allocation (which starts at .2
upward). Now derives the first host of the actual subnetIp/subnetCidr
network via netip, matching serverAddressV6's own approach. A /32
base (no host bits at all) is still used as-is. (Finding 12, partial
-- the /16 pool-widening half of this finding only exists on the
upstream-pr/amneziawg branch's merged client_wireguard.go, not here;
handled separately on that branch.)
- manager.go: ensureLocked carried the previous per-peer traffic
counters (`last`) forward even through a full restart, but
awg-quick down+up resets the kernel's own counters to zero -- the
next CollectTraffic computed a large negative delta (clamped to 0),
silently discarding real traffic. Extracted the decision into
nextTrafficBaseline: only a reload (syncconf) preserves the
baseline. (Finding 13)
- portfwd.go: exported ForwardedPortsInclude; inbound_amneziawg.go's
new checkForwardedPortsConflict uses it to reject, at save time, a
client's forwardedPorts that would DNAT the panel's own port or
another enabled inbound's port to the tunnel client --
portForwardLines has no destination restriction, so this collision
was previously silent. Wired into both the single-client update path
and the add-client path (client_inbound_apply.go), plus
normalizeAmneziaWGSettings for the whole-inbound save path. (Finding 14)
- inbound.go: InboundOption.AwgServer sent the whole ServerSettings
struct including PrivateKey to GetInboundOptions callers -- a
shared, admin-wide dropdown-filling endpoint the frontend's own
AwgServerOptionSchema never reads that field from. Redacted it
before assigning. (Finding 11)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(amneziawg): don't widen the peer address pool past AmneziaWG's own subnet
Completes Finding 12 from the automated PR review (the serverAddress half
of this finding was already fixed on main and cherry-picked here). This
half is specific to this branch: allocateWireguardAddress's /16
pool-widening fallback is an independent addition from upstream's own
main that this branch inherited during the cherry-pick rebase -- it
doesn't exist on the fork's own main at all, so this fix can't be
cherry-picked the normal way and is committed directly here.
Widening is safe for WireGuard's own Xray-native inbound (AllowedIPs
isn't tied to a strict kernel interface subnet), but AmneziaWG's kernel
interface Address is exactly the configured subnet -- an address
allocated from the containing /16 once the /24 fills up would be
silently unroutable. allocateWireguardAddress now takes an explicit
allowWidening bool: WireGuard's own caller passes true (unchanged
behavior), AmneziaWG's passes false (fails loudly on exhaustion instead).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(docker): note that AmneziaWG doesn't work in this image
Investigated: the image is Alpine-based, and AmneziaWG's own packaging
(DKMS module + amneziawg-tools) doesn't target Alpine/musl at all --
unlike the Debian/Ubuntu/Fedora/Arch paths install.sh already handles,
there's no package to apk add even with full host network/capabilities.
The panel already degrades gracefully (IsAwgInstalled() logs one warning
instead of retrying forever), so no code change is needed -- just made
the reason explicit at the point where a user would reach for cap_add/
network_mode to try to work around it.
* fix(sub): include amneziawg inbounds in subscription links
getInboundsBySubId's SQL protocol allowlist never had 'amneziawg' added,
so every AmneziaWG client was silently excluded from all three
subscription formats (plain/individual links, JSON, Clash) and from the
Telegram bot's QR/individual-link buttons, which fetch through the same
path. genAmneziaWGLink itself was already fully implemented and already
wired into GetLink's dispatch switch -- it just never got a chance to
run. Same bug shape as the earlier TRACKED_PROTOCOLS frontend gap: a
hardcoded protocol list one entry short.
Found while investigating whether the Telegram bot needed AmneziaWG-
specific client-management code -- it doesn't (the bot itself is fully
protocol-agnostic), but this is the actual root cause of "can't share
an AmneziaWG client's config via the bot."
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(inbound): enforce node-eligibility server-side, not just in the UI
Investigated multi-node interaction with AmneziaWG: the master's own
reconcile (DesiredAmneziaWGInstances) and Xray config generation
(injectAmneziawgEgress, the GenXrayInboundConfig protocol skip) all
correctly filter on NodeID IS NULL, so a node-assigned AmneziaWG (or
MTProto) inbound would never be managed by the master. But nothing
stopped one from being created that way: NODE_ELIGIBLE_PROTOCOLS
(frontend/src/pages/inbounds/form/InboundFormModal.tsx) only hides the
node picker client-side -- a direct API call could set nodeId on an
AmneziaWG inbound, which every node then reconciles as an ordinary
local inbound (nodes run the identical binary, full cron suite
included), leaving it running unmanaged and untracked by the master's
own AmneziaWG bookkeeping.
Added isNodeEligibleProtocol (inbound_protocol.go), mirroring the
frontend's allowlist, and enforced it in both AddInbound (the actually
exploitable path -- nodeId comes straight from the request) and
UpdateInbound (defense in depth; NodeID is already restored from the
stored row there before this check, so it mainly guards against a
protocol change on an existing node-hosted inbound).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(amneziawg): allow TPROXY-marked traffic through a default-deny INPUT chain
TPROXY never rewrites a packet's own destination address, only the routing
decision. A default-deny firewall whose INPUT chain sanity-checks "is this
destination actually local" (UFW's ufw-not-local, via addrtype --dst-type
LOCAL, is a concrete example) silently drops the redirected packet before
Xray's socket ever sees it -- RouteThroughXray looked fully configured
(TPROXY rule present and counting, Xray listening with IP_TRANSPARENT set)
yet every peer's traffic vanished with no trace on either side.
Adds an idempotent, never-torn-down "iptables -I INPUT 1 -m mark --mark
<fwmark> -j ACCEPT" alongside the existing shared policy route, so this
works regardless of which firewall manager owns the rest of the INPUT chain.
* fix(frontend): give AmneziaWG the same UDP tag and its own tag color
The Inbounds list only special-cased isWireguard/isHysteria for the "UDP"
network badge, so an AmneziaWG row showed just the bare protocol tag with
no transport badge next to it. Added the missing isAmneziawg flag (mirrors
isWireguard exactly) and wired it into the same branch.
Client-row protocol-color maps in ClientsPage/HostList had no amneziawg
entry, silently falling back to grey -- ClientInfoModal already had
amneziawg: 'yellow' from earlier work, these two just never got it.
* feat(logs): show which AmneziaWG client an access-log line belongs to
The dokodemo-door TPROXY bridge every AmneziaWG peer's traffic is routed
through has no per-user identity, so Xray's own access log never carries an
"email:" token for these lines -- the Access Logs modal showed a blank
Email column for every in-*-udp row, even though every other protocol's
rows show the client normally.
The peer's decapsulated tunnel IP does survive as the log's "from" address,
and that IP deterministically maps to exactly one configured peer. Builds a
"<inbound tag>|<ip>" -> email index from the same AmneziaWG inbounds already
parsed elsewhere (amneziawg.InstanceFromInbound), and fills in Email from it
whenever the raw log line didn't have one.
* fix(amneziawg): enable sniffing on the TPROXY bridge
Domain-based Routing rules could never match RouteThroughXray traffic: an
AmneziaWG peer resolves DNS itself, through the tunnel, before ever sending
a packet, so the decapsulated traffic TPROXY hands to the bridge is already
a bare destination IP with no domain name attached at the network layer.
Every other inbound recovers this via sniffing (confirmed working for the
stock wireguard inbound, which does have it configured); the bridge never
got a sniffing block at all, so only tag/IP/network-based rules could ever
match it -- any domain rule above it in the list was silently unreachable.
* docs: add an AmneziaWG config page and list it as a supported protocol
Closes the PR checklist gap: the feature shipped with zero mention on
the docs site. Mirrors reality.mdx's structure (key settings, setup
steps, config excerpt) and notes the Docker/multi-node/Telegram-bot
caveats the PR itself is honest about not having confirmed.
* fix: address the fresh review round on PR #6105 (8 findings)
1. hostRulesFingerprint didn't account for ForwardedPorts when
RouteThroughXray was off, so re-IPing a peer with port-forwarding
configured left stale DNAT rules pointing at an address the next
peer could be handed.
2. Server/client config values (keys, email, I1) were never validated
for control characters before being written into the generated
.conf; a newline could smuggle a PostUp hook into awg-quick's
parser. Added ValidateConfigValue at save time and a
sanitizeConfigValue backstop at render time.
3. checkForwardedPortsConflict didn't scope to node_id IS NULL, so a
port used only on a different node produced a false collision; also
hoisted the panel-port/inbounds lookup out of the per-client loop
(portConflictContext) so N clients cost one query, not N.
4. PostDown commands were ";"-joined and abort on the first failure;
appendOrTrue makes teardown best-effort so an external firewall
flush can't leave DNAT rules to accumulate across bounces.
5. The "ip rule list | grep -q" existence check could SIGPIPE under
pipefail and re-add a duplicate rule; switched to grep -c >/dev/null.
6. Ported the vpn:// share-link format (base64url of the plain .conf
text, matching the real AmneziaVPN app) onto this branch -- it had
only ever landed on our own fork's main, so this PR branch was still
on the old amneziawg://+query-params scheme our own docs no longer
described. Also corrected the docs' install.sh claim (opt-in/
interactive, not automatic) and stale pre-opt-in comments in
route_egress.go.
7. install.sh: Arch's ndppd install used pacman -Syu (full system
upgrade) instead of -Sy like every other call in the script; and
should_install_amneziawg re-prompted on every `x-ui update` even
when awg was already installed.
8. CollectTraffic could clobber a concurrent restart's freshly-reset
(empty) traffic baseline with stale pre-restart counters, since
getPeerStats runs lock-free; now checks pointer identity before
writing back. sweepOrphansLocked permanently disabled itself on a
transient os.ReadDir failure instead of allowing a retry.
go build/vet/test and frontend typecheck/lint/build/vitest all pass.
* fix(install.sh): check the live sysctl value, not sysctl.conf text
Reviewer feedback (cherts, PR #6105): grepping /etc/sysctl.conf for the
setting name is unreliable -- many distros split sysctl config across
/etc/sysctl.d/*.conf, and /etc/sysctl.conf can be a symlink into that
directory, so the check can miss an already-active setting (harmless
duplicate append) or match a disabled/commented line (forwarding
silently stays off). Query the live value via `sysctl -n` instead,
which is accurate regardless of which file set it. Applied the same
fix to both the IPv6 and IPv4 checks for consistency.
* fix: update inbound_amneziawg.go to the split buildInboundForLocalRuntime
Same fork-only-file blind spot as the one caught on our own main after
the 3.6.0 sync: upstream split buildRuntimeInboundForAPI into
buildInboundForNodePush / buildInboundForLocalRuntime (part of the
node-sync client-deletion fix, 5bc81dfd), updating every call site it
could see. This file doesn't exist upstream, so it kept calling the
old name even after the branch merged in that commit.
* fix(frontend): recognize AmneziaWG's vpn:// scheme in share-link labels
The shared link-tag/label helper (used by the client info modal, QR
modal, and subscription page) had no entry for the vpn:// scheme
AmneziaWG links use, so it fell through to the generic fallback: a
plain "Vpn" tag with no color, and an empty remark/port that made the
row's title fall back to "Link N" instead of the inbound's actual
name:port — unlike every other protocol, which shows its real tag and
label.
vpn:// links are base64url of a plain .conf text (matching the real
AmneziaVPN app's own share-link format), not a structured URL, so
there's no query string or #hash to read a remark/port from. Decode
the payload and pull the remark/endpoint back out of the .conf text
directly instead.
* fix(xray): force a full restart for TPROXY inbounds, never hot-add them
Real incident: an AmneziaWG inbound with RouteThroughXray enabled lost
all internet on that connection after a migration. Root-caused on the
live box -- iptables TPROXY counters were incrementing (packets
correctly redirected to 127.0.0.1:63110), but nothing was actually
listening there (ss showed nothing on that port) until a full
`systemctl restart x-ui`, after which the bridge came up immediately.
Xray-core's gRPC AddInbound reports success for a new sockopt.tproxy
inbound (internal/amneziawg's own Xray egress bridge is the only kind
this fork ever generates) but doesn't reliably bind a working listener
for it outside of process startup -- the bridge silently never comes
up, and RouteThroughXray traffic goes nowhere until the next full
restart happens to occur for an unrelated reason.
diffInbounds already has this exact defensive pattern for REALITY
inbounds ("a gRPC remove+add does not reliably rebuild the REALITY
authenticator"), just never extended to TPROXY, and only in the
already-existing-then-changed branch -- the "brand new inbound" branch
had no such guard at all, which is exactly the path a freshly-enabled
RouteThroughXray bridge takes. Added inboundUsesTproxy and wired it
into both branches.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(amneziawg): flag Xray for resync when a peer edit changes qualifying state
Real production bug, root-caused on iiadmin-vps: updateAmneziaWGInbound/
AddInbound/DelInbound only ever updated the kernel interface via
amneziawg.GetManager() -- they never called SetNeedRestart the way every
other protocol's mutation path does (client_crud.go, inbound.go, etc. all
do). injectAmneziawgEgress's TPROXY bridge inbound depends on
InstanceFromInbound finding at least one qualifying peer plus
RouteThroughXray, so an edit that flips that (first peer added, last one
removed, RouteThroughXray toggled on) previously required a full panel
restart before the bridge actually got created, with no error anywhere:
the kernel interface would handshake fine, but traffic redirected into the
bridge's TPROXY port went nowhere because nothing was listening there.
diffInbounds/inboundUsesTproxy already correctly force a full restart for
a brand new TPROXY inbound (bdee0a20) -- that part was never the bug. The
gap was entirely upstream: nothing ever told Xray a resync was even needed.
* fix(clients): reject AllowedIPs already used on another WireGuard/AmneziaWG inbound
defaultWireguardClients/defaultAmneziaWGClients only ever checked uniqueness
against their own inbound's client list, so two inbounds sharing a subnet
(same protocol or not) could silently hand out or accept the same address --
the exact scenario behind a real duplicate-IP incident where a WireGuard and
an AmneziaWG client both ended up on the same address. otherTunnelAllowedIPs
now collects every address already claimed on every other tunnel inbound and
folds it into both the auto-allocation pool and the manual-entry collision
check, naming the other inbound in the error when it fires.
* fix(frontend): add the missing AmneziaWG config download on the sub page
The subscription page already gave WireGuard links their own "Config"
block (copy/download/QR of the actual .conf, via wireguardConfigFromLink
reversing the wireguard:// query params) but had no equivalent for
AmneziaWG's vpn:// links -- its isWireguardLink gate never matched them,
and no reverse-parse helper existed for this page specifically. Every
other surface (InboundInfoModal, ClientInfoModal, ClientQrModal) already
had this parity; this was the one page that didn't.
Fixed by adding amneziawgConfigFromLink (inbound-link.ts), simpler than
its WireGuard counterpart since a vpn:// payload already *is* the plain
.conf text -- just base64url-decode it, no query-param reconstruction
needed -- and wiring it into SubPage.tsx alongside the existing WireGuard
block, reusing the same pages.clients.amneziaWgConfig label the other
three surfaces already use.
* fix(xray): force a full restart for password-auth SOCKS5 hot-apply
Real production incident: editing a client under an AmneziaWG inbound
left its embedded SOCKS5 relay's settings byte-different (a new account
list), and Xray's gRPC remove+add hot swap silently dropped the account
for a peer whose email contained non-ASCII characters -- its tunnel kept
handshaking fine but all its traffic got rejected at the SOCKS5 layer,
while every other peer on the same relay was unaffected. A full restart
(reading the same JSON straight from disk) always produced the correct
account list. socks isn't in userDiffableProtocols (that only covers
vless/vmess/trojan's clients+email shape, not accounts+user), so any
settings drift on this inbound fell through to the generic remove+add
path. Forces a restart instead, the same defensive choice already made
for REALITY and TPROXY -- scoped to auth:"password" specifically so the
other, noauth SOCKS5 bridges (panel/node/mtproto egress) keep the cheaper
hot path.
