3x-ui/internal/web/web_mtls_test.go

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feat(node): node hardening — mTLS, hashed+zstd reconcile transport, per-node net metrics (#5382) * fix(api-docs): document clientIpsByGuid route Restores a green `go test ./...` baseline: TestAPIRoutesDocumented flagged POST /panel/api/clients/clientIpsByGuid (added in 9385b6c6) as undocumented in endpoints.ts. * test(node): characterize current node TLS + API auth behavior Phase 0 regression net for the mTLS work. These pass on unchanged production code and lock the pre-mTLS contracts so later phases can be proven additive: - tlsConfigForNode: skip -> InsecureSkipVerify (no VerifyConnection); pin -> VerifyConnection installed. - checkAPIAuth: bearer match -> Next + api_authed; unauthenticated -> 401 (XHR) / 404; valid session -> Next. - panel HTTPS listener with no ClientAuth accepts a client that presents no client certificate (the browsers-keep-working invariant). * feat(crypto): node-auth CA + client-cert minting (TDD) Stdlib-only ECDSA P-256 helpers for the node mTLS work: - GenerateNodeCA: self-signed CA (IsCA, CertSign, path len 0) - IssueClientCert: client-auth leaf (ExtKeyUsageClientAuth) signed by CA - LoadCAFromPEM: parse a CA cert+key for issuing / trust-pool building Tests assert the contract (leaf verifies against the issuing CA with ExtKeyUsageClientAuth), seen failing on the assertion before impl. * feat(node): lazy node mTLS CA + client cert in settings (TDD) SettingService gains opt-in mTLS material, all stored as Setting rows with empty defaults and kept out of entity.AllSetting (so private keys never reach the settings UI/export): - EnsureNodeMtlsCA: mint+persist the node-auth CA once, reuse thereafter - EnsureMasterClientCert: issue the master client cert from the CA, idempotent - NodeMtlsClientCAPool: ClientCAs trust pool for the listener; nil when unconfigured so the no-mTLS path is unchanged Tests assert idempotency and that the client cert verifies against the CA for client auth; seen failing on the assertion before impl. * feat(node): mtls client TLS config + master-cert provider (TDD) tlsConfigForNode gains an 'mtls' branch that presents the master client certificate and verifies the node server against system roots (no InsecureSkipVerify, no custom RootCAs). The cert is supplied via an injected MasterClientCertProvider so runtime need not import service; it fails closed when unconfigured. skip/pin contracts unchanged. * feat(node): allow tokenless mtls nodes in remote do() (TDD) mtls nodes authenticate with a client certificate, so the bearer token becomes optional for them: do() no longer rejects an empty ApiToken when TlsVerifyMode is mtls, and the Authorization header is omitted when no token is set. Every other mode still requires a token (regression kept). * feat(node): authenticate verified client certs in checkAPIAuth (TDD) A completed mTLS handshake (non-empty r.TLS.VerifiedChains) now authenticates an API request, equivalent to a valid bearer token, and sets api_authed so the CSRF middleware lets cert-authed mutations through. Bearer/session/reject paths unchanged. The accept-path assert was mutation-checked (guard flipped -> test red -> reverted). * feat(node): opt-in mTLS on the panel listener (TDD; mutation-checked) web.go now applies VerifyClientCertIfGiven + ClientCAs to the HTTPS listener when a node trust CA is configured, and wires the master client cert provider for outbound mtls calls. With no CA the listener is byte-identical to before (browsers unaffected). applyNodeMtls is covered end-to-end: no-cert client handshakes (browsers keep working), a CA-signed client cert verifies, a foreign-CA cert is rejected at the handshake. Mutation-checked: - RequireAndVerifyClientCert -> no-cert client rejected (red) -> reverted - drop ClientCAs -> master cert no longer trusted (red) -> reverted * feat(node): accept mtls verify-mode + CA reveal endpoint (TDD) - model.Node.TlsVerifyMode validator now accepts 'mtls' - normalize() preserves mtls and requires the node scheme to be https (fail closed), instead of clamping mtls back to verify - NodeService.NodeMtlsCaCert + POST /panel/api/nodes/mtls/ca return this panel's node-auth CA cert (public) to paste into a node, minting the CA + master client cert on first call - endpoints.ts