3x-ui/internal/web/runtime/tls_client.go

283 lines
8.1 KiB
Go
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package runtime
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/subtle"
"crypto/tls"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/hex"
"net/http"
"strings"
feat(node): node hardening — mTLS, hashed+zstd reconcile transport, per-node net metrics (#5382) * fix(api-docs): document clientIpsByGuid route Restores a green `go test ./...` baseline: TestAPIRoutesDocumented flagged POST /panel/api/clients/clientIpsByGuid (added in 9385b6c6) as undocumented in endpoints.ts. * test(node): characterize current node TLS + API auth behavior Phase 0 regression net for the mTLS work. These pass on unchanged production code and lock the pre-mTLS contracts so later phases can be proven additive: - tlsConfigForNode: skip -> InsecureSkipVerify (no VerifyConnection); pin -> VerifyConnection installed. - checkAPIAuth: bearer match -> Next + api_authed; unauthenticated -> 401 (XHR) / 404; valid session -> Next. - panel HTTPS listener with no ClientAuth accepts a client that presents no client certificate (the browsers-keep-working invariant). * feat(crypto): node-auth CA + client-cert minting (TDD) Stdlib-only ECDSA P-256 helpers for the node mTLS work: - GenerateNodeCA: self-signed CA (IsCA, CertSign, path len 0) - IssueClientCert: client-auth leaf (ExtKeyUsageClientAuth) signed by CA - LoadCAFromPEM: parse a CA cert+key for issuing / trust-pool building Tests assert the contract (leaf verifies against the issuing CA with ExtKeyUsageClientAuth), seen failing on the assertion before impl. * feat(node): lazy node mTLS CA + client cert in settings (TDD) SettingService gains opt-in mTLS material, all stored as Setting rows with empty defaults and kept out of entity.AllSetting (so private keys never reach the settings UI/export): - EnsureNodeMtlsCA: mint+persist the node-auth CA once, reuse thereafter - EnsureMasterClientCert: issue the master client cert from the CA, idempotent - NodeMtlsClientCAPool: ClientCAs trust pool for the listener; nil when unconfigured so the no-mTLS path is unchanged Tests assert idempotency and that the client cert verifies against the CA for client auth; seen failing on the assertion before impl. * feat(node): mtls client TLS config + master-cert provider (TDD) tlsConfigForNode gains an 'mtls' branch that presents the master client certificate and verifies the node server against system roots (no InsecureSkipVerify, no custom RootCAs). The cert is supplied via an injected MasterClientCertProvider so runtime need not import service; it fails closed when unconfigured. skip/pin contracts unchanged. * feat(node): allow tokenless mtls nodes in remote do() (TDD) mtls nodes authenticate with a client certificate, so the bearer token becomes optional for them: do() no longer rejects an empty ApiToken when TlsVerifyMode is mtls, and the Authorization header is omitted when no token is set. Every other mode still requires a token (regression kept). * feat(node): authenticate verified client certs in checkAPIAuth (TDD) A completed mTLS handshake (non-empty r.TLS.VerifiedChains) now authenticates an API request, equivalent to a valid bearer token, and sets api_authed so the CSRF middleware lets cert-authed mutations through. Bearer/session/reject paths unchanged. The accept-path assert was mutation-checked (guard flipped -> test red -> reverted). * feat(node): opt-in mTLS on the panel listener (TDD; mutation-checked) web.go now applies VerifyClientCertIfGiven + ClientCAs to the HTTPS listener when a node trust CA is configured, and wires the master client cert provider for outbound mtls calls. With no CA the listener is byte-identical to before (browsers unaffected). applyNodeMtls is covered end-to-end: no-cert client handshakes (browsers keep working), a CA-signed client cert verifies, a foreign-CA cert is rejected at the handshake. Mutation-checked: - RequireAndVerifyClientCert -> no-cert client rejected (red) -> reverted - drop ClientCAs -> master cert no longer trusted (red) -> reverted * feat(node): accept