* Fix Attach reusing one identity's address across wg/awg inbounds
ClientService.Attach deliberately copies one identity's stored
AllowedIPs into every WireGuard/AmneziaWG inbound it's attached to
in the same call, so the same person gets the same tunnel address
on every protocol they use. Its loop calls addInboundClient once per
inbound, and each of those independently computes
otherTunnelAllowedIPs -- so by the second inbound in the batch, the
first inbound's just-written copy of this identity's own address
looked like a cross-inbound collision against itself.
Real production symptom this caused: detaching then re-attaching a
client to both wg and awg failed with "wireguard: allowedIPs entry
X is already used by a client on inbound 'awg' (#N)" -- the exact
address the identity is supposed to keep, rejected as if it belonged
to someone else.
Add a selfEmails exclusion to otherTunnelAllowedIPs and populate it
from the client(s) being processed at the one real call site. Safe
unconditionally: ClientRecord.Email is globally unique, so a match
can only ever be this same identity's own entry on a sibling inbound,
never a genuine different client's address.
Reproduced the underlying mechanism live (manual entry correctly
rejected as a cross-inbound collision; fresh auto-allocation
correctly avoided a used address) before writing the fix, to confirm
the guard itself works and the bug is specifically in how Attach's
per-inbound calls interact with it.
* Attach: allocate fresh when re-attaching with no active tunnel
The previous fix (82cc69f5) made Attach's own address-reuse
correctly not collide with itself across inbounds -- but it still
always reused an identity's stored AllowedIPs verbatim, even when
that identity currently has zero WireGuard/AmneziaWG attachments at
all. A real report from testing this live: an identity fully
detached from both its wg and awg inbounds, then re-attached, got
its old address back even though several lower addresses were free
-- because nothing about being fully detached ever cleared the
stored value Attach copies from.
Add hasTunnelAttachment, checked once against the identity's CURRENT
inbound set before Attach's loop runs: if none of its current
inbounds is WireGuard/AmneziaWG, clear the stored AllowedIPs so this
attach allocates fresh (matching what a brand-new client would get)
instead of resurrecting an address nothing reserves anymore. Left
alone when the identity already has an active tunnel elsewhere, so
extending it to a second protocol still keeps a consistent address.
* Fix TestOtherTunnelAllowedIPsExcludesSelfEmail's own test setup
CI caught this: the "genuinely different client" (other@wg) was
seeded onto the SAME inbound passed as excludeID, which
otherTunnelAllowedIPs already excludes entirely regardless of the
selfEmails fix -- so the assertion that its address is still
reported could never have passed, proving nothing either way. Move
it onto the sibling inbound alongside shared@id, which is what the
test actually needs to exercise (two clients on one sibling, one
excluded by email, one not).
* Attach: never inherit an address that doesn't fit the target inbound
hasTunnelAttachment (from the earlier fix, commit 51067f16) only
asked "does this identity have ANY tunnel attachment", treating that
as license to reuse its stored address verbatim on every inbound
being attached. Real production case this missed: an identity's
stored address came from WireGuard's own fallback subnet
(10.0.0.0/24, used when that inbound has no other clients to infer a
base from), then got attached to a second, AmneziaWG inbound
configured for a completely different subnet (10.8.1.0/24).
defaultAmneziaWGClients's already-set-AllowedIPs branch only checks
for collisions, never subnet membership, so the mismatched address
was accepted silently -- producing a peer that can never actually
connect, since an AmneziaWG address must fall inside the kernel
interface's own configured subnet to be routable at all.
Add addressesFitAmneziaWGInbound, checked per inbound inside Attach's
loop: if the inherited address doesn't fit the SPECIFIC inbound being
attached, clear it just for that one so it gets a fresh, valid
allocation instead, while other already-attached inbounds keep their
existing values. WireGuard has no equivalent strict subnet
requirement (allocateWireguardAddress can widen to a fallback pool
for it), so this only ever constrains AmneziaWG targets.
* Give WireGuard an explicit, admin-configurable subnet field
WireGuard previously had no configurable subnet at all -- only an
implicit one, either inferred from existing clients' own addresses
(wireguardAllocationBase) or a hardcoded 10.0.0.0/24 fallback when
none exist yet. AmneziaWG, by contrast, has always had a real
server.subnetIp/subnetCidr field in its settings, editable in the
UI. User request: give WireGuard the same treatment.
Backend: explicitWireguardSubnetBase reads an optional subnetIp/
subnetCidr pair from the inbound's own settings JSON (mirroring
AmneziaWG's defaultAmneziaWGSubnetBases). defaultWireguardClients
checks it first; only when unset does it fall back to today's
inference-from-existing-clients behavior, so an inbound saved before
this field existed keeps working exactly as it always has.
Frontend: subnetIp/subnetCidr added to WireguardInboundSettingsSchema
and the inbound form (mirroring AmneziaWG's own field layout/labels),
with a real default (10.0.0.0/24, the same value the backend already
fell back to) seeded for newly created inbounds so the field starts
populated and editable rather than blank. Translated across all 13
locales.
This also structurally closes the class of bug fixed in
82cc69f5/291c47b3: with wg and awg subnets explicit and
independently controllable, an admin who wants matching addresses
across both protocols can configure them to actually agree, instead
of one silently inheriting the other's incompatible range.
* Split the client edit form's AllowedIPs into per-protocol fields
A client attached to both WireGuard and AmneziaWG shared one AllowedIPs
form field with a dynamically-switching label, so its two genuinely
different addresses could never both be shown or edited correctly.
Worse, Update/Create broadcast that one shared value to every attached
wg/awg inbound with no subnet-fit check, so an ordinary edit save could
silently overwrite one protocol's address with the other's -- the same
bug class already fixed for Attach, but reachable from any client edit.
model.Client gains an optional AllowedIPsByInbound map so a caller can
send distinct values per inbound; Update/Create honor it and, when it's
absent, clear a shared value that doesn't fit an AmneziaWG inbound's own
subnet instead of writing it through. A new TunnelAllowedIPsByInbound
read path feeds the real per-inbound address to the client edit form via
GET, which now renders two separate, correctly-labeled fields whenever
both protocols are attached (unchanged single dynamic field otherwise).
* Regenerate openapi.json for the new allowedIPsByInbound field
Follow-up to 878ee839: gen:zod (frontend/src/generated) was already
regenerated and committed, but gen:api (frontend/public/openapi.json)
wasn't, so CI's codegen drift check failed.
* Fix build breakage from merging upstream main: Update() gained a limitHwid param
Two of our own AllowedIPs tests (not present upstream, so the merge never
flagged them as conflicting) still called the old 3-arg Update(inboundSvc,
id, client) -- upstream's hardware-ID-limit feature added a required
limitHwid parameter that every other caller in this package already
passes. Also drop createDefaultInboundSettings from InboundsPage.tsx: the
merge conflict resolution kept the import, but upstream's clone-payload
refactor (buildClonePayload, inbound-clone.ts) already calls it
internally now -- this file doesn't need it directly anymore.
* Fix real bug: AmneziaWG clients rejected as "empty client ID" in 3 places
Three switch statements on inbound.Protocol handle "wireguard" explicitly
(checking client.PublicKey) but fall through to the default case for
"amneziawg" (checking client.ID, which AmneziaWG clients never set --
they use PublicKey/Email like WireGuard, not the VMess/VLESS UUID field).
This is what the 4 AllowedIPs tests were actually catching:
UpdateInboundClient's newClientId derivation hit this same default branch,
so every Update() on an AmneziaWG client returned "empty client ID"
before ever reaching the AllowedIPs logic being tested.
Fixed by adding "amneziawg" alongside "wireguard" in each switch:
addInboundClient's per-client validation, UpdateInboundClient's
newClientId derivation, and AddInbound's per-client validation (the
third one wasn't hit by these tests, but has the identical bug -- creating
a brand-new AmneziaWG inbound with a client attached would fail the
same way).
* refactor(amneziawg): rename Obfuscation20 to Obfuscation31, drop the dead mobile preset
Mechanical rename ahead of the AmneziaWG 3.1 parameter work: the type,
generator and prose all said 2.0, and the "mobile" generator preset was
reachable only from its own test. No behavior change.
* feat(amneziawg): AmneziaWG 3.1 obfuscation parameters (backend + generated schemas)
Adds the 3.1 parameter surface to the inbound settings and both Go config
emitters: I2-I5 signature packets, HeaderProtectionKey (base64 32-byte,
shared server<->client), ContentPaddingAddition, the five handshake-timing
randomization ranges (RekeyAfterTime/RekeyTimeout/RejectAfterTime/
KeepaliveTimeout/MaxHandshakeAttempts), and the RandomTrailers/
DisableCookies switches. Freshly generated sets fill everything except
I2-I5 (matching Amnezia's own generator) with jittered ranges bracketing
WireGuard's stock timing constants; every reject window starts >= 30s
above the rekey window by construction. Empty fields stay off the wire,
so blanking a field disables just that feature.
Validation generalizes the H1-H4 range checker for the new uint32-range
fields, requires min 1 on timers, cross-checks rekey-vs-reject, and
demands a real 32-byte base64 header-protection key. The manager warns
once per process when the installed awg tools predate 3.1 but an inbound
uses 3.1 parameters (awg-quick rejects unknown keys with a generic
error otherwise); apply still proceeds.
Requires amneziawg-tools v3.1.20260812+ / module or amneziawg-go
v3.1.20260814+ on the host.
* feat(amneziawg): emit and randomize 3.1 parameters in the frontend
Both client-config emitters (the vpn:// link builder and the clients-page
.conf builder) now carry the 3.1 [Interface] lines in the same order as
the Go emitters. The obfuscation randomizer moves out of InboundFormModal
into a shared lib/xray/amneziawg-obfuscation.ts that also fills the new
fields, and createDefaultAmneziawgInboundSettings switches from static
values to that generator — a fresh inbound now really gets the unique
fingerprint the docs promise instead of the same jc=5/jmin=10 set on
every install.
Schema parse-time defaults for the new fields stay ''/false on purpose:
real values come only from the generator, so resaving an inbound never
mutates its stored parameters. A new parity test pins the hand-written
AmneziawgServerSchema to the generated ServerSettings key set, so a field
added on one side can no longer silently vanish from configs.
* feat(amneziawg): 3.1 form fields and translations
Inbound form gains inputs for I2-I5, HeaderProtectionKey (filled by the
existing obfuscation Regenerate button), ContentPaddingAddition, the five
timing ranges, and the RandomTrailers/DisableCookies switches; the MTU
input picks up the min=1 its schema already enforced. All 13 locales get
the 19 new keys and drop the "2.0" branding from the s3/s4/i1 labels.
* docs(amneziawg): document 3.1 parameters; install.sh kernel/version notes
The AmneziaWG page's obfuscation section moves from the 2.0 to the 3.1
parameter set: table rows for I2-I5, HeaderProtectionKey,
ContentPaddingAddition, the timing-randomization ranges and the
RandomTrailers/DisableCookies switches, a requirements callout (tools
v3.1.20260812+, module/awg-go v3.1.20260814+, Linux 6.7+ for the DKMS
path), and a sample client .conf that matches what the panel actually
emits (including the DNS defaults and PersistentKeepalive it always had).
install.sh warns before a DKMS build on a pre-6.7 kernel and after any
install that left pre-3.1 amneziawg-tools on PATH.
Also updates the hosts API operation paths ({id} -> {groupId}) in the
stale ru/zh/fa reference pages: syncing docs/public/openapi.json for the
new AmneziaWG schema fields surfaced that rename, which had never been
copied over, and the docs build fails on paths missing from the spec.
* fix(amneziawg): reject control characters and canonicalize 3.1 range values
Adversarial review of the 3.1 work surfaced a validation gap:
base64.DecodeString silently ignores CR/LF, so a header-protection key
that picked up a line wrap in transit decoded to a valid 32 bytes,
passed validation, and was emitted verbatim into every client config —
where the orphan second line breaks the import while the server (whose
emitter strips control chars) keeps running with the correct key. The
key and range validators now reject control characters outright.
Also from the same review: range values are canonicalized on save
("110 - 140" -> "110-140", whitespace-only collapses to feature-off,
closing a case where the server conf rendered an invalid blank-value
line the client emitters omitted); the rekey/reject invariant is now
enforced against WireGuard's 120s/180s defaults when only one side is
set; and the structural fingerprint joins on "\n" instead of "|",
which is a legal I1-I5 character and made adjacent free-text fields
join-ambiguous.
* fix(install): resolve latest release tag via web redirect to dodge API rate limits
The non-interactive install smoke test resolved the release version through
the unauthenticated GitHub API (api.github.com/.../releases/latest), which
allows only 60 requests/hour per IP. The test installs twice in one run, and
on shared CI runner IPs the second call gets rate-limited, returns no
tag_name, and install.sh treats an empty version as fatal (exit 1) — the same
"Failed to fetch x-ui version" real users hit behind CGNAT/shared addresses.
resolve_latest_tag() now reads the tag from the github.com releases/latest
web redirect (not subject to the API rate limit), falling back to the API
only if the redirect yields nothing. Verified with the real
deploy/test/smoke-noninteractive.sh (two installs, both green).
* fix(amneziawg): three review findings on #6105, plus a comment trim
1. A peer's allowedIPs reached the generated .conf unvalidated and
unsanitized, unlike email/publicKey/preSharedKey which
normalizeAmneziaWGSettings already guards. A newline in an entry let a
following "[Interface]" re-open the interface section, whose "PostUp = ..."
awg-quick then runs as root on the next apply. Reproduced end to end
against generateServerConfig. The save path now rejects and canonicalizes
through normalizeWireguardAllowedIPs, and the render path sanitizes as a
backstop for rows predating the validation (an upgrade, a restored backup,
a direct DB edit). H1-H4 get the same render-time sanitize, and the two NIC
name fields a plausibility check, since stripping control characters alone
would still let a shell metacharacter into a root-executed PostUp line.
2. EgressPortForInbound is 63100 + inbound id, so an id past 2435 derives a
port above 65535 -- and Xray rejects the whole generated config over one
invalid port, taking every other protocol down with it. It now reports
ok=false past the range, and both the Xray bridge and its TPROXY rules are
skipped instead of emitting an impossible port.
3. The downloadable AmneziaWG .conf read ClientRecord.allowedIPs, a single
shared column that holds the WireGuard address for an identity attached to
both protocols -- the exact ambiguity tunnelAllowedIPs was added to resolve
for the edit form. The info and QR modals already hydrate that field, so
they now pass this inbound's own address to the builder.
Also trims the comment blocks in the files touched here to the 2-line
guidance in CLAUDE.md: internal/amneziawg alone carried 423 comment lines in
over-long blocks against 118 for the comparable internal/mtproto, and is now
at 110. Every non-obvious constraint is kept (the kernel S1/S2 rule, why
PostDown is best-effort, why grep -c and not -q, why the fingerprints split
three ways); the narration is gone. Two hot_diff.go comments pointed at an
internal/amneziawgnet package and an injectAmneziawgnetSocks function that
exist nowhere in the tree; the checks themselves are unchanged.
* feat(logs): add an AmneziaWG log view to the overview
The overview has an access-log view for Xray but nothing for AmneziaWG, so
when a tunnel misbehaves there is no way to see it from the panel at all. A
kernel tunnel logs no per-request lines, so the equivalent view is built from
the two things it does expose:
- Live per-peer activity from `awg show <iface> dump`, joined to the client
email through the desired peer set: last handshake, endpoint, allowed IPs,
cumulative transfer and online state, newest handshake first.
- The panel's own AmneziaWG event lines (interface up/down, awg-quick
failures, the pre-3.1 tools warning), which are what actually explain a peer
being absent from the table.
POST /panel/api/server/amneziawglogs/:count serves both, with the same
count + filter contract GetXrayLogs uses, and the modal mirrors XrayLogModal's
toolbar, auto-update, mobile cards and download. The action-bar button is
gated on a new status.amneziawg.configured, which stays true while an inbound
exists but its interface is down -- exactly when the event lines matter.
Verified against a running panel: the endpoint returns the peer table and
real event lines ("awg/awg-quick not found on PATH", "create config dir:
permission denied"), and count and filter both narrow as documented.
