The confirmation gate in updateSetting only covered the true -> false transition, so a settings save that kept twoFactorEnable=true while carrying a non-blank twoFactorToken silently rebound the authenticator. preserveRedactedSecrets restores the stored secret only when the submitted one is blank, so a non-blank value went straight through without any branch asking for a code. Not reachable pre-auth or cross-site (CSRFMiddleware rejects unsafe methods without the session token), but it matters after a session hijack or with an admin API token, which sets api_authed and short-circuits the CSRF check: the attacker gains persistence and locks the legitimate operator out of their own authenticator. Now a code is required whenever 2FA is currently on and the submitted secret differs from the stored one. Enabling from off is untouched, as no code exists yet to verify, and a blank secret still means "unchanged", so the panel's normal save path is unaffected. Reported by @n0ctal (GHSA-xqqw-jqqv-99h6). |
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| .. | ||
| controller | ||
| entity | ||
| global | ||
| job | ||
| locale | ||
| middleware | ||
| network | ||
| runtime | ||
| service | ||
| session | ||
| translation | ||
| websocket | ||
| cadence_test.go | ||
| routes_contract_test.go | ||
| web.go | ||
| web_mtls.go | ||
| web_mtls_test.go | ||