documents the new route (doc-sync test) No model column added (enum is a string), so no migration/codegen. * feat(node): node mTLS UI + trust-CA setter (TDD) Backend: - NodeService.SetNodeMtlsTrustCA + POST /panel/api/nodes/mtls/trustCA store the CA this panel trusts for incoming node-API client certs (validates PEM, empty clears); applied on next restart - endpoints.ts + regenerated openapi.json document both mtls routes Frontend: - node form: 'mtls' TLS-verify option + setup hint (zod enum updated) - Nodes page 'Node mTLS' card: copy this panel's CA, and paste/save the trusted parent CA - en-US i18n keys (other locales fall back to en-US) Gates green: go build (native+windows), vet, go test ./...; frontend typecheck, lint, vitest (541). * style(node): gofmt web_mtls_test doc comment * feat(node): hashed+zstd reconcile transport (TDD, negotiated, mixed-version safe) Adds an integrity + compression envelope to node config pushes: - internal/util/wirecodec: shared zstd codec (bomb-capped decode) + SHA-256 hashing + the header/capability constants - Remote.do(): always attaches X-Config-Sha256 of the uncompressed body; zstd-compresses only when the node advertised support (learned from its X-3x-Node-Caps response header) and the body is >=1KiB - ConfigEnvelopeMiddleware on /panel/api: advertises the cap, decompresses and verifies the hash (handler not invoked on mismatch) before binding Mixed-version safe: old nodes never advertise the cap -> plain bodies; the hash header is verify-if-present so any panel/node mix interoperates (existing reconcile tests stay green). klauspost/compress promoted to a direct dep. Hash-mismatch reject was mutation-checked (compare defeated -> test red -> reverted). * feat(node): per-node network throughput metrics (TDD) The node status response already carries gopsutil netIO.up/down (summed non-virtual interfaces), so no node-side change is needed: - probe() parses netIO.up/down into HeartbeatPatch.NetUp/NetDown - Node gains net_up/net_down columns (AutoMigrate); UpdateHeartbeat persists them and appends netUp/netDown to the per-node metric history - NodeMetricKeys whitelists netUp/netDown so the history endpoint serves them - NodeHistoryPanel renders Net Up/Down sparklines (KB/s, no 0-100 clamp) - regenerated frontend types + openapi.json for the new Node fields * feat(node): move node mTLS controls into a toolbar button + modal The Node mTLS panel was an always-visible card cluttering the nodes page. Replace it with a 'Node mTLS' button beside 'Add node' that opens a modal with the same copy-CA + trusted-parent-CA controls; the modal closes on a successful save. No backend/i18n changes. * i18n(node): translate mTLS + net-metrics keys for all locales Adds the node mTLS strings (tlsMtls, mtlsFormHint, mtls.* dialog + the saveMtls toast) and the netUp/netDown chart labels to all 12 non-English catalogs (ar, es, fa, id, ja, pt, ru, tr, uk, vi, zh-CN, zh-TW), matching each catalog's existing terminology. Technical tokens (mTLS/TLS/CA/API/ KB/s) kept verbatim. * fix(node): address Copilot review on node-hardening PR - setting_mtls: fail closed on a half-present CA/master-cert pair instead of silently regenerating (which would rotate the CA and break fleet trust). - config_envelope: reject non-zstd Content-Encoding on the envelope path rather than hashing/forwarding a still-encoded body to the handler. - node mTLS: support tokenless mTLS end-to-end — apiToken is now required_unless tlsVerifyMode=mtls (model) with matching conditional validation in NodeFormSchema, so the runtime allowance is actually reachable. - NodesPage: add a catch block to onSaveTrustCa so save failures surface.
2026-06-16 03:19:33 -07:00
package web
import (
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strconv"
"testing"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/util/crypto"
)
// TestPanelTLSAcceptsClientWithoutClientCert characterizes the invariant the
// mTLS work must preserve: the panel's HTTPS listener — configured today with a
// server certificate and NO ClientAuth — completes the TLS handshake for a
// client that presents no client certificate (i.e. every browser). When mTLS is
// wired into web.go, the no-CA path must keep this behavior byte-for-byte. P1.6
// extends this file with the VerifyClientCertIfGiven + ClientCAs cases.