One of those lines surfaced a Debugf that had been rendering as
"for inbound1:amneziawg:"; fixed here since it is now user-visible.
* fix(amneziawg): stop double-counting a routed inbound's traffic
injectAmneziawgEgress tags its Xray bridge with the AmneziaWG inbound's own
tag, so the stock Routing page can target it. Xray therefore reports that
bridge's bytes under the inbound's tag, and XrayTrafficJob feeds them to
AddTraffic -- which accumulates -- on top of the same bytes AmneziaWGJob
already reported from `awg show dump`. An inbound with routeThroughXray on
counted roughly twice its real traffic, which also inflates the quota checks
that read the same counters.
The awg counters are the complete measure: every peer, whether or not TPROXY
routed it, and the same wire bytes the per-client totals are built from, so
they stay and the Xray rows are dropped. Per-client stats were never affected
-- a dokodemo-door bridge has no per-user identity, so Xray emits no
user>>>email rows for it.
Filtering happens before every consumer, so the DB totals, the external
traffic inform and the dashboard's live speed all read one source per inbound.
The set of bridge tags now comes from a predicate shared with
injectAmneziawgEgress itself, with a test that pins the two together -- naming
one tag too few doubles the traffic again, one too many makes real traffic
vanish.
* fix(amneziawg): align the three .conf emitters on one peer field order
The panel builds an AmneziaWG client .conf in three independent places, and
they disagreed: buildAmneziaWGClientConfig put PresharedKey right after
PublicKey (wg-quick(8)'s own order, and what both WireGuard emitters on the
clients side already use), while genAmneziaWGConfig and the Go
amneziaWGConfigText put it after Endpoint. A user comparing a subscription
link against a downloaded .conf sees the difference immediately, and the
generators are exactly the kind of parallel implementation CLAUDE.md warns
about drifting.
Moves the two outliers onto the wg-quick order. Also drops the stray trailing
newline that only appeared when PersistentKeepalive was set, so a config now
always ends on its last set field whichever that is -- the same shape all
three emitters produce for the same client.
Parsing is unaffected either way (the format is order-insensitive, and the
AmneziaVPN app reads it as a flat key-value bag), so this changes only the
rendered text. Adds a test on each side that pins the peer block's field
order, since nothing previously asserted it.
* refactor(amneziawg): switch to the embedded amneziawg-go/gVisor architecture
Replaces the kernel-module (DKMS) + awg-quick + TPROXY backend with the
fork's own embedded design: amneziawg-go runs in-process over a userspace
gVisor netstack, and each peer's decapsulated traffic relays into its own
loopback Xray SOCKS5 inbound, so Xray's native stats/sniffing/routing work
for free instead of through hand-rolled bridges. No kernel module, no DKMS,
no Secure Boot conflicts, works the same in a container as on bare metal.
- internal/amneziawgnet: new package (Device/UAPI, gVisor netstack, TCP/UDP
forwarding, SOCKS5 relay, peer identity, IPv6 host-alias egress identity,
per-client port-forwarding) - amneziawg-go v3.1.20260814 + gvisor.
- internal/amneziawg: keep the reusable protocol-shape types/validation
(Instance/Peer/Obfuscation, InstanceFromInbound); drop the OS-shellout
half (awg-quick, TPROXY policy routing, NDP proxy, peer-stats parsing).
- internal/web/service: rewire the 5 integration points (job, runtime,
client-apply, web shutdown, xray config) from the old manager to the new
one; the AmneziaWG log view is rebuilt on the embedded Device's own UAPI
dump (extended to carry endpoint/AllowedIPs) instead of `awg show dump`.
- install.sh: drop DKMS/ndppd/TPROXY/Secure-Boot installer code (~250
lines) - an entire recurring class of installer fragility goes away.
- frontend: drop the now-meaningless routeThroughXray toggle (the relay is
always on); keep the field in the Zod schema, unexposed, so it isn't
silently stripped from stored settings on next save - two regression
tests deliberately depend on the Go struct still carrying it.
- docs/i18n: rewrite amneziawg.mdx for the new architecture; drop the
dead routeThroughXray translation keys across all 13 locales.
Real production throughput (embedded core datapath, isolated bench, same
box the kernel-module path was measured on): ~296 Mbit/s up, ~640 Mbit/s
down, vs. 414.69 MB/s (~3.3 Gbit/s) for the kernel module on the same
hardware - a real gap, tempered by this being single-stream/no-SOCKS5-hop
and most VPN traffic being latency-bound rather than throughput-saturating.
* fix(amneziawg): restore the branch's own Obfuscation31 shape + 2 CodeQL findings
The previous push's wholesale-copy of types.go/params.go from the fork's
main branch pulled in that branch's own independent (and incompatible)
naming for the same AWG 3.1 feature set: Obfuscation20/GenerateObfuscation20
instead of this branch's already-shipped Obfuscation31/GenerateObfuscation31,
and a missing CanonicalizeUintRange -- broke every Go CI job (the whole
matrix fails to compile when any one package doesn't, which is why govulncheck/
golangci/postgres-durable-first/race all failed identically, not just go-test).
Restores params.go/params_test.go verbatim from this branch's own last
commit (a strict superset of validation: it already cross-checks rekey vs.
reject timing windows, which the copied version never did) and folds the
3.0/3.1 fields (HeaderProtectionKey, ContentPaddingAddition, the 5 timing
fields, RandomTrailers/DisableCookies) into Obfuscation31 itself, matching
the original struct exactly instead of as separate top-level Instance
fields. instance.go, the two amneziawgnet call sites, and 7 amneziawgnet
test files updated to match. Also drops the one test (sanitizeConfigValue)
that only ever served the retired kernel-module .conf writer -- correctly
not ported, so the test testing it shouldn't have been copied either.
Also fixes 2 CodeQL findings the same push surfaced: a clamped uint64->int64
conversion for the new log view's live byte counters (server.go), and an
unneeded len+len sum feeding a slice pre-size in the v6-egress outbound
merge (xray.go) -- append already grows correctly without it.
* chore(amneziawg): regenerate frontend schemas for updated doc comments
npm run gen was missed after the previous commit's types.go doc-comment
edits (Obfuscation20 -> Obfuscation31, ValidateHeaderProtection ->
ValidateObfuscation in the prose) -- openapigen bakes those comments
into the generated schema's description field, so the committed
frontend/src/generated/schemas.ts and openapi.json still had the old
wording. codegen's git-diff-exit-code check caught it correctly.
* fix(amneziawg): narrow 2 test fixtures that collided with MaxForwardedPorts
TestCheckForwardedPortsConflict_CollidesWithEnabledInboundPort and
..._NoCollisionWhenPortsDontOverlap used "8000-8100"/"9000-9100" as their
ForwardedPorts fixture -- 101 ports each, one over MaxForwardedPorts (100).
The cap check (checkForwardedPortsConflict, added this session alongside
the SOCKS-phantom-port check) fires first, so both tests got "more than
100 forwarded ports" instead of ever reaching the collision logic they're
actually testing. The cap itself has its own dedicated boundary test
already; these two just needed a narrower range that still covers/misses
port 8080 as intended -- 8075-8085 and 9075-9085, 11 ports each.
* fix(amneziawg): checkAmneziawgnetSocksConflict had no receiver in its new home
My merge-conflict resolution kept this as a method call (s.checkAmneziawgnetSocksConflict)
inside checkPortConflictTx, a plain function with no *InboundService receiver --
upstream's #6225 fix moved the port-conflict check out of the (s *InboundService)
method and into this new tx-scoped free function, and I didn't notice the call
site needed to change shape too. CI caught it immediately (undefined: s); nothing
in this specific package can be locally verified past internal/database's own
unrelated, pre-existing CGO build issue on this dev machine.
Since the signature had to change either way, folded in the fix already flagged
as a separate follow-up: checkAmneziawgnetSocksConflict now takes the caller's
db handle instead of fetching its own via database.GetDB(), so it actually runs
inside the same serialized transaction #6225 introduced -- previously it sat
right next to that race fix without benefiting from it.
* fix: address the review findings on the embedded AmneziaWG PR
5 blocking findings:
- Floor S3/S4 at 12 in both obfuscation generators (Go and frontend) and
reject a hand-edited value below that when HeaderProtectionKey is set --
IpcSet requires it, and ~39% of previously-generated sets violated it
silently.
- Guard PrivateKey/PrimaryDNS/SecondaryDNS/remark against newline injection
in the AmneziaWG .conf builder (both the Go subscription-link path and
the frontend downloadable-config path) -- unguarded, any of them could
inject an arbitrary config line into a subscriber's client.
- Bound the derived AmneziaWG SOCKS relay port to <= 65535 once an
inbound's id is known, and check the reverse direction (does the relay
port collide with an existing inbound's port) on both create and update
-- previously only port -> relay collisions were checked, not relay ->
port.
- Gate injectAmneziawgV6Egress on the same V6AliasesActive predicate
desiredV6Aliases already uses, so the two can't disagree about whether a
peer's IPv6 identity is actually active at the OS level.
2 minor findings:
- Fix the forwarded-ports cap check's off-by-one (a spec covering exactly
the cap was rejected as if it were over it).
- Correct docker-compose.yml's stale comment describing the retired
DKMS/kernel-module architecture.
* chore: retrigger CI
build (armv5) failed on a transient Go module proxy network error
(INTERNAL_ERROR stream reset on sagernet/sing), unrelated to this PR's
changes.
* docs: fix doc comments still describing the retired DKMS/awg-quick design
A few doc comments (and one illustrative test log line) survived the
embedded-architecture cutover unchanged and now contradict the code
they sit next to:
- internal/amneziawg/types.go's package comment claimed this package
still owns a Manager that reconciles OS-level interfaces via
awg-quick/DKMS -- that Manager was removed; the reconcile loop lives
in internal/amneziawgnet now, and this package is protocol-shape-only.
- internal/amneziawg/params.go's ValidateObfuscation/ValidateConfigValue
comments cited "awg-quick up" / "awg-quick executes as root" as the
reason to validate -- the server itself never calls awg-quick in this
architecture; the same value still reaches a real rendered .conf that
a client app or an admin's own awg-quick CLI applies downstream, so
the validation is still warranted, just for a different consumer.
Mirrored the same fix in inbound_amneziawg.go's matching comment and
its test's comment.
- internal/amneziawgnet/manager.go's Manager doc comments (x3) pointed
readers at "internal/amneziawg.Manager" for comparison -- that type no
longer exists in this diff at all. Repointed at internal/mtproto.Manager,
the pattern this was actually modeled on and the one that's still real.
- Swapped one test's illustrative "awg-quick up awg2 failed" log line for
a message shaped like this architecture's actual amneziawgnet logging,
so a reader skimming the test doesn't wonder whether the server still
shells out to awg-quick.
No behavior change.
* fix(docs): re-run codegen for xray-settings.mdx after conflict merge
The automated conflict-resolution hand-merge for this generated file
was content-correct but didn't byte-match a real regen (different
YAML long-string folding style). Re-ran npm run gen + docs' gen:api
and kept that canonical output instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(amneziawg): drop the dead access-log email backfill
amneziawgEmailIndex keyed peers by "<tag>|<tunnel IP>", a scheme built
for the retired TPROXY bridge where the peer's decapsulated tunnel
address survived as the access log's from-address. The embedded
architecture relays through a loopback SOCKS5 dial, so every AmneziaWG
log line's from-address is 127.0.0.1:<ephemeral> and the lookup could
never match: the index was rebuilt on every log view just to miss.
Remove the index, its GetXrayLogs wiring and its test. If per-line
emails are wanted back, the relay would have to publish a
local-port->email registry for the viewer to resolve loopback sources.
* fix(api): generate AmneziaWGLogs/PeerActivity schemas instead of hand-writing them
The amneziawglogs endpoint's response structs were missing from
openapigen's StructAllow, so they were silently absent from every
generated schema/example, the endpoints.ts entry carried a hand-written
response, and AmneziaWGLogModal.tsx duplicated the shapes as local
interfaces - the exact drift the allowlist rule exists to prevent.
Allowlist both structs with example tags, point the endpoint at the
generated schema, import the generated types in the modal, and sync
docs/public/openapi.json.
* chore(amneziawg): drop the unreferenced quiccapture package
Nothing imports internal/amneziawg/quiccapture and no route exposes it;
its package doc justifies the code as a port of
frontend/src/lib/xray/i1Generators.ts, which does not exist in this
repository, and promises an API round-trip that also does not exist.
1,110 lines of unreachable code with misleading provenance claims.
Revert this commit to bring the package back when the live-capture I1
feature and its frontend counterpart actually land.
* fix(clients): re-run cross-inbound conflict checks on the serialized writer
The new client-level checks - cross-inbound AllowedIPs collisions and
AmneziaWG forwardedPorts conflicts - read a fresh DB snapshot, decide,
and only then enter runSerializedTx, while lockInbound only serializes
writers on the SAME inbound. Two concurrent client creates on two
different tunnel inbounds both passed the read and both committed,
yielding two peers with one address: the exact check-then-claim race
81cfd857 (#6225) closed for AddInbound, which this PR's own
checkAmneziawgnetSocksReverseConflict already cites. Keep the pre-tx
pass for fail-fast UX and re-validate inside the transaction, where the
single writer makes the answer authoritative. The race test drives two
goroutines at two inbounds and demands exactly one winner; it fails
with committed=2 when the in-tx re-check is removed.
* fix(amneziawg): hot-apply depletion disables like mtproto does
applyTrafficMutationBatch special-cases MTProto so a quota/expiry
depletion cuts the sidecar immediately, but AmneziaWG fell through to
runtime AddUser/RemoveUser - explicit no-ops for this protocol - so a
depleted peer kept tunneling until the next 10s reconcile tick. Route
it through applyLocalAmneziaWG, whose own contract (re-read committed
settings, filter depleted clients, push to the interface) is exactly
this case; the comment claiming it mirrors applyLocalMtproto is now
true for the depletion path too.
* fix(amneziawg): persist cleared DNS fields instead of resurrecting defaults
PrimaryDNS/SecondaryDNS marshaled with omitempty, so clearing them
persisted settings with no key at all - and the frontend re-parses
stored settings through a Zod schema whose .default('8.8.8.8') /
.default('8.8.4.4') fire on missing keys, silently repopulating the
form on every load and re-persisting the defaults on the next save.
Blank is a documented, meaningful state (no DNS line in client
configs); drop omitempty so a cleared value survives the round-trip.
The regression test normalizes a server block with cleared DNS and
fails when the keys are dropped.
* fix(amneziawg): accept cleared numeric obfuscation/subnet fields in the form
AntD InputNumber emits null when cleared, Zod .default() only replaces
undefined, and unlike wireguard.ts - whose optionalClearedInt comment
documents exactly this failure mode - the AmneziaWG schema declared
subnetCidr and jc/jmin/jmax/s1-s4 as bare z.number() defaults. Clearing
any of the eight fields made safeParse reject the null and block the
save until the user retyped a value. Absorb null into undefined while
keeping each field's schema default, so a cleared field refills its
documented default and legacy blobs with absent keys behave as before.
* fix(amneziawg): guard the third .conf emitter against newline injection
The review-round fix added the newline guard to amneziaWGConfigText (Go)
and buildAmneziaWGClientConfig, but genAmneziaWGConfig in inbound-link.ts
- the third of the three emitters its own comment says must not drift -
still rendered privateKey/primaryDns/secondaryDns/remark unescaped, so a
newline there injected a config line (e.g. a rogue PostUp) into the
inbound form's downloaded .conf. Add the same guard, plus the regression
tests the original fix shipped without: all four fields on the Go and
both frontend emitters go red if any guard is removed.
* test(amneziawg): pin the S3/S4 floors the TS drift guard claims to mirror
The test's docstring says it mirrors internal/amneziawg/params_test.go,
but it asserted S3>=8/S4>=4 while the Go test and both generators pin
12/12 - the floor ValidateObfuscation enforces whenever a header
protection key is set, which this generator always sets. A regression
narrowing the TS floors into 8-11/4-11 would have passed the drift
guard and produced configs the backend rejects on save.