mtls verify-mode + CA reveal endpoint (TDD) - model.Node.TlsVerifyMode validator now accepts 'mtls' - normalize() preserves mtls and requires the node scheme to be https (fail closed), instead of clamping mtls back to verify - NodeService.NodeMtlsCaCert + POST /panel/api/nodes/mtls/ca return this panel's node-auth CA cert (public) to paste into a node, minting the CA + master client cert on first call - endpoints.ts documents the new route (doc-sync test) No model column added (enum is a string), so no migration/codegen. * feat(node): node mTLS UI + trust-CA setter (TDD) Backend: - NodeService.SetNodeMtlsTrustCA + POST /panel/api/nodes/mtls/trustCA store the CA this panel trusts for incoming node-API client certs (validates PEM, empty clears); applied on next restart - endpoints.ts + regenerated openapi.json document both mtls routes Frontend: - node form: 'mtls' TLS-verify option + setup hint (zod enum updated) - Nodes page 'Node mTLS' card: copy this panel's CA, and paste/save the trusted parent CA - en-US i18n keys (other locales fall back to en-US) Gates green: go build (native+windows), vet, go test ./...; frontend typecheck, lint, vitest (541). * style(node): gofmt web_mtls_test doc comment * feat(node): hashed+zstd reconcile transport (TDD, negotiated, mixed-version safe) Adds an integrity + compression envelope to node config pushes: - internal/util/wirecodec: shared zstd codec (bomb-capped decode) + SHA-256 hashing + the header/capability constants - Remote.do(): always attaches X-Config-Sha256 of the uncompressed body; zstd-compresses only when the node advertised support (learned from its X-3x-Node-Caps response header) and the body is >=1KiB - ConfigEnvelopeMiddleware on /panel/api: advertises the cap, decompresses and verifies the hash (handler not invoked on mismatch) before binding Mixed-version safe: old nodes never advertise the cap -> plain bodies; the hash header is verify-if-present so any panel/node mix interoperates (existing reconcile tests stay green). klauspost/compress promoted to a direct dep. Hash-mismatch reject was mutation-checked (compare defeated -> test red -> reverted). * feat(node): per-node network throughput metrics (TDD) The node status response already carries gopsutil netIO.up/down (summed non-virtual interfaces), so no node-side change is needed: - probe() parses netIO.up/down into HeartbeatPatch.NetUp/NetDown - Node gains net_up/net_down columns (AutoMigrate); UpdateHeartbeat persists them and appends netUp/netDown to the per-node metric history - NodeMetricKeys whitelists netUp/netDown so the history endpoint serves them - NodeHistoryPanel renders Net Up/Down sparklines (KB/s, no 0-100 clamp) - regenerated frontend types + openapi.json for the new Node fields * feat(node): move node mTLS controls into a toolbar button + modal The Node mTLS panel was an always-visible card cluttering the nodes page. Replace it with a 'Node mTLS' button beside 'Add node' that opens a modal with the same copy-CA + trusted-parent-CA controls; the modal closes on a successful save. No backend/i18n changes. * i18n(node): translate mTLS + net-metrics keys for all locales Adds the node mTLS strings (tlsMtls, mtlsFormHint, mtls.* dialog + the saveMtls toast) and the netUp/netDown chart labels to all 12 non-English catalogs (ar, es, fa, id, ja, pt, ru, tr, uk, vi, zh-CN, zh-TW), matching each catalog's existing terminology. Technical tokens (mTLS/TLS/CA/API/ KB/s) kept verbatim. * fix(node): address Copilot review on node-hardening PR - setting_mtls: fail closed on a half-present CA/master-cert pair instead of silently regenerating (which would rotate the CA and break fleet trust). - config_envelope: reject non-zstd Content-Encoding on the envelope path rather than hashing/forwarding a still-encoded body to the handler. - node mTLS: support tokenless mTLS end-to-end — apiToken is now required_unless tlsVerifyMode=mtls (model) with matching conditional validation in NodeFormSchema, so the runtime allowance is actually reachable. - NodesPage: add a catch block to onSaveTrustCa so save failures surface.