func TestPanelTLSAcceptsClientWithoutClientCert(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewTLSServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer srv.Close()
// Precondition: like web.go today, the listener requests no client cert.
if srv.TLS.ClientAuth != tls.NoClientCert {
t.Fatalf("precondition: ClientAuth = %v, want NoClientCert", srv.TLS.ClientAuth)
}
// srv.Client() trusts the server's self-signed cert and presents NO client cert.
resp, err := srv.Client().Get(srv.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request without a client certificate failed: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200", resp.StatusCode)
}
}
// TestApplyNodeMtls exercises the listener policy applied by web.go: a nil pool
// leaves the listener unchanged (no client auth, browsers work); a set pool is
// request-but-don't-require, so no-cert clients still handshake while a
// CA-signed client cert is verified and a foreign cert is rejected.
func TestApplyNodeMtls(t *testing.T) {
ca, err := crypto.GenerateNodeCA("test ca")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateNodeCA: %v", err)
}
clientPEM, err := crypto.IssueClientCert(ca, "master")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IssueClientCert: %v", err)
}
clientCert, err := tls.X509KeyPair(clientPEM.CertPEM, clientPEM.KeyPEM)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client X509KeyPair: %v", err)
}
caPool := x509.NewCertPool()
if !caPool.AppendCertsFromPEM(ca.CertPEM) {
t.Fatal("append CA to pool")
}
otherCA, err := crypto.GenerateNodeCA("other ca")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateNodeCA(other): %v", err)
}
foreignPEM, err := crypto.IssueClientCert(otherCA, "intruder")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IssueClientCert(foreign): %v", err)
}
foreignCert, err := tls.X509KeyPair(foreignPEM.CertPEM, foreignPEM.KeyPEM)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("foreign X509KeyPair: %v", err)
}
newServer := func(pool *x509.CertPool) *httptest.Server {
srv := httptest.NewUnstartedServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
n := 0
if r.TLS != nil {
n = len(r.TLS.VerifiedChains)
}
w.Header().Set("X-Verified-Chains", strconv.Itoa(n))
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
srv.TLS = &tls.Config{}
applyNodeMtls(srv.TLS, pool)
srv.StartTLS()
return srv
}
// clientFor forces the client to present cert via GetClientCertificate so the
// server's verification is what's under test (the default Certificates path
// would let the Go client silently withhold a cert whose CA the server didn't
// advertise, masking the reject behavior).
clientFor := func(srv *httptest.Server, cert *tls.Certificate) *http.Client {
roots := x509.NewCertPool()
roots.AddCert(srv.Certificate())
cfg := &tls.Config{RootCAs: roots}
if cert != nil {
c := *cert
cfg.GetClientCertificate = func(*tls.CertificateRequestInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
return &c, nil
}
}
return &http.Client{Transport: &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: cfg}}
}
t.Run("nil pool leaves the listener without client auth", func(t *testing.T) {
srv := newServer(nil)
defer srv.Close()
if srv.TLS.ClientAuth != tls.NoClientCert {
t.Fatalf("nil pool must not set ClientAuth, got %v", srv.TLS.ClientAuth)
}
resp, err := clientFor(srv, nil).Get(srv.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("no-cert client failed: %v", err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
})
t.Run("pool set still accepts a no-cert client", func(t *testing.T) {
srv := newServer(caPool)
defer srv.Close()
resp, err := clientFor(srv, nil).Get(srv.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("no-cert client must still handshake under VerifyClientCertIfGiven: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if got := resp.Header.Get("X-Verified-Chains"); got != "0" {
t.Fatalf("no-cert client verified chains = %s, want 0", got)
}
})
t.Run("pool set verifies the master client cert", func(t *testing.T) {
srv := newServer(caPool)
defer srv.Close()
resp, err := clientFor(srv, &clientCert).Get(srv.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("master client cert must be accepted: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if got := resp.Header.Get("X-Verified-Chains"); got != "1" {
t.Fatalf("master cert verified chains = %s, want 1 (cert was not verified)", got)
}
})
t.Run("pool set rejects a foreign-CA client cert", func(t *testing.T) {
srv := newServer(caPool)
defer srv.Close()
if _, err := clientFor(srv, &foreignCert).Get(srv.URL); err == nil {
t.Fatal("a client cert from an untrusted CA must fail the handshake")
}
})
}