* docs: restore the pia repo-map entry and document the AmneziaWG subsystem
Merging main dropped CLAUDE.md's internal/pia/ bullet (added by #6272)
while resolving the repo-map conflict - the package itself is untouched.
Restore it, add the missing map entries for the two packages this branch
introduces (internal/amneziawg/, internal/amneziawgnet/), bump the cron
count, and give amneziawg_job its row in architecture.md's 5.4 table.
* chore(amneziawg): correct comments stranded by the architecture pivot
ae77c7e9's cutover to the embedded gVisor path deleted the kernel-module
code but left several comments describing it in the present tense:
hot_diff.go cited the removed service.amneziawgEgressStreamSettings and
wrongly claimed AmneziaWG is the only sockopt.tproxy source (tunnel's
TProxy mode is the live one the guard protects), socks_config.go pointed
at the deleted EgressBasePort/EgressPortForInbound, manager.go referred
to the deleted Manager and its fingerprinting as live code, web.go's
cron registration claimed the job scrapes traffic (its own doc says it
does not), and types.go capped ContentPaddingAddition at uint16 when
validation and upstream both use uint32.
* style(lint): satisfy gofumpt/goimports so make verify is green
json_service.go's two 'Tag: "proxy"}' literals came in with main's own
cc245a90 formatting commit and fail the repo's gofumpt gate for everyone;
the import grouping in inbound_amneziawg.go is from the serialized-writer
fix on this branch.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Sanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
1758 lines
79 KiB
Bash
1758 lines
79 KiB
Bash
#!/bin/bash
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red='\033[0;31m'
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green='\033[0;32m'
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blue='\033[0;34m'
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yellow='\033[0;33m'
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plain='\033[0m'
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xui_folder="${XUI_MAIN_FOLDER:=/usr/local/x-ui}"
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xui_service="${XUI_SERVICE:=/etc/systemd/system}"
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# check root
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[[ $EUID -ne 0 ]] && echo -e "${red}Fatal error: ${plain} Please run this script with root privilege \n " && exit 1
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# Check OS and set release variable
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if [[ -f /etc/os-release ]]; then
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source /etc/os-release
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release=$ID
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elif [[ -f /usr/lib/os-release ]]; then
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source /usr/lib/os-release
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release=$ID
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else
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echo "Failed to check the system OS, please contact the author!" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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echo "The OS release is: $release"
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arch() {
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case "$(uname -m)" in
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x86_64 | x64 | amd64) echo 'amd64' ;;
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i*86 | x86) echo '386' ;;
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armv8* | armv8 | arm64 | aarch64) echo 'arm64' ;;
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armv7* | armv7 | arm) echo 'armv7' ;;
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armv6* | armv6) echo 'armv6' ;;
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armv5* | armv5) echo 'armv5' ;;
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s390x) echo 's390x' ;;
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*) echo -e "${green}Unsupported CPU architecture! ${plain}" && rm -f "$(realpath "$0")" && exit 1 ;;
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esac
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}
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echo "Arch: $(arch)"
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# Non-interactive mode: triggered explicitly via XUI_NONINTERACTIVE=1, or
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# implicitly when stdin is not a TTY (e.g. `curl ... | bash`, cloud-init).
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# In this mode every prompt below is replaced by an env var or a sane default.
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if [[ "${XUI_NONINTERACTIVE:-0}" == "1" ]] || [[ ! -t 0 ]]; then
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NONINTERACTIVE=1
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else
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NONINTERACTIVE=0
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fi
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export NONINTERACTIVE
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# Simple helpers
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is_ipv4() {
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[[ "$1" =~ ^([0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}$ ]] && return 0 || return 1
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}
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is_ipv6() {
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[[ "$1" =~ : ]] && return 0 || return 1
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}
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is_ip() {
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is_ipv4 "$1" || is_ipv6 "$1"
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}
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is_domain() {
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[[ "$1" =~ ^([A-Za-z0-9](-*[A-Za-z0-9])*\.)+(xn--[a-z0-9]{2,}|[A-Za-z]{2,})$ ]] && return 0 || return 1
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}
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# acme.sh's standalone server binds IPv4 by default; --listen-v6 makes it
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# v6-only, which breaks HTTP-01 validation when the domain's A record points
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# at this host's IPv4 (#4994). Only force IPv6 when the host has no global
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# IPv4 address at all.
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acme_listen_flag() {
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if ip -4 addr show scope global 2> /dev/null | grep -q "inet "; then
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echo ""
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else
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echo "--listen-v6"
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fi
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}
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# Port helpers
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is_port_in_use() {
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local port="$1"
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if command -v ss > /dev/null 2>&1; then
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ss -ltn 2> /dev/null | awk -v p=":${port}$" '$4 ~ p {exit 0} END {exit 1}'
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return
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fi
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if command -v netstat > /dev/null 2>&1; then
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netstat -lnt 2> /dev/null | awk -v p=":${port} " '$4 ~ p {exit 0} END {exit 1}'
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return
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fi
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if command -v lsof > /dev/null 2>&1; then
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lsof -nP -iTCP:${port} -sTCP:LISTEN > /dev/null 2>&1 && return 0
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fi
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return 1
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}
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install_base() {
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case "${release}" in
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ubuntu | debian | armbian)
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apt-get update && apt-get install -y -q cron curl tar tzdata socat ca-certificates openssl
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;;
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fedora | amzn | virtuozzo | rhel | almalinux | rocky | ol)
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dnf makecache -y && dnf install -y -q cronie curl tar tzdata socat ca-certificates openssl
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;;
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centos)
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if [[ "${VERSION_ID}" =~ ^7 ]]; then
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yum makecache -y && yum install -y cronie curl tar tzdata socat ca-certificates openssl
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else
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dnf makecache -y && dnf install -y -q cronie curl tar tzdata socat ca-certificates openssl
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fi
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;;
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arch | manjaro | parch)
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pacman -Sy --noconfirm cronie curl tar tzdata socat ca-certificates openssl
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;;
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opensuse-tumbleweed | opensuse-leap)
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zypper refresh && zypper -q install -y cron curl tar timezone socat ca-certificates openssl
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;;
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alpine)
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apk update && apk add dcron curl tar tzdata socat ca-certificates openssl
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;;
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*)
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apt-get update && apt-get install -y -q cron curl tar tzdata socat ca-certificates openssl
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;;
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esac
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}
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gen_random_string() {
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local length="$1"
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openssl rand -base64 $((length * 2)) \
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| tr -dc 'a-zA-Z0-9' \
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| head -c "$length"
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}
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# prompt_or_default VARNAME "prompt text" "default" [ENV_NAME]
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# Interactive: read into VARNAME. Non-interactive: VARNAME = ${ENV_NAME:-default}.
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# ENV_NAME defaults to VARNAME when omitted. Keeps every interactive prompt
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# string byte-for-byte identical to the original `read -rp`.
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prompt_or_default() {
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local __var="$1" __prompt="$2" __default="$3" __env="${4:-$1}"
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if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]]; then
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printf -v "$__var" '%s' "${!__env:-$__default}"
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else
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# shellcheck disable=SC2229
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read -rp "$__prompt" "$__var"
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fi
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}
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|
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# write_install_result <user> <pass> <port> <webpath> <scheme> <host> <token> <dbtype>
|
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# Persists a parseable, root-only credentials file consumed by cloud-init/MOTD.
|
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# Values are written with printf '%q' so a pinned password/username containing
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# spaces, quotes, $(...) or backticks is shell-escaped and the file stays safely
|
|
# source-able (consumers do '. install-result.env'). For the alphanumeric random
|
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# values gen_random_string emits, %q is a no-op. This is a DIFFERENT file from the
|
|
# Postgres env file (/etc/default/x-ui).
|
|
write_install_result() {
|
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local u="$1" p="$2" port="$3" wbp="$4" scheme="$5" host="$6" token="$7" dbtype="$8"
|
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local result_file="/etc/x-ui/install-result.env"
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local url_host="${host:-SERVER_IP_UNKNOWN}"
|
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install -d -m 755 /etc/x-ui 2> /dev/null
|
|
local prev_umask
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prev_umask=$(umask)
|
|
umask 077
|
|
if ! {
|
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printf 'XUI_USERNAME=%q\n' "$u"
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printf 'XUI_PASSWORD=%q\n' "$p"
|
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printf 'XUI_PANEL_PORT=%q\n' "$port"
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printf 'XUI_WEB_BASE_PATH=%q\n' "$wbp"
|
|
printf 'XUI_ACCESS_URL=%q\n' "${scheme}://${url_host}:${port}/${wbp}"
|
|
printf 'XUI_API_TOKEN=%q\n' "$token"
|
|
printf 'XUI_DB_TYPE=%q\n' "$dbtype"
|
|
} > "$result_file"; then
|
|
umask "$prev_umask"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Warning: failed to write ${result_file}.${plain}" >&2
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
umask "$prev_umask"
|
|
chmod 600 "$result_file" 2> /dev/null
|
|
chown root:root "$result_file" 2> /dev/null || true
|
|
echo -e "${green}Install result written to ${result_file} (mode 600).${plain}"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# RHEL-family initdb writes pg_hba.conf host rules with ident auth, which
|
|
# compares the OS username against the Postgres role and always rejects the
|
|
# randomly generated panel role over TCP (#5806). Prepend password-auth rules
|
|
# scoped to the panel database; first match wins, and md5 also accepts
|
|
# scram-sha-256-stored verifiers, so this works on every supported distro.
|
|
pg_ensure_hba_password_auth() {
|
|
local pg_db="$1"
|
|
local hba_file
|
|
hba_file=$(sudo -u postgres psql -tAc 'SHOW hba_file' 2> /dev/null | tr -d '[:space:]')
|
|
[[ -n "${hba_file}" && -f "${hba_file}" ]] || return 0
|
|
grep -Eq "^host[[:space:]]+${pg_db}[[:space:]]" "${hba_file}" && return 0
|
|
local tmp
|
|
tmp=$(mktemp) || return 1
|
|
{
|
|
echo "# Added by 3x-ui: allow password logins for the panel database."
|
|
echo "host ${pg_db} all 127.0.0.1/32 md5"
|
|
echo "host ${pg_db} all ::1/128 md5"
|
|
cat "${hba_file}"
|
|
} > "${tmp}" || {
|
|
rm -f "${tmp}"
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
cat "${tmp}" > "${hba_file}" || {
|
|
rm -f "${tmp}"
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
rm -f "${tmp}"
|
|
sudo -u postgres psql -tAc 'SELECT pg_reload_conf()' > /dev/null 2>&1 || true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
install_postgres_local() {
|
|
local pg_user pg_pass
|
|
pg_pass=$(gen_random_string 24)
|
|
local pg_db="xui"
|
|
local pg_host="127.0.0.1"
|
|
local pg_port="5432"
|
|
|
|
case "${release}" in
|
|
ubuntu | debian | armbian)
|
|
apt-get update >&2 && apt-get install -y -q postgresql >&2 || return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
fedora | amzn | virtuozzo | rhel | almalinux | rocky | ol)
|
|
dnf install -y -q postgresql-server postgresql-contrib >&2 || return 1
|
|
[[ -d /var/lib/pgsql/data && -f /var/lib/pgsql/data/PG_VERSION ]] || postgresql-setup --initdb >&2 || return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
centos)
|
|
if [[ "${VERSION_ID}" =~ ^7 ]]; then
|
|
yum install -y postgresql-server postgresql-contrib >&2 || return 1
|
|
else
|
|
dnf install -y -q postgresql-server postgresql-contrib >&2 || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -d /var/lib/pgsql/data && -f /var/lib/pgsql/data/PG_VERSION ]] || postgresql-setup --initdb >&2 || return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
arch | manjaro | parch)
|
|
pacman -Sy --noconfirm postgresql >&2 || return 1
|
|
if [[ ! -f /var/lib/postgres/data/PG_VERSION ]]; then
|
|
sudo -u postgres initdb -D /var/lib/postgres/data >&2 || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
opensuse-tumbleweed | opensuse-leap)
|
|
zypper -q install -y postgresql-server postgresql-contrib >&2 || return 1
|
|
if [[ ! -f /var/lib/pgsql/data/PG_VERSION ]]; then
|
|
install -d -o postgres -g postgres -m 700 /var/lib/pgsql/data >&2 || return 1
|
|
su - postgres -c "initdb -D /var/lib/pgsql/data" >&2 || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
alpine)
|
|
apk add --no-cache postgresql postgresql-contrib >&2 || return 1
|
|
if [[ ! -f /var/lib/postgresql/data/PG_VERSION ]]; then
|
|
/etc/init.d/postgresql setup >&2 || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
rc-update add postgresql default >&2 2> /dev/null || true
|
|
rc-service postgresql start >&2 || return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
echo -e "${red}Unsupported distro for automatic PostgreSQL install: ${release}${plain}" >&2
|
|
return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
if [[ "${release}" != "alpine" ]]; then
|
|
systemctl enable --now postgresql >&2 || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Wait briefly for the server to accept connections.
|
|
local i
|
|
for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do
|
|
sudo -u postgres psql -tAc 'SELECT 1' > /dev/null 2>&1 && break
|
|
sleep 1
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
local existing_owner=""
|
|
existing_owner=$(sudo -u postgres psql -tAc \
|
|
"SELECT pg_catalog.pg_get_userbyid(datdba) FROM pg_database WHERE datname='${pg_db}'" 2> /dev/null \
|
|
| tr -d '[:space:]')
|
|
if [[ -n "${existing_owner}" && "${existing_owner}" != "postgres" ]]; then
|
|
pg_user="${existing_owner}"
|
|
else
|
|
pg_user=$(gen_random_string 8)
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Idempotent role/db creation. Identifiers are double-quoted because a
|
|
# random username may start with a digit, which Postgres rejects unquoted.
|
|
sudo -u postgres psql -tAc "SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname='${pg_user}'" 2> /dev/null \
|
|
| grep -q 1 \
|
|
|| sudo -u postgres psql -c "CREATE USER \"${pg_user}\" WITH PASSWORD '${pg_pass}';" >&2 || return 1
|
|
|
|
sudo -u postgres psql -tAc "SELECT 1 FROM pg_database WHERE datname='${pg_db}'" 2> /dev/null \
|
|
| grep -q 1 \
|
|
|| sudo -u postgres psql -c "CREATE DATABASE \"${pg_db}\" OWNER \"${pg_user}\";" >&2 || return 1
|
|
|
|
sudo -u postgres psql -c "ALTER USER \"${pg_user}\" WITH PASSWORD '${pg_pass}';" >&2 || return 1
|
|
|
|
pg_ensure_hba_password_auth "${pg_db}" \
|
|
|| echo -e "${yellow}Warning: could not update pg_hba.conf; PostgreSQL may reject the panel's TCP login (ident auth).${plain}" >&2
|
|
|
|
local pg_pass_enc
|
|
pg_pass_enc=$(printf '%s' "${pg_pass}" | sed -e 's/%/%25/g' -e 's/:/%3A/g' -e 's/@/%40/g' -e 's|/|%2F|g' -e 's/?/%3F/g' -e 's/#/%23/g')
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "${PG_CRED_FILE:-}" ]]; then
|
|
local prev_umask
|
|
prev_umask=$(umask)
|
|
umask 077
|
|
if ! cat > "${PG_CRED_FILE}" << EOF; then
|
|
PG_USER=${pg_user}
|
|
PG_PASS=${pg_pass}
|
|
PG_HOST=${pg_host}
|
|
PG_PORT=${pg_port}
|
|
PG_DB=${pg_db}
|
|
EOF
|
|
umask "${prev_umask}"
|
|
echo -e "${red}Failed to write PostgreSQL credentials to ${PG_CRED_FILE}${plain}" >&2
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
umask "${prev_umask}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
echo "postgres://${pg_user}:${pg_pass_enc}@${pg_host}:${pg_port}/${pg_db}?sslmode=disable"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ensure_pg_client() {
|
|
if command -v pg_dump > /dev/null 2>&1 && command -v pg_restore > /dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Installing PostgreSQL client tools (pg_dump/pg_restore) for in-panel backup...${plain}" >&2
|
|
case "${release}" in
|
|
ubuntu | debian | armbian)
|
|
apt-get update >&2 && apt-get install -y -q postgresql-client >&2 || return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
fedora | amzn | virtuozzo | rhel | almalinux | rocky | ol)
|
|
dnf install -y -q postgresql >&2 || return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
centos)
|
|
if [[ "${VERSION_ID}" =~ ^7 ]]; then
|
|
yum install -y postgresql >&2 || return 1
|
|
else
|
|
dnf install -y -q postgresql >&2 || return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
arch | manjaro | parch)
|
|
pacman -Sy --noconfirm postgresql >&2 || return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
opensuse-tumbleweed | opensuse-leap)
|
|
zypper -q install -y postgresql >&2 || return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
alpine)
|
|
apk add --no-cache postgresql-client >&2 || return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
command -v pg_dump > /dev/null 2>&1 && command -v pg_restore > /dev/null 2>&1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
install_acme() {
|
|
echo -e "${green}Installing acme.sh for SSL certificate management...${plain}"
|
|
cd ~ || return 1
|
|
curl -s https://get.acme.sh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1
|
|
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Failed to install acme.sh${plain}"
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${green}acme.sh installed successfully${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
setup_ssl_certificate() {
|
|
local domain="$1"
|
|
local server_ip="$2"
|
|
local existing_port="$3"
|
|
local existing_webBasePath="$4"
|
|
|
|
echo -e "${green}Setting up SSL certificate...${plain}"
|
|
|
|
# Check if acme.sh is installed
|
|
if ! command -v ~/.acme.sh/acme.sh &> /dev/null; then
|
|
install_acme
|
|
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Failed to install acme.sh, skipping SSL setup${plain}"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Create certificate directory
|
|
local certPath="/root/cert/${domain}"
|
|
mkdir -p "$certPath"
|
|
|
|
# Issue certificate
|
|
echo -e "${green}Issuing SSL certificate for ${domain}...${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Note: Port 80 must be open and accessible from the internet${plain}"
|
|
|
|
~/.acme.sh/acme.sh --set-default-ca --server letsencrypt --force > /dev/null 2>&1
|
|
~/.acme.sh/acme.sh --issue -d ${domain} $(acme_listen_flag) --standalone --httpport 80 --force
|
|
|
|
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Failed to issue certificate for ${domain}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Please ensure port 80 is open and try again later with: x-ui${plain}"
|
|
rm -rf ~/.acme.sh/${domain} ~/.acme.sh/${domain}_ecc 2> /dev/null
|
|
rm -rf "$certPath" 2> /dev/null
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Install certificate
|
|
~/.acme.sh/acme.sh --installcert --force -d ${domain} \
|
|
--key-file /root/cert/${domain}/privkey.pem \
|
|
--fullchain-file /root/cert/${domain}/fullchain.pem \
|
|
--reloadcmd "systemctl restart x-ui" > /dev/null 2>&1
|
|
|
|
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Failed to install certificate${plain}"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Enable auto-renew
|
|
~/.acme.sh/acme.sh --upgrade --auto-upgrade > /dev/null 2>&1
|
|
# Secure permissions: private key readable only by owner
|
|
chmod 600 $certPath/privkey.pem 2> /dev/null
|
|
chmod 644 $certPath/fullchain.pem 2> /dev/null
|
|
|
|
# Set certificate for panel
|
|
local webCertFile="/root/cert/${domain}/fullchain.pem"
|
|
local webKeyFile="/root/cert/${domain}/privkey.pem"
|
|
|
|
if [[ -f "$webCertFile" && -f "$webKeyFile" ]]; then
|
|
${xui_folder}/x-ui cert -webCert "$webCertFile" -webCertKey "$webKeyFile" > /dev/null 2>&1
|
|
echo -e "${green}SSL certificate installed and configured successfully!${plain}"
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Certificate files not found${plain}"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Issue Let's Encrypt IP certificate with shortlived profile (~6 days validity)
|
|
# Requires acme.sh and port 80 open for HTTP-01 challenge
|
|
setup_ip_certificate() {
|
|
local ipv4="$1"
|
|
local ipv6="$2" # optional
|
|
|
|
echo -e "${green}Setting up Let's Encrypt IP certificate (shortlived profile)...${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Note: IP certificates are valid for ~6 days and will auto-renew.${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Default listener is port 80. If you choose another port, ensure external port 80 forwards to it.${plain}"
|
|
|
|
# Check for acme.sh
|
|
if ! command -v ~/.acme.sh/acme.sh &> /dev/null; then
|
|
install_acme
|
|
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Failed to install acme.sh${plain}"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Validate IP address
|
|
if [[ -z "$ipv4" ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}IPv4 address is required${plain}"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if ! is_ipv4 "$ipv4"; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Invalid IPv4 address: $ipv4${plain}"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Create certificate directory
|
|
local certDir="/root/cert/ip"
|
|
mkdir -p "$certDir"
|
|
|
|
# Build domain arguments
|
|
local domain_args="-d ${ipv4}"
|
|
if [[ -n "$ipv6" ]] && is_ipv6 "$ipv6"; then
|
|
domain_args="${domain_args} -d ${ipv6}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Including IPv6 address: ${ipv6}${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Set reload command for auto-renewal (add || true so it doesn't fail during first install)
|
|
local reloadCmd="systemctl restart x-ui 2>/dev/null || rc-service x-ui restart 2>/dev/null || true"
|
|
|
|
# Choose port for HTTP-01 listener (default 80, prompt override)
|
|
local WebPort=""
|
|
prompt_or_default WebPort "Port to use for ACME HTTP-01 listener (default 80): " "80" XUI_ACME_HTTP_PORT
|
|
WebPort="${WebPort:-80}"
|
|
if ! [[ "${WebPort}" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || ((WebPort < 1 || WebPort > 65535)); then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Invalid port provided. Falling back to 80.${plain}"
|
|
WebPort=80
|
|
fi
|
|
echo -e "${green}Using port ${WebPort} for standalone validation.${plain}"
|
|
if [[ "${WebPort}" -ne 80 ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Reminder: Let's Encrypt still connects on port 80; forward external port 80 to ${WebPort}.${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Ensure chosen port is available
|
|
while true; do
|
|
if is_port_in_use "${WebPort}"; then
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Port ${WebPort} is in use.${plain}"
|
|
|
|
local alt_port=""
|
|
if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Port ${WebPort} is busy; cannot proceed in non-interactive mode.${plain}"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
read -rp "Enter another port for acme.sh standalone listener (leave empty to abort): " alt_port
|
|
alt_port="${alt_port// /}"
|
|
if [[ -z "${alt_port}" ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Port ${WebPort} is busy; cannot proceed.${plain}"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if ! [[ "${alt_port}" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || ((alt_port < 1 || alt_port > 65535)); then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Invalid port provided.${plain}"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
WebPort="${alt_port}"
|
|
continue
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${green}Port ${WebPort} is free and ready for standalone validation.${plain}"
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# Issue certificate with shortlived profile
|
|
echo -e "${green}Issuing IP certificate for ${ipv4}...${plain}"
|
|
~/.acme.sh/acme.sh --set-default-ca --server letsencrypt --force > /dev/null 2>&1
|
|
[[ -n "${XUI_ACME_EMAIL:-}" ]] && ~/.acme.sh/acme.sh --register-account -m "${XUI_ACME_EMAIL}" > /dev/null 2>&1
|
|
|
|
~/.acme.sh/acme.sh --issue \
|
|
${domain_args} \
|
|
--standalone \
|
|
--server letsencrypt \
|
|
--certificate-profile shortlived \
|
|
--days 6 \
|
|
--httpport ${WebPort} \
|
|
--force
|
|
|
|
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Failed to issue IP certificate${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Please ensure port ${WebPort} is reachable (or forwarded from external port 80)${plain}"
|
|
# Cleanup acme.sh data for both IPv4 and IPv6 if specified
|
|
rm -rf ~/.acme.sh/${ipv4} ~/.acme.sh/${ipv4}_ecc 2> /dev/null
|
|
[[ -n "$ipv6" ]] && rm -rf ~/.acme.sh/${ipv6} ~/.acme.sh/${ipv6}_ecc 2> /dev/null
|
|
rm -rf ${certDir} 2> /dev/null
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
echo -e "${green}Certificate issued successfully, installing...${plain}"
|
|
|
|
# Install certificate
|
|
# Note: acme.sh may report "Reload error" and exit non-zero if reloadcmd fails,
|
|
# but the cert files are still installed. We check for files instead of exit code.
|
|
~/.acme.sh/acme.sh --installcert --force -d ${ipv4} \
|
|
--key-file "${certDir}/privkey.pem" \
|
|
--fullchain-file "${certDir}/fullchain.pem" \
|
|
--reloadcmd "${reloadCmd}" 2>&1 || true
|
|
|
|
# Verify certificate files exist (don't rely on exit code - reloadcmd failure causes non-zero)
|
|
if [[ ! -f "${certDir}/fullchain.pem" || ! -f "${certDir}/privkey.pem" ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Certificate files not found after installation${plain}"
|
|
# Cleanup acme.sh data for both IPv4 and IPv6 if specified
|
|
rm -rf ~/.acme.sh/${ipv4} ~/.acme.sh/${ipv4}_ecc 2> /dev/null
|
|
[[ -n "$ipv6" ]] && rm -rf ~/.acme.sh/${ipv6} ~/.acme.sh/${ipv6}_ecc 2> /dev/null
|
|
rm -rf ${certDir} 2> /dev/null
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
echo -e "${green}Certificate files installed successfully${plain}"
|
|
|
|
# Enable auto-upgrade for acme.sh (ensures cron job runs)
|
|
~/.acme.sh/acme.sh --upgrade --auto-upgrade > /dev/null 2>&1
|
|
|
|
# Secure permissions: private key readable only by owner
|
|
chmod 600 ${certDir}/privkey.pem 2> /dev/null
|
|
chmod 644 ${certDir}/fullchain.pem 2> /dev/null
|
|
|
|
# Configure panel to use the certificate
|
|
echo -e "${green}Setting certificate paths for the panel...${plain}"
|
|
${xui_folder}/x-ui cert -webCert "${certDir}/fullchain.pem" -webCertKey "${certDir}/privkey.pem"
|
|
|
|
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Warning: Could not set certificate paths automatically${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Certificate files are at:${plain}"
|
|
echo -e " Cert: ${certDir}/fullchain.pem"
|
|
echo -e " Key: ${certDir}/privkey.pem"
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${green}Certificate paths configured successfully${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
echo -e "${green}IP certificate installed and configured successfully!${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Certificate valid for ~6 days, auto-renews via acme.sh cron job.${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}acme.sh will automatically renew and reload x-ui before expiry.${plain}"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Comprehensive manual SSL certificate issuance via acme.sh
|
|
ssl_cert_issue() {
|
|
local existing_webBasePath=$(${xui_folder}/x-ui setting -show true | grep 'webBasePath:' | awk -F': ' '{print $2}' | tr -d '[:space:]' | sed 's#^/##')
|
|
local existing_port=$(${xui_folder}/x-ui setting -show true | grep 'port:' | awk -F': ' '{print $2}' | tr -d '[:space:]')
|
|
|
|
# check for acme.sh first
|
|
if ! command -v ~/.acme.sh/acme.sh &> /dev/null; then
|
|
echo "acme.sh could not be found. Installing now..."
|
|
cd ~ || return 1
|
|
curl -s https://get.acme.sh | sh
|
|
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Failed to install acme.sh${plain}"
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${green}acme.sh installed successfully${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# get the domain here, and we need to verify it
|
|
local domain=""
|
|
if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]]; then
|
|
domain="${XUI_DOMAIN// /}"
|
|
if [[ -z "$domain" ]] || ! is_domain "$domain"; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}XUI_SSL_MODE=domain requires a valid XUI_DOMAIN (got: '${XUI_DOMAIN:-}').${plain}"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
while true; do
|
|
read -rp "Please enter your domain name: " domain
|
|
domain="${domain// /}" # Trim whitespace
|
|
|
|
if [[ -z "$domain" ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Domain name cannot be empty. Please try again.${plain}"
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if ! is_domain "$domain"; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Invalid domain format: ${domain}. Please enter a valid domain name.${plain}"
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
break
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
echo -e "${green}Your domain is: ${domain}, checking it...${plain}"
|
|
SSL_ISSUED_DOMAIN="${domain}"
|
|
|
|
# detect existing certificate and reuse it only if its files are actually
|
|
# present and non-empty. acme.sh stores ECC certs under ${domain}_ecc and RSA
|
|
# certs under ${domain}; a failed issuance can leave a domain entry in --list
|
|
# with no usable cert files, which must not be reused (it produces a 0-byte
|
|
# fullchain.pem). Broken partial state is cleaned up so issuance can proceed.
|
|
local cert_exists=0
|
|
if ~/.acme.sh/acme.sh --list 2> /dev/null | awk '{print $1}' | grep -Fxq "${domain}"; then
|
|
local acmeCertDir=""
|
|
if [[ -s ~/.acme.sh/${domain}_ecc/fullchain.cer && -s ~/.acme.sh/${domain}_ecc/${domain}.key ]]; then
|
|
acmeCertDir=~/.acme.sh/${domain}_ecc
|
|
elif [[ -s ~/.acme.sh/${domain}/fullchain.cer && -s ~/.acme.sh/${domain}/${domain}.key ]]; then
|
|
acmeCertDir=~/.acme.sh/${domain}
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -n "${acmeCertDir}" ]]; then
|
|
cert_exists=1
|
|
local certInfo=$(~/.acme.sh/acme.sh --list 2> /dev/null | grep -F "${domain}")
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Existing certificate found for ${domain}, will reuse it.${plain}"
|
|
[[ -n "${certInfo}" ]] && echo "$certInfo"
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Found incomplete acme.sh state for ${domain} (no valid certificate files); cleaning it up and re-issuing.${plain}"
|
|
rm -rf ~/.acme.sh/${domain} ~/.acme.sh/${domain}_ecc
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ${cert_exists} -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${green}Your domain is ready for issuing certificates now...${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# create a directory for the certificate
|
|
certPath="/root/cert/${domain}"
|
|
if [ ! -d "$certPath" ]; then
|
|
mkdir -p "$certPath"
|
|
else
|
|
rm -rf "$certPath"
|
|
mkdir -p "$certPath"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# get the port number for the standalone server
|
|
local WebPort=80
|
|
prompt_or_default WebPort "Please choose which port to use (default is 80): " "80" XUI_ACME_HTTP_PORT
|
|
if [[ -z ${WebPort} ]]; then
|
|
WebPort=80
|
|
elif [[ ! ${WebPort} =~ ^[1-9][0-9]*$ || ${WebPort} -gt 65535 ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Your input ${WebPort} is invalid, will use default port 80.${plain}"
|
|
WebPort=80
|
|
fi
|
|
echo -e "${green}Will use port: ${WebPort} to issue certificates. Please make sure this port is open.${plain}"
|
|
|
|
# Stop panel temporarily
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Stopping panel temporarily...${plain}"
|
|
systemctl stop x-ui 2> /dev/null || rc-service x-ui stop 2> /dev/null
|
|
|
|
if [[ ${cert_exists} -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
# issue the certificate
|
|
~/.acme.sh/acme.sh --set-default-ca --server letsencrypt --force
|
|
[[ -n "${XUI_ACME_EMAIL:-}" ]] && ~/.acme.sh/acme.sh --register-account -m "${XUI_ACME_EMAIL}" > /dev/null 2>&1
|
|
~/.acme.sh/acme.sh --issue -d ${domain} $(acme_listen_flag) --standalone --httpport ${WebPort} --force
|
|
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Issuing certificate failed, please check logs.${plain}"
|
|
rm -rf ~/.acme.sh/${domain} ~/.acme.sh/${domain}_ecc
|
|
systemctl start x-ui 2> /dev/null || rc-service x-ui start 2> /dev/null
|
|
return 1
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${green}Issuing certificate succeeded, installing certificates...${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${green}Using existing certificate, installing certificates...${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Setup reload command
|
|
reloadCmd="systemctl restart x-ui || rc-service x-ui restart"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Default --reloadcmd for ACME is: ${yellow}systemctl restart x-ui || rc-service x-ui restart${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}This command will run on every certificate issue and renew.${plain}"
|
|
if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]]; then
|
|
setReloadcmd="n"
|
|
else
|
|
read -rp "Would you like to modify --reloadcmd for ACME? (y/n): " setReloadcmd
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$setReloadcmd" == "y" || "$setReloadcmd" == "Y" ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "\n${green}\t1.${plain} Preset: systemctl reload nginx ; systemctl restart x-ui"
|
|
echo -e "${green}\t2.${plain} Input your own command"
|
|
echo -e "${green}\t0.${plain} Keep default reloadcmd"
|
|
read -rp "Choose an option: " choice
|
|
case "$choice" in
|
|
1)
|
|
echo -e "${green}Reloadcmd is: systemctl reload nginx ; systemctl restart x-ui${plain}"
|
|
reloadCmd="systemctl reload nginx ; systemctl restart x-ui"
|
|
;;
|
|
2)
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}It's recommended to put x-ui restart at the end${plain}"
|
|
read -rp "Please enter your custom reloadcmd: " reloadCmd
|
|
echo -e "${green}Reloadcmd is: ${reloadCmd}${plain}"
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
echo -e "${green}Keeping default reloadcmd${plain}"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# install the certificate
|
|
local installOutput=""
|
|
installOutput=$(~/.acme.sh/acme.sh --installcert --force -d ${domain} \
|
|
--key-file /root/cert/${domain}/privkey.pem \
|
|
--fullchain-file /root/cert/${domain}/fullchain.pem --reloadcmd "${reloadCmd}" 2>&1)
|
|
local installRc=$?
|
|
echo "${installOutput}"
|
|
|
|
local installWroteFiles=0
|
|
if echo "${installOutput}" | grep -q "Installing key to:" && echo "${installOutput}" | grep -q "Installing full chain to:"; then
|
|
installWroteFiles=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -f "/root/cert/${domain}/privkey.pem" && -f "/root/cert/${domain}/fullchain.pem" && (${installRc} -eq 0 || ${installWroteFiles} -eq 1) ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${green}Installing certificate succeeded, enabling auto renew...${plain}"
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${red}Installing certificate failed, exiting.${plain}"
|
|
if [[ ${cert_exists} -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
rm -rf ~/.acme.sh/${domain} ~/.acme.sh/${domain}_ecc
|
|
fi
|
|
systemctl start x-ui 2> /dev/null || rc-service x-ui start 2> /dev/null
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# enable auto-renew
|
|
~/.acme.sh/acme.sh --upgrade --auto-upgrade
|
|
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Auto renew setup had issues, certificate details:${plain}"
|
|
ls -lah /root/cert/${domain}/
|
|
# Secure permissions: private key readable only by owner
|
|
chmod 600 $certPath/privkey.pem 2> /dev/null
|
|
chmod 644 $certPath/fullchain.pem 2> /dev/null
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${green}Auto renew succeeded, certificate details:${plain}"
|
|
ls -lah /root/cert/${domain}/
|
|
# Secure permissions: private key readable only by owner
|
|
chmod 600 $certPath/privkey.pem 2> /dev/null
|
|
chmod 644 $certPath/fullchain.pem 2> /dev/null
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# start panel
|
|
systemctl start x-ui 2> /dev/null || rc-service x-ui start 2> /dev/null
|
|
|
|
# Prompt user to set panel paths after successful certificate installation
|
|
if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]]; then
|
|
setPanel="y"
|
|
else
|
|
read -rp "Would you like to set this certificate for the panel? (y/n): " setPanel
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$setPanel" == "y" || "$setPanel" == "Y" ]]; then
|
|
local webCertFile="/root/cert/${domain}/fullchain.pem"
|
|
local webKeyFile="/root/cert/${domain}/privkey.pem"
|
|
|
|
if [[ -f "$webCertFile" && -f "$webKeyFile" ]]; then
|
|
${xui_folder}/x-ui cert -webCert "$webCertFile" -webCertKey "$webKeyFile"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Certificate paths set for the panel${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Certificate File: $webCertFile${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Private Key File: $webKeyFile${plain}"
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo -e "${green}Access URL: https://${domain}:${existing_port}/${existing_webBasePath}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Panel will restart to apply SSL certificate...${plain}"
|
|
systemctl restart x-ui 2> /dev/null || rc-service x-ui restart 2> /dev/null
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${red}Error: Certificate or private key file not found for domain: $domain.${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Skipping panel path setting.${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Reusable interactive SSL setup (domain or IP)
|
|
# Sets global `SSL_HOST` to the chosen domain/IP for Access URL usage
|
|
prompt_and_setup_ssl() {
|
|
local panel_port="$1"
|
|
local web_base_path="$2"
|
|
local server_ip="$3"
|
|
|
|
local ssl_choice=""
|
|
SSL_SCHEME="https"
|
|
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Choose SSL certificate setup method:${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}1.${plain} Let's Encrypt for Domain (90-day validity, auto-renews)"
|
|
echo -e "${green}2.${plain} Let's Encrypt for IP Address (6-day validity, auto-renews)"
|
|
echo -e "${green}3.${plain} Custom SSL Certificate (Path to existing files)"
|
|
echo -e "${green}4.${plain} Skip SSL (advanced — behind reverse proxy / SSH tunnel only)"
|
|
echo -e "${blue}Note:${plain} Options 1 & 2 require port 80 open. Option 3 requires manual paths."
|
|
echo -e "${blue}Note:${plain} Option 4 serves the panel over plain HTTP — only safe behind nginx/Caddy or an SSH tunnel."
|
|
if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]]; then
|
|
case "${XUI_SSL_MODE:-none}" in
|
|
domain) ssl_choice="1" ;;
|
|
ip) ssl_choice="2" ;;
|
|
none | "") ssl_choice="4" ;;
|
|
*)
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Unknown XUI_SSL_MODE='${XUI_SSL_MODE}', defaulting to none (HTTP).${plain}"
|
|
ssl_choice="4"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
read -rp "Choose an option (default 2 for IP): " ssl_choice
|
|
ssl_choice="${ssl_choice// /}" # Trim whitespace
|
|
|
|
# Default to 2 (IP cert) if input is empty or invalid (not 1, 3 or 4)
|
|
if [[ "$ssl_choice" != "1" && "$ssl_choice" != "3" && "$ssl_choice" != "4" ]]; then
|
|
ssl_choice="2"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
case "$ssl_choice" in
|
|
1)
|
|
# User chose Let's Encrypt domain option
|
|
echo -e "${green}Using Let's Encrypt for domain certificate...${plain}"
|
|
if ssl_cert_issue; then
|
|
local cert_domain="${SSL_ISSUED_DOMAIN}"
|
|
if [[ -z "${cert_domain}" ]]; then
|
|
cert_domain=$(~/.acme.sh/acme.sh --list 2> /dev/null | tail -1 | awk '{print $1}')
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -n "${cert_domain}" ]]; then
|
|
SSL_HOST="${cert_domain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}✓ SSL certificate configured successfully with domain: ${cert_domain}${plain}"
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}SSL setup may have completed, but domain extraction failed${plain}"
|
|
SSL_HOST="${server_ip}"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${red}SSL certificate setup failed for domain mode.${plain}"
|
|
SSL_HOST="${server_ip}"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
2)
|
|
# User chose Let's Encrypt IP certificate option
|
|
echo -e "${green}Using Let's Encrypt for IP certificate (shortlived profile)...${plain}"
|
|
|
|
# Confirm the auto-detected IP before issuing for it: with asymmetric
|
|
# routing / multi-WAN the echo services can return a transit address.
|
|
if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" != "1" ]]; then
|
|
local ip_confirm=""
|
|
read -rp "Is ${server_ip} the correct incoming public IPv4 address for this server? [Default y]: " ip_confirm
|
|
if [[ -n "$ip_confirm" && "$ip_confirm" != "y" && "$ip_confirm" != "Y" ]]; then
|
|
server_ip=""
|
|
while [[ -z "$server_ip" ]]; do
|
|
read -rp "Please enter your server's public IPv4 address: " server_ip
|
|
server_ip="${server_ip// /}"
|
|
if [[ ! "$server_ip" =~ ^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$ ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Invalid IPv4 address. Please try again.${plain}"
|
|
server_ip=""
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Ask for optional IPv6
|
|
local ipv6_addr=""
|
|
prompt_or_default ipv6_addr "Do you have an IPv6 address to include? (leave empty to skip): " "" XUI_SSL_IPV6
|
|
ipv6_addr="${ipv6_addr// /}" # Trim whitespace
|
|
|
|
# Stop panel if running (port 80 needed)
|
|
if [[ $release == "alpine" ]]; then
|
|
rc-service x-ui stop > /dev/null 2>&1
|
|
else
|
|
systemctl stop x-ui > /dev/null 2>&1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
setup_ip_certificate "${server_ip}" "${ipv6_addr}"
|
|
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
|
|
SSL_HOST="${server_ip}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}✓ Let's Encrypt IP certificate configured successfully${plain}"
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${red}✗ IP certificate setup failed. Please check port 80 is open.${plain}"
|
|
SSL_HOST="${server_ip}"
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
3)
|
|
# User chose Custom Paths (User Provided) option
|
|
echo -e "${green}Using custom existing certificate...${plain}"
|
|
local custom_cert=""
|
|
local custom_key=""
|
|
local custom_domain=""
|
|
|
|
# 3.1 Request Domain to compose Panel URL later
|
|
read -rp "Please enter domain name certificate issued for: " custom_domain
|
|
custom_domain="${custom_domain// /}" # Remove spaces
|
|
|
|
# 3.2 Loop for Certificate Path
|
|
while true; do
|
|
read -rp "Input certificate path (keywords: .crt / fullchain): " custom_cert
|
|
# Strip quotes if present
|
|
custom_cert=$(echo "$custom_cert" | tr -d '"' | tr -d "'")
|
|
|
|
if [[ -f "$custom_cert" && -r "$custom_cert" && -s "$custom_cert" ]]; then
|
|
break
|
|
elif [[ ! -f "$custom_cert" ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Error: File does not exist! Try again.${plain}"
|
|
elif [[ ! -r "$custom_cert" ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Error: File exists but is not readable (check permissions)!${plain}"
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${red}Error: File is empty!${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# 3.3 Loop for Private Key Path
|
|
while true; do
|
|
read -rp "Input private key path (keywords: .key / privatekey): " custom_key
|
|
# Strip quotes if present
|
|
custom_key=$(echo "$custom_key" | tr -d '"' | tr -d "'")
|
|
|
|
if [[ -f "$custom_key" && -r "$custom_key" && -s "$custom_key" ]]; then
|
|
break
|
|
elif [[ ! -f "$custom_key" ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Error: File does not exist! Try again.${plain}"
|
|
elif [[ ! -r "$custom_key" ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Error: File exists but is not readable (check permissions)!${plain}"
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${red}Error: File is empty!${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# 3.4 Apply Settings via x-ui binary
|
|
${xui_folder}/x-ui cert -webCert "$custom_cert" -webCertKey "$custom_key" > /dev/null 2>&1
|
|
|
|
# Set SSL_HOST for composing Panel URL
|
|
if [[ -n "$custom_domain" ]]; then
|
|
SSL_HOST="$custom_domain"
|
|
else
|
|
SSL_HOST="${server_ip}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
echo -e "${green}✓ Custom certificate paths applied.${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Note: You are responsible for renewing these files externally.${plain}"
|
|
|
|
systemctl restart x-ui > /dev/null 2>&1 || rc-service x-ui restart > /dev/null 2>&1
|
|
;;
|
|
4)
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo -e "${red}⚠ Panel will be installed WITHOUT SSL/TLS.${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Login credentials and cookies will travel as plain HTTP.${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Only safe when:${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow} • A reverse proxy (nginx, Caddy, Traefik) terminates TLS for you, or${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow} • You access the panel exclusively via SSH tunnel${plain}"
|
|
echo ""
|
|
|
|
SSL_SCHEME="http"
|
|
SSL_HOST="${server_ip}"
|
|
|
|
local bind_local=""
|
|
if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]]; then
|
|
# Cloud images must stay reachable on their public interface.
|
|
bind_local="n"
|
|
else
|
|
read -rp "Bind the panel to 127.0.0.1 only? (recommended — forces SSH tunnel / reverse-proxy access) [y/N]: " bind_local
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$bind_local" == "y" || "$bind_local" == "Y" ]]; then
|
|
${xui_folder}/x-ui setting -listenIP "127.0.0.1" > /dev/null 2>&1
|
|
SSL_HOST="127.0.0.1"
|
|
echo -e "${green}✓ Panel bound to 127.0.0.1 only. It is now unreachable from the public internet.${plain}"
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo -e "${green}SSH Port Forwarding — open the panel from your local machine via:${plain}"
|
|
echo -e " Standard SSH command:"
|
|
echo -e " ${yellow}ssh -L 2222:127.0.0.1:${panel_port} root@${server_ip}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e " If using an SSH key:"
|
|
echo -e " ${yellow}ssh -i <sshkeypath> -L 2222:127.0.0.1:${panel_port} root@${server_ip}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e " Then open in your browser:"
|
|
echo -e " ${yellow}http://localhost:2222/${web_base_path}${plain}"
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Alternative: point a reverse proxy (nginx/Caddy) at 127.0.0.1:${panel_port} and let it terminate TLS.${plain}"
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Panel will listen on all interfaces over plain HTTP. Make sure something else is terminating TLS in front of it.${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
systemctl restart x-ui > /dev/null 2>&1 || rc-service x-ui restart > /dev/null 2>&1
|
|
echo -e "${green}✓ SSL setup skipped.${plain}"
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
echo -e "${red}Invalid option. Skipping SSL setup.${plain}"
|
|
SSL_HOST="${server_ip}"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
config_after_install() {
|
|
local existing_hasDefaultCredential=$(${xui_folder}/x-ui setting -show true | grep -Eo 'hasDefaultCredential: .+' | awk '{print $2}')
|
|
local existing_webBasePath=$(${xui_folder}/x-ui setting -show true | grep -Eo 'webBasePath: .+' | awk '{print $2}' | sed 's#^/##')
|
|
local existing_port=$(${xui_folder}/x-ui setting -show true | grep -Eo 'port: .+' | awk '{print $2}')
|
|
# Properly detect empty cert by checking if cert: line exists and has content after it
|
|
local existing_cert=$(${xui_folder}/x-ui setting -getCert true | grep 'cert:' | awk -F': ' '{print $2}' | tr -d '[:space:]')
|
|
local URL_lists=(
|
|
"https://api4.ipify.org"
|
|
"https://ipv4.icanhazip.com"
|
|
"https://v4.api.ipinfo.io/ip"
|
|
"https://ipv4.myexternalip.com/raw"
|
|
"https://4.ident.me"
|
|
"https://check-host.net/ip"
|
|
)
|
|
local server_ip=""
|
|
for ip_address in "${URL_lists[@]}"; do
|
|
local response=$(curl -s -w "\n%{http_code}" --max-time 3 "${ip_address}" 2> /dev/null)
|
|
local http_code=$(echo "$response" | tail -n1)
|
|
local ip_result=$(echo "$response" | head -n-1 | tr -d '[:space:]"')
|
|
if [[ "${http_code}" == "200" && "${ip_result}" =~ ^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$ ]]; then
|
|
server_ip="${ip_result}"
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
if [[ -z "$server_ip" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]]; then
|
|
# Panel binds 0.0.0.0 regardless; the IP is only used to compose the
|
|
# displayed access URL. Fall back to XUI_SERVER_IP or leave blank.
|
|
server_ip="${XUI_SERVER_IP:-}"
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Could not auto-detect server IP from any provider.${plain}"
|
|
while [[ -z "$server_ip" ]]; do
|
|
read -rp "Please enter your server's public IPv4 address: " server_ip
|
|
server_ip="${server_ip// /}"
|
|
if [[ ! "$server_ip" =~ ^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$ ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Invalid IPv4 address. Please try again.${plain}"
|
|
server_ip=""
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ ${#existing_webBasePath} -lt 4 ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "$existing_hasDefaultCredential" == "true" ]]; then
|
|
local config_webBasePath="${XUI_WEB_BASE_PATH:-$(gen_random_string 18)}"
|
|
local config_username="${XUI_USERNAME:-$(gen_random_string 10)}"
|
|
local config_password="${XUI_PASSWORD:-$(gen_random_string 10)}"
|
|
local config_port=""
|
|
|
|
local db_label="SQLite (/etc/x-ui/x-ui.db)"
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo -e "${green}═══════════════════════════════════════════${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green} Database Selection ${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}═══════════════════════════════════════════${plain}"
|
|
echo -e " 1) SQLite (default — recommended for < 500 clients)"
|
|
echo -e " 2) PostgreSQL (recommended for high client counts / many nodes)"
|
|
if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "${XUI_DB_TYPE:-sqlite}" == "postgres" ]]; then
|
|
db_choice="2"
|
|
else
|
|
db_choice="1"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
read -rp "Choose [1]: " db_choice
|
|
db_choice="${db_choice:-1}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ "$db_choice" == "2" ]]; then
|
|
local xui_env_file
|
|
case "${release}" in
|
|
ubuntu | debian | armbian)
|
|
xui_env_file="/etc/default/x-ui"
|
|
;;
|
|
arch | manjaro | parch | alpine)
|
|
xui_env_file="/etc/conf.d/x-ui"
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
xui_env_file="/etc/sysconfig/x-ui"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
local xui_dsn=""
|
|
local pg_mode=""
|
|
local pg_local_installed=0
|
|
while [[ -z "$xui_dsn" ]]; do
|
|
if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "${XUI_DB_DSN:-}" ]]; then
|
|
xui_dsn="${XUI_DB_DSN}"
|
|
db_label="PostgreSQL (external)"
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Installing PostgreSQL locally (non-interactive)...${plain}"
|
|
local pg_cred_file
|
|
pg_cred_file=$(mktemp 2> /dev/null) || pg_cred_file=$(mktemp -t x-ui-pg-creds.XXXXXXXX)
|
|
if [[ -n "${pg_cred_file}" ]] && xui_dsn=$(PG_CRED_FILE="${pg_cred_file}" install_postgres_local); then
|
|
pg_local_installed=1
|
|
if [[ -r "${pg_cred_file}" ]]; then
|
|
# shellcheck disable=SC1090
|
|
source "${pg_cred_file}"
|
|
fi
|
|
rm -f "${pg_cred_file}"
|
|
db_label="PostgreSQL (${PG_USER}@${PG_HOST}:${PG_PORT}/${PG_DB})"
|
|
break
|
|
fi
|
|
rm -f "${pg_cred_file}"
|
|
echo -e "${red}PostgreSQL installation failed in non-interactive mode; aborting.${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Set XUI_DB_DSN to use an existing server, or XUI_DB_TYPE=sqlite.${plain}"
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo -e " 1) Install PostgreSQL locally and create a dedicated user/db (recommended)"
|
|
echo -e " 2) Use an existing PostgreSQL server (enter DSN)"
|
|
read -rp "Choose [1]: " pg_mode
|
|
pg_mode="${pg_mode:-1}"
|
|
if [[ "$pg_mode" == "2" ]]; then
|
|
while [[ -z "$xui_dsn" ]]; do
|
|
read -rp "Enter PostgreSQL DSN (postgres://user:pass@host:port/dbname?sslmode=disable): " xui_dsn
|
|
xui_dsn="${xui_dsn// /}"
|
|
done
|
|
db_label="PostgreSQL (external)"
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Installing PostgreSQL — this may take a moment...${plain}"
|
|
local pg_cred_file
|
|
pg_cred_file=$(mktemp 2> /dev/null) || pg_cred_file=$(mktemp -t x-ui-pg-creds.XXXXXXXX)
|
|
if [[ -z "${pg_cred_file}" ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Failed to create temporary credentials file.${plain}"
|
|
xui_dsn=""
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
if xui_dsn=$(PG_CRED_FILE="${pg_cred_file}" install_postgres_local); then
|
|
pg_local_installed=1
|
|
if [[ -r "${pg_cred_file}" ]]; then
|
|
# shellcheck disable=SC1090
|
|
source "${pg_cred_file}"
|
|
fi
|
|
rm -f "${pg_cred_file}"
|
|
db_label="PostgreSQL (${PG_USER}@${PG_HOST}:${PG_PORT}/${PG_DB})"
|
|
else
|
|
rm -f "${pg_cred_file}"
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo -e "${red}PostgreSQL installation failed.${plain}"
|
|
echo -e " 1) Retry local install"
|
|
echo -e " 2) Enter an external DSN instead"
|
|
echo -e " 3) Abort install"
|
|
echo -e " 4) Fall back to SQLite"
|
|
read -rp "Choose [1]: " pg_fail
|
|
pg_fail="${pg_fail:-1}"
|
|
case "$pg_fail" in
|
|
2) pg_mode="2" ;;
|
|
3)
|
|
echo -e "${red}Install aborted.${plain}"
|
|
exit 1
|
|
;;
|
|
4)
|
|
db_choice="1"
|
|
xui_dsn=""
|
|
break
|
|
;;
|
|
*) xui_dsn="" ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [[ -n "$xui_dsn" ]]; then
|
|
install -d -m 755 "$(dirname "$xui_env_file")"
|
|
umask 077
|
|
cat > "$xui_env_file" << EOF
|
|
XUI_DB_TYPE=postgres
|
|
XUI_DB_DSN=${xui_dsn}
|
|
EOF
|
|
chmod 600 "$xui_env_file"
|
|
umask 022
|
|
export XUI_DB_TYPE=postgres
|
|
export XUI_DB_DSN="${xui_dsn}"
|
|
ensure_pg_client || echo -e "${yellow}⚠ Could not install pg_dump/pg_restore. In-panel database backup/restore will be unavailable until you install the postgresql-client package.${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ -n "${XUI_PANEL_PORT:-}" ]]; then
|
|
config_port="${XUI_PANEL_PORT}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Your Panel Port is: ${config_port}${plain}"
|
|
else
|
|
config_port=$(shuf -i 1024-62000 -n 1)
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Generated random port: ${config_port}${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
read -rp "Would you like to customize the Panel Port settings? (If not, a random port will be applied) [y/n]: " config_confirm
|
|
if [[ "${config_confirm}" == "y" || "${config_confirm}" == "Y" ]]; then
|
|
read -rp "Please set up the panel port: " config_port
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Your Panel Port is: ${config_port}${plain}"
|
|
else
|
|
config_port=$(shuf -i 1024-62000 -n 1)
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Generated random port: ${config_port}${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
${xui_folder}/x-ui setting -username "${config_username}" -password "${config_password}" -port "${config_port}" -webBasePath "${config_webBasePath}"
|
|
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo -e "${green}═══════════════════════════════════════════${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green} SSL Certificate Setup (RECOMMENDED) ${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}═══════════════════════════════════════════${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}SSL is strongly recommended. Skip only if a reverse proxy${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}or SSH tunnel handles TLS for you.${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Let's Encrypt now supports both domains and IP addresses!${plain}"
|
|
echo ""
|
|
|
|
prompt_and_setup_ssl "${config_port}" "${config_webBasePath}" "${server_ip}"
|
|
|
|
# Retrieve the API token for display
|
|
local config_apiToken=$(${xui_folder}/x-ui setting -getApiToken true | grep -Eo 'apiToken: .+' | awk '{print $2}')
|
|
|
|
# Display final credentials and access information
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo -e "${green}═══════════════════════════════════════════${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green} Panel Installation Complete! ${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}═══════════════════════════════════════════${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Username: ${config_username}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Password: ${config_password}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Port: ${config_port}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}WebBasePath: ${config_webBasePath}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Database: ${db_label}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Access URL: ${SSL_SCHEME}://${SSL_HOST}:${config_port}/${config_webBasePath}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}API Token: ${config_apiToken}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}═══════════════════════════════════════════${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}⚠ IMPORTANT: Save these credentials securely!${plain}"
|
|
if [[ "$SSL_SCHEME" == "https" ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}⚠ SSL Certificate: Enabled and configured${plain}"
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}⚠ SSL Certificate: Skipped — panel is HTTP-only. Use a reverse proxy or SSH tunnel.${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$db_choice" == "2" ]]; then
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo -e "${green}PostgreSQL backup & restore is built into the panel:${plain}"
|
|
echo -e " ${blue}${SSL_SCHEME}://${SSL_HOST}:${config_port}/${config_webBasePath}${plain} → Backup & Restore"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow} Back Up downloads a pg_dump .dump file; Restore reloads it via pg_restore.${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$db_choice" == "2" && "$pg_local_installed" == "1" ]]; then
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo -e "${green}═══════════════════════════════════════════${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green} PostgreSQL Credentials ${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}═══════════════════════════════════════════${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}DB Name: ${PG_DB}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Username: ${PG_USER}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Password: ${PG_PASS}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Host: ${PG_HOST}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Port: ${PG_PORT}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}DSN: ${xui_dsn}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Env file: ${xui_env_file}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}-------------------------------------------${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Connect from this server:${plain}"
|
|
echo -e " ${blue}sudo -u postgres psql -d ${PG_DB}${plain} (as the postgres superuser)"
|
|
echo -e " ${blue}PGPASSWORD='${PG_PASS}' psql -h ${PG_HOST} -p ${PG_PORT} -U ${PG_USER} -d ${PG_DB}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}═══════════════════════════════════════════${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}⚠ The panel reads these credentials from ${xui_env_file}.${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}⚠ Save the password — it is not stored anywhere else in plain text.${plain}"
|
|
unset PG_USER PG_PASS PG_HOST PG_PORT PG_DB
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Persist a machine-parseable credentials file for cloud-init / MOTD.
|
|
: "${SSL_SCHEME:=https}"
|
|
: "${SSL_HOST:=${server_ip}}"
|
|
local db_type_out="sqlite"
|
|
[[ "$db_choice" == "2" ]] && db_type_out="postgres"
|
|
write_install_result "${config_username}" "${config_password}" "${config_port}" \
|
|
"${config_webBasePath}" "${SSL_SCHEME}" "${SSL_HOST}" "${config_apiToken}" "${db_type_out}"
|
|
else
|
|
local config_webBasePath=$(gen_random_string 18)
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}WebBasePath is missing or too short. Generating a new one...${plain}"
|
|
${xui_folder}/x-ui setting -webBasePath "${config_webBasePath}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}New WebBasePath: ${config_webBasePath}${plain}"
|
|
|
|
# If the panel is already installed but no certificate is configured, prompt for SSL now
|
|
if [[ -z "${existing_cert}" ]]; then
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo -e "${green}═══════════════════════════════════════════${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green} SSL Certificate Setup (RECOMMENDED) ${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}═══════════════════════════════════════════${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Let's Encrypt now supports both domains and IP addresses!${plain}"
|
|
echo ""
|
|
prompt_and_setup_ssl "${existing_port}" "${config_webBasePath}" "${server_ip}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Access URL: ${SSL_SCHEME}://${SSL_HOST}:${existing_port}/${config_webBasePath}${plain}"
|
|
else
|
|
# If a cert already exists, just show the access URL
|
|
echo -e "${green}Access URL: https://${server_ip}:${existing_port}/${config_webBasePath}${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [[ "$existing_hasDefaultCredential" == "true" ]]; then
|
|
local config_username="${XUI_USERNAME:-$(gen_random_string 10)}"
|
|
local config_password="${XUI_PASSWORD:-$(gen_random_string 10)}"
|
|
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Default credentials detected. Security update required...${plain}"
|
|
${xui_folder}/x-ui setting -username "${config_username}" -password "${config_password}"
|
|
echo -e "Generated new random login credentials:"
|
|
echo -e "###############################################"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Username: ${config_username}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Password: ${config_password}${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "###############################################"
|
|
|
|
# Persist a machine-parseable credentials file for cloud-init / MOTD.
|
|
local config_apiToken
|
|
config_apiToken=$(${xui_folder}/x-ui setting -getApiToken true | grep -Eo 'apiToken: .+' | awk '{print $2}')
|
|
: "${SSL_SCHEME:=https}"
|
|
: "${SSL_HOST:=${server_ip}}"
|
|
write_install_result "${config_username}" "${config_password}" "${existing_port}" \
|
|
"${existing_webBasePath}" "${SSL_SCHEME}" "${SSL_HOST}" "${config_apiToken}" "${XUI_DB_TYPE:-sqlite}"
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${green}Username, Password, and WebBasePath are properly set.${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Existing install: if no cert configured, prompt user for SSL setup
|
|
# Properly detect empty cert by checking if cert: line exists and has content after it
|
|
existing_cert=$(${xui_folder}/x-ui setting -getCert true | grep 'cert:' | awk -F': ' '{print $2}' | tr -d '[:space:]')
|
|
if [[ -z "$existing_cert" ]]; then
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo -e "${green}═══════════════════════════════════════════${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green} SSL Certificate Setup (RECOMMENDED) ${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}═══════════════════════════════════════════${plain}"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Let's Encrypt now supports both domains and IP addresses!${plain}"
|
|
echo ""
|
|
prompt_and_setup_ssl "${existing_port}" "${existing_webBasePath}" "${server_ip}"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Access URL: ${SSL_SCHEME}://${SSL_HOST}:${existing_port}/${existing_webBasePath}${plain}"
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${green}SSL certificate already configured. No action needed.${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
${xui_folder}/x-ui migrate
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# setup_fail2ban auto-installs and configures fail2ban for the IP Limit feature
|
|
# by invoking the freshly installed x-ui CLI. IP Limit is load-bearing on
|
|
# fail2ban (without it the panel disables the limitIp field and zeroes existing
|
|
# limits), so a fresh install should make it work out of the box, just like the
|
|
# Docker image already does. Non-fatal by design: a fail2ban failure must never
|
|
# abort the panel install.
|
|
setup_fail2ban() {
|
|
if [[ -n "${XUI_ENABLE_FAIL2BAN+x}" && "${XUI_ENABLE_FAIL2BAN}" != "true" ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}XUI_ENABLE_FAIL2BAN=${XUI_ENABLE_FAIL2BAN}, skipping Fail2ban auto-setup.${plain}"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ ! -x /usr/bin/x-ui ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}x-ui CLI not found; skipping Fail2ban auto-setup.${plain}"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
echo -e "${green}Setting up Fail2ban for the IP Limit feature...${plain}"
|
|
if /usr/bin/x-ui setup-fail2ban; then
|
|
echo -e "${green}Fail2ban setup complete.${plain}"
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Fail2ban setup did not finish; IP Limit stays disabled until you run 'x-ui' and open the IP Limit menu. Continuing.${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Lands a systemd unit file at ${xui_service}/x-ui.service via a temp file +
|
|
# atomic mv, so a failed cp/curl or an interrupted mv never leaves a
|
|
# truncated unit file at the live path -- systemd would then fail to parse
|
|
# it on the next daemon-reload/start. Same pattern already used for
|
|
# /usr/bin/x-ui elsewhere in this script. source_is_url picks cp (from a
|
|
# file already extracted from the release tarball) vs curl (GitHub fallback).
|
|
_install_xui_service_unit() {
|
|
local source="$1"
|
|
local source_is_url="$2"
|
|
local dest="${xui_service}/x-ui.service"
|
|
local temp_file="${dest}.tmp.$$"
|
|
|
|
rm -f "$temp_file"
|
|
if [[ "$source_is_url" == "true" ]]; then
|
|
curl -fLRo "$temp_file" "$source" > /dev/null 2>&1
|
|
else
|
|
cp -f "$source" "$temp_file" > /dev/null 2>&1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
rm -f "$temp_file"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ! -s "$temp_file" ]]; then
|
|
rm -f "$temp_file"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
mv -f "$temp_file" "$dest"
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
rm -f "$temp_file"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# resolve_latest_tag prints the latest stable release tag. It prefers the web
|
|
# releases/latest redirect, which is not subject to the unauthenticated API's
|
|
# 60 req/h-per-IP limit that trips shared CI/CGNAT addresses (the install then
|
|
# fails with "Failed to fetch x-ui version"), and falls back to the API.
|
|
resolve_latest_tag() {
|
|
local url tag
|
|
url=$(curl -sSLI -o /dev/null -w '%{url_effective}' --retry 5 --retry-delay 3 --connect-timeout 15 --max-time 60 "https://github.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui/releases/latest" 2>/dev/null)
|
|
tag=${url##*/tag/}
|
|
if [[ "$tag" != "$url" && -n "$tag" && "$tag" != "latest" ]]; then
|
|
echo "$tag"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
curl -Ls --retry 5 --retry-delay 3 --connect-timeout 15 --max-time 60 "https://api.github.com/repos/MHSanaei/3x-ui/releases/latest" | grep '"tag_name":' | sed -E 's/.*"([^"]+)".*/\1/'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
install_x-ui() {
|
|
cd ${xui_folder%/x-ui}/
|
|
|
|
# Download resources
|
|
if [ $# == 0 ]; then
|
|
tag_version=$(resolve_latest_tag)
|
|
if [[ ! -n "$tag_version" ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Failed to fetch x-ui version, it may be due to GitHub API restrictions, please try it later${plain}"
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
echo -e "Got x-ui latest version: ${tag_version}, beginning the installation..."
|
|
curl -fLR --retry 5 --retry-delay 3 --connect-timeout 15 --speed-limit 1 --speed-time 300 -o ${xui_folder}-linux-$(arch).tar.gz https://github.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui/releases/download/${tag_version}/x-ui-linux-$(arch).tar.gz
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Downloading x-ui failed, please be sure that your server can access GitHub ${plain}"
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ! -s ${xui_folder}-linux-$(arch).tar.gz ]]; then
|
|
rm ${xui_folder}-linux-$(arch).tar.gz -f
|
|
echo -e "${red}Downloaded x-ui release archive is empty${plain}"
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
tag_version=$1
|
|
# The rolling dev channel ships under a fixed, non-semver tag that is
|
|
# force-moved to the latest main commit on every push. Accept `dev` as a
|
|
# convenient alias and skip the numeric floor check for it.
|
|
if [[ "$tag_version" == "dev" || "$tag_version" == "dev-latest" ]]; then
|
|
tag_version="dev-latest"
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Installing the rolling dev build (tag: dev-latest). This is a per-commit pre-release, not a stable version.${plain}"
|
|
else
|
|
tag_version_numeric=${tag_version#v}
|
|
min_version="2.3.5"
|
|
|
|
if [[ "$(printf '%s\n' "$min_version" "$tag_version_numeric" | sort -V | head -n1)" != "$min_version" ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Please use a newer version (at least v2.3.5). Exiting installation.${plain}"
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
url="https://github.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui/releases/download/${tag_version}/x-ui-linux-$(arch).tar.gz"
|
|
echo -e "Beginning to install x-ui ${tag_version}"
|
|
curl -fLR --retry 5 --retry-delay 3 --connect-timeout 15 --speed-limit 1 --speed-time 300 -o ${xui_folder}-linux-$(arch).tar.gz ${url}
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Download x-ui ${tag_version} failed, please check if the version exists ${plain}"
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ! -s ${xui_folder}-linux-$(arch).tar.gz ]]; then
|
|
rm ${xui_folder}-linux-$(arch).tar.gz -f
|
|
echo -e "${red}Downloaded x-ui release archive is empty${plain}"
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
local xui_script_temp="/usr/bin/x-ui-temp.$$"
|
|
rm -f "${xui_script_temp}"
|
|
curl -fLRo "${xui_script_temp}" https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui/main/x-ui.sh
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
rm -f "${xui_script_temp}"
|
|
echo -e "${red}Failed to download x-ui.sh${plain}"
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ! -s "${xui_script_temp}" ]]; then
|
|
rm -f "${xui_script_temp}"
|
|
echo -e "${red}Downloaded x-ui.sh is empty${plain}"
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Stop x-ui service and remove old resources
|
|
local custom_bin_backup=""
|
|
if [[ -e ${xui_folder}/ ]]; then
|
|
if [[ $release == "alpine" ]]; then
|
|
rc-service x-ui stop
|
|
else
|
|
systemctl stop x-ui
|
|
fi
|
|
# Kill any leftover mtg (MTProto) sidecars. x-ui runs them outside its own
|
|
# lifecycle, so on Linux a stale one can survive the stop and keep holding
|
|
# an inbound port with an outdated secret, silently breaking new clients.
|
|
# The freshly installed panel respawns a clean mtg per inbound on start.
|
|
pkill -f 'mtg-linux-[^ ]* run ' > /dev/null 2>&1 || true
|
|
|
|
# bin/ is about to be wiped wholesale by the tar extraction below. The
|
|
# release only ships known assets (xray/mtg binaries, the bundled
|
|
# geoip*/geosite*.dat sets) -- anything else in bin/ was placed there
|
|
# by the admin (e.g. a hand-added custom geoip/geosite file referenced
|
|
# from a routing rule via "ext:<file>:<code>") and would otherwise be
|
|
# silently deleted on every update, breaking Xray at next start with
|
|
# "failed to open <file>: no such file or directory" for any routing
|
|
# rule that references it. Moved aside rather than copied: a rename
|
|
# on the same filesystem is atomic (no truncated file if disk space
|
|
# runs out mid-copy, unlike `cp`) and keeps the snapshot under
|
|
# /usr/local rather than a separate, possibly small/tmpfs $TMPDIR.
|
|
if [[ -d "${xui_folder}/bin" ]]; then
|
|
custom_bin_backup="${xui_folder%/x-ui}/x-ui-bin-backup.$$"
|
|
rm -rf "${custom_bin_backup}"
|
|
if ! mv "${xui_folder}/bin" "${custom_bin_backup}"; then
|
|
custom_bin_backup=""
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Could not back up bin/ -- custom files there will not be preserved across this update${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
# Sole cleanup path for the backup from here on -- covers both the
|
|
# two `exit 1`s below (extraction/binary-missing failures) and an
|
|
# interrupted update (Ctrl-C, signal) before the restore runs.
|
|
# Cleared once the restore below finishes normally.
|
|
trap '[[ -n "${custom_bin_backup}" ]] && rm -rf "${custom_bin_backup}"' EXIT INT TERM
|
|
rm ${xui_folder}/ -rf
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Extract resources and set permissions
|
|
tar zxvf x-ui-linux-$(arch).tar.gz
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
rm x-ui-linux-$(arch).tar.gz -f
|
|
rm -f "${xui_script_temp}"
|
|
echo -e "${red}Failed to extract the x-ui release archive -- the previous installation has already been removed, so the panel will not start until this is fixed; try running the installer again${plain}"
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
rm x-ui-linux-$(arch).tar.gz -f
|
|
|
|
cd x-ui
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 || ! -s x-ui ]]; then
|
|
rm -f "${xui_script_temp}"
|
|
echo -e "${red}Extracted x-ui archive is missing the x-ui binary -- the previous installation has already been removed, so the panel will not start until this is fixed; try running the installer again${plain}"
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
chmod +x x-ui
|
|
chmod +x x-ui.sh
|
|
|
|
# Check the system's architecture and rename the file accordingly.
|
|
# The panel binary maps GOARCH=arm to "arm32" (internal/xray/process.go),
|
|
# so the Xray binary must be named xray-linux-arm32; mtg keeps plain "arm".
|
|
if [[ $(arch) == "armv5" || $(arch) == "armv6" || $(arch) == "armv7" ]]; then
|
|
mv bin/xray-linux-$(arch) bin/xray-linux-arm32
|
|
chmod +x bin/xray-linux-arm32
|
|
if [[ -f bin/mtg-linux-$(arch) ]]; then
|
|
mv bin/mtg-linux-$(arch) bin/mtg-linux-arm
|
|
chmod +x bin/mtg-linux-arm
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
chmod +x x-ui bin/xray-linux-$(arch)
|
|
if [[ -f bin/mtg-linux-arm ]]; then
|
|
chmod +x bin/mtg-linux-arm
|
|
elif [[ -f bin/mtg-linux-$(arch) ]]; then
|
|
chmod +x bin/mtg-linux-$(arch)
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Restore anything from the old bin/ that the fresh release doesn't ship
|
|
# (custom geoip/geosite files, or anything else an admin hand-placed
|
|
# there) -- never overwrites a same-named file the new release provides,
|
|
# so bundled assets (geoip.dat, geoip_RU.dat, ...) still get the fresh
|
|
# per-release copy. Runs after the arch-rename above so xray-linux-arm32/
|
|
# mtg-linux-arm already exist under their final names there and aren't
|
|
# mistaken for custom files needing a restore. Skips paths the panel
|
|
# itself regenerates at runtime (config.json, mtproto/*.toml -- see
|
|
# internal/xray/process.go, internal/mtproto/manager.go): those aren't
|
|
# admin-placed, and restoring a stale one only resurrects dead state (an
|
|
# orphaned mtg config for a since-deleted inbound) or the wrong
|
|
# directory permissions.
|
|
if [[ -n "${custom_bin_backup}" ]]; then
|
|
local restored_custom_bin=()
|
|
while IFS= read -r -d '' f; do
|
|
local rel="${f#"${custom_bin_backup}"/}"
|
|
case "${rel}" in
|
|
config.json | mtproto | mtproto/*) continue ;;
|
|
esac
|
|
if [[ ! -e "bin/${rel}" ]]; then
|
|
mkdir -p "bin/$(dirname "${rel}")"
|
|
cp -a "${f}" "bin/${rel}"
|
|
restored_custom_bin+=("${rel}")
|
|
fi
|
|
done < <(find "${custom_bin_backup}" \( -type f -o -type l \) -print0)
|
|
rm -rf "${custom_bin_backup}"
|
|
custom_bin_backup=""
|
|
if [[ ${#restored_custom_bin[@]} -gt 0 ]]; then
|
|
echo -e "${green}Restored custom file(s) in bin/ not shipped by this release: ${restored_custom_bin[*]}${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
trap - EXIT INT TERM
|
|
|
|
# Update x-ui cli and se set permission
|
|
mv -f "${xui_script_temp}" /usr/bin/x-ui
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
rm -f "${xui_script_temp}"
|
|
echo -e "${red}Failed to install x-ui.sh${plain}"
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
chmod +x /usr/bin/x-ui
|
|
mkdir -p /var/log/x-ui
|
|
config_after_install
|
|
|
|
# Etckeeper compatibility
|
|
if [ -d "/etc/.git" ]; then
|
|
if [ -f "/etc/.gitignore" ]; then
|
|
if ! grep -q "x-ui/x-ui.db" "/etc/.gitignore"; then
|
|
echo "" >> "/etc/.gitignore"
|
|
echo "x-ui/x-ui.db" >> "/etc/.gitignore"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Added x-ui.db to /etc/.gitignore for etckeeper${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
echo "x-ui/x-ui.db" > "/etc/.gitignore"
|
|
echo -e "${green}Created /etc/.gitignore and added x-ui.db for etckeeper${plain}"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ $release == "alpine" ]]; then
|
|
xui_rc_temp="/etc/init.d/x-ui.tmp.$$"
|
|
rm -f "${xui_rc_temp}"
|
|
curl -fLRo "${xui_rc_temp}" https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui/main/x-ui.rc
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
rm -f "${xui_rc_temp}"
|
|
echo -e "${red}Failed to download x-ui.rc${plain}"
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ ! -s "${xui_rc_temp}" ]]; then
|
|
rm -f "${xui_rc_temp}"
|
|
echo -e "${red}Downloaded x-ui.rc is empty${plain}"
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
mv -f "${xui_rc_temp}" /etc/init.d/x-ui
|
|
if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then
|
|
rm -f "${xui_rc_temp}"
|
|
echo -e "${red}Failed to install x-ui.rc${plain}"
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
chmod +x /etc/init.d/x-ui
|
|
rc-update add x-ui
|
|
rc-service x-ui start
|
|
else
|
|
# Install systemd service file
|
|
service_installed=false
|
|
|
|
if [ -f "x-ui.service" ]; then
|
|
echo -e "${green}Found x-ui.service in extracted files, installing...${plain}"
|
|
if _install_xui_service_unit "x-ui.service" "false"; then
|
|
service_installed=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ "$service_installed" = false ]; then
|
|
case "${release}" in
|
|
ubuntu | debian | armbian)
|
|
if [ -f "x-ui.service.debian" ]; then
|
|
echo -e "${green}Found x-ui.service.debian in extracted files, installing...${plain}"
|
|
if _install_xui_service_unit "x-ui.service.debian" "false"; then
|
|
service_installed=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
arch | manjaro | parch)
|
|
if [ -f "x-ui.service.arch" ]; then
|
|
echo -e "${green}Found x-ui.service.arch in extracted files, installing...${plain}"
|
|
if _install_xui_service_unit "x-ui.service.arch" "false"; then
|
|
service_installed=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
if [ -f "x-ui.service.rhel" ]; then
|
|
echo -e "${green}Found x-ui.service.rhel in extracted files, installing...${plain}"
|
|
if _install_xui_service_unit "x-ui.service.rhel" "false"; then
|
|
service_installed=true
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# If service file not found in tar.gz, download from GitHub
|
|
if [ "$service_installed" = false ]; then
|
|
echo -e "${yellow}Service files not found in tar.gz, downloading from GitHub...${plain}"
|
|
case "${release}" in
|
|
ubuntu | debian | armbian)
|
|
service_unit_url="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui/main/x-ui.service.debian"
|
|
;;
|
|
arch | manjaro | parch)
|
|
service_unit_url="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui/main/x-ui.service.arch"
|
|
;;
|
|
*)
|
|
service_unit_url="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui/main/x-ui.service.rhel"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
if ! _install_xui_service_unit "$service_unit_url" "true"; then
|
|
echo -e "${red}Failed to install x-ui.service from GitHub${plain}"
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
service_installed=true
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ "$service_installed" = true ]; then
|
|
echo -e "${green}Setting up systemd unit...${plain}"
|
|
chown root:root ${xui_service}/x-ui.service > /dev/null 2>&1
|
|
chmod 644 ${xui_service}/x-ui.service > /dev/null 2>&1
|
|
systemctl daemon-reload
|
|
systemctl enable x-ui
|
|
systemctl start x-ui
|
|
else
|
|
echo -e "${red}Failed to install x-ui.service file${plain}"
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# IP Limit relies on fail2ban; install + configure it now so the feature
|
|
# works out of the box (no-op when XUI_ENABLE_FAIL2BAN=false). Never fatal.
|
|
setup_fail2ban
|
|
|
|
echo -e "${green}x-ui ${tag_version}${plain} installation finished, it is running now..."
|
|
echo -e ""
|
|
echo -e "┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
|
|
│ ${blue}x-ui control menu usages (subcommands):${plain} │
|
|
│ │
|
|
│ ${blue}x-ui${plain} - Admin Management Script │
|
|
│ ${blue}x-ui start${plain} - Start │
|
|
│ ${blue}x-ui stop${plain} - Stop │
|
|
│ ${blue}x-ui restart${plain} - Restart │
|
|
│ ${blue}x-ui status${plain} - Current Status │
|
|
│ ${blue}x-ui settings${plain} - Current Settings │
|
|
│ ${blue}x-ui enable${plain} - Enable Autostart on OS Startup │
|
|
│ ${blue}x-ui disable${plain} - Disable Autostart on OS Startup │
|
|
│ ${blue}x-ui log${plain} - Check logs │
|
|
│ ${blue}x-ui banlog${plain} - Check Fail2ban ban logs │
|
|
│ ${blue}x-ui update${plain} - Update │
|
|
│ ${blue}x-ui legacy${plain} - Legacy version │
|
|
│ ${blue}x-ui install${plain} - Install │
|
|
│ ${blue}x-ui uninstall${plain} - Uninstall │
|
|
└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
echo -e "${green}Running...${plain}"
|
|
install_base
|
|
install_x-ui $1
|