2026-06-16 03:19:33 -07:00
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database/model"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/util/common"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/util/netproxy"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/util/netsafe"
)
feat(node): node hardening — mTLS, hashed+zstd reconcile transport, per-node net metrics (#5382) * fix(api-docs): document clientIpsByGuid route Restores a green `go test ./...` baseline: TestAPIRoutesDocumented flagged POST /panel/api/clients/clientIpsByGuid (added in 9385b6c6) as undocumented in endpoints.ts. * test(node): characterize current node TLS + API auth behavior Phase 0 regression net for the mTLS work. These pass on unchanged production code and lock the pre-mTLS contracts so later phases can be proven additive: - tlsConfigForNode: skip -> InsecureSkipVerify (no VerifyConnection); pin -> VerifyConnection installed. - checkAPIAuth: bearer match -> Next + api_authed; unauthenticated -> 401 (XHR) / 404; valid session -> Next. - panel HTTPS listener with no ClientAuth accepts a client that presents no client certificate (the browsers-keep-working invariant). * feat(crypto): node-auth CA + client-cert minting (TDD) Stdlib-only ECDSA P-256 helpers for the node mTLS work: - GenerateNodeCA: self-signed CA (IsCA, CertSign, path len 0) - IssueClientCert: client-auth leaf (ExtKeyUsageClientAuth) signed by CA - LoadCAFromPEM: parse a CA cert+key for issuing / trust-pool building Tests assert the contract (leaf verifies against the issuing CA with ExtKeyUsageClientAuth), seen failing on the assertion before impl. * feat(node): lazy node mTLS CA + client cert in settings (TDD) SettingService gains opt-in mTLS material, all stored as Setting rows with empty defaults and kept out of entity.AllSetting (so private keys never reach the settings UI/export): - EnsureNodeMtlsCA: mint+persist the node-auth CA once, reuse thereafter - EnsureMasterClientCert: issue the master client cert from the CA, idempotent - NodeMtlsClientCAPool: ClientCAs trust pool for the listener; nil when unconfigured so the no-mTLS path is unchanged Tests assert idempotency and that the client cert verifies against the CA for client auth; seen failing on the assertion before impl. * feat(node): mtls client TLS config + master-cert provider (TDD) tlsConfigForNode gains an 'mtls' branch that presents the master client certificate and verifies the node server against system roots (no InsecureSkipVerify, no custom RootCAs). The cert is supplied via an injected MasterClientCertProvider so runtime need not import service; it fails closed when unconfigured. skip/pin contracts unchanged. * feat(node): allow tokenless mtls nodes in remote do() (TDD) mtls nodes authenticate with a client certificate, so the bearer token becomes optional for them: do() no longer rejects an empty ApiToken when TlsVerifyMode is mtls, and the Authorization header is omitted when no token is set. Every other mode still requires a token (regression kept). * feat(node): authenticate verified client certs in checkAPIAuth (TDD) A completed mTLS handshake (non-empty r.TLS.VerifiedChains) now authenticates an API request, equivalent to a valid bearer token, and sets api_authed so the CSRF middleware lets cert-authed mutations through. Bearer/session/reject paths unchanged. The accept-path assert was mutation-checked (guard flipped -> test red -> reverted). * feat(node): opt-in mTLS on the panel listener (TDD; mutation-checked) web.go now applies VerifyClientCertIfGiven + ClientCAs to the HTTPS listener when a node trust CA is configured, and wires the master client cert provider for outbound mtls calls. With no CA the listener is byte-identical to before (browsers unaffected). applyNodeMtls is covered end-to-end: no-cert client handshakes (browsers keep working), a CA-signed client cert verifies, a foreign-CA cert is rejected at the handshake. Mutation-checked: - RequireAndVerifyClientCert -> no-cert client rejected (red) -> reverted - drop ClientCAs -> master cert no longer trusted (red) -> reverted * feat(node): accept mtls verify-mode + CA reveal endpoint (TDD) - model.Node.TlsVerifyMode validator now accepts 'mtls' - normalize() preserves mtls and requires the node scheme to be https (fail closed), instead of clamping mtls back to verify - NodeService.NodeMtlsCaCert + POST /panel/api/nodes/mtls/ca return this panel's node-auth CA cert (public) to paste into a node, minting the CA + master client cert on first call - endpoints.ts documents the new route (doc-sync test) No model column added (enum is a string), so no migration/codegen. * feat(node): node mTLS UI + trust-CA setter (TDD) Backend: - NodeService.SetNodeMtlsTrustCA + POST /panel/api/nodes/mtls/trustCA store the CA this panel trusts for incoming node-API client certs (validates PEM, empty clears); applied on next restart - endpoints.ts + regenerated openapi.json document both mtls routes Frontend: - node form: 'mtls' TLS-verify option + setup hint (zod enum updated) - Nodes page 'Node mTLS' card: copy this panel's CA, and paste/save the trusted parent CA - en-US i18n keys (other locales fall back to en-US) Gates green: go build (native+windows), vet, go test ./...; frontend typecheck, lint, vitest (541). * style(node): gofmt web_mtls_test doc comment * feat(node): hashed+zstd reconcile transport (TDD, negotiated, mixed-version safe) Adds an integrity + compression envelope to node config pushes: - internal/util/wirecodec: shared zstd codec (bomb-capped decode) + SHA-256 hashing + the header/capability constants - Remote.do(): always attaches X-Config-Sha256 of the uncompressed body; zstd-compresses only when the node advertised support (learned from its X-3x-Node-Caps response header) and the body is >=1KiB - ConfigEnvelopeMiddleware on /panel/api: advertises the cap, decompresses and verifies the hash (handler not invoked on mismatch) before binding Mixed-version safe: old nodes never advertise the cap -> plain bodies; the hash header is verify-if-present so any panel/node mix interoperates (existing reconcile tests stay green). klauspost/compress promoted to a direct dep. Hash-mismatch reject was mutation-checked (compare defeated -> test red -> reverted). * feat(node): per-node network throughput metrics (TDD) The node status response already carries gopsutil netIO.up/down (summed non-virtual interfaces), so no node-side change is needed: - probe() parses netIO.up/down into HeartbeatPatch.NetUp/NetDown - Node gains net_up/net_down columns (AutoMigrate); UpdateHeartbeat persists them and appends netUp/netDown to the per-node metric history - NodeMetricKeys whitelists netUp/netDown so the history endpoint serves them - NodeHistoryPanel renders Net Up/Down sparklines (KB/s, no 0-100 clamp) - regenerated frontend types + openapi.json for the new Node fields * feat(node): move node mTLS controls into a toolbar button + modal The Node mTLS panel was an always-visible card cluttering the nodes page. Replace it with a 'Node mTLS' button beside 'Add node' that opens a modal with the same copy-CA + trusted-parent-CA controls; the modal closes on a successful save. No backend/i18n changes. * i18n(node): translate mTLS + net-metrics keys for all locales Adds the node mTLS strings (tlsMtls, mtlsFormHint, mtls.* dialog + the saveMtls toast) and the netUp/netDown chart labels to all 12 non-English catalogs (ar, es, fa, id, ja, pt, ru, tr, uk, vi, zh-CN, zh-TW), matching each catalog's existing terminology. Technical tokens (mTLS/TLS/CA/API/ KB/s) kept verbatim. * fix(node): address Copilot review on node-hardening PR - setting_mtls: fail closed on a half-present CA/master-cert pair instead of silently regenerating (which would rotate the CA and break fleet trust). - config_envelope: reject non-zstd Content-Encoding on the envelope path rather than hashing/forwarding a still-encoded body to the handler. - node mTLS: support tokenless mTLS end-to-end — apiToken is now required_unless tlsVerifyMode=mtls (model) with matching conditional validation in NodeFormSchema, so the runtime allowance is actually reachable. - NodesPage: add a catch block to onSaveTrustCa so save failures surface.
2026-06-16 03:19:33 -07:00
// MasterClientCertProvider supplies the master client certificate this panel
// presents to nodes in mtls mode. It is injected by the web layer so the
// runtime package need not import service.
type MasterClientCertProvider func() (tls.Certificate, error)
var (
masterClientCertMu sync.RWMutex
masterClientCert MasterClientCertProvider
masterCertEpoch atomic.Uint64
feat(node): node hardening — mTLS, hashed+zstd reconcile transport, per-node net metrics (#5382) * fix(api-docs): document clientIpsByGuid route Restores a green `go test ./...` baseline: TestAPIRoutesDocumented flagged POST /panel/api/clients/clientIpsByGuid (added in 9385b6c6) as undocumented in endpoints.ts. * test(node): characterize current node TLS + API auth behavior Phase 0 regression net for the mTLS work. These pass on unchanged production code and lock the pre-mTLS contracts so later phases can be proven additive: - tlsConfigForNode: skip -> InsecureSkipVerify (no VerifyConnection); pin -> VerifyConnection installed. - checkAPIAuth: bearer match -> Next + api_authed; unauthenticated -> 401 (XHR) / 404; valid session -> Next. - panel HTTPS listener with no ClientAuth accepts a client that presents no client certificate (the browsers-keep-working invariant). * feat(crypto): node-auth CA + client-cert minting (TDD) Stdlib-only ECDSA P-256 helpers for the node mTLS work: - GenerateNodeCA: self-signed CA (IsCA, CertSign, path len 0) - IssueClientCert: client-auth leaf (ExtKeyUsageClientAuth) signed by CA - LoadCAFromPEM: parse a CA cert+key for issuing / trust-pool building Tests assert the contract (leaf verifies against the issuing CA with ExtKeyUsageClientAuth), seen failing on the assertion before impl. * feat(node): lazy node mTLS CA + client cert in settings (TDD) SettingService gains opt-in mTLS material, all stored as Setting rows with empty defaults and kept out of entity.AllSetting (so private keys never reach the settings UI/export): - EnsureNodeMtlsCA: mint+persist the node-auth CA once, reuse thereafter - EnsureMasterClientCert: issue the master client cert from the CA, idempotent - NodeMtlsClientCAPool: ClientCAs trust pool for the listener; nil when unconfigured so the no-mTLS path is unchanged Tests assert idempotency and that the client cert verifies against the CA for client auth; seen failing on the assertion before impl. * feat(node): mtls client TLS config + master-cert provider (TDD) tlsConfigForNode gains an 'mtls' branch that presents the master client certificate and verifies the node server against system roots (no InsecureSkipVerify, no custom RootCAs). The cert is supplied via an injected MasterClientCertProvider so runtime need not import service; it fails closed when unconfigured. skip/pin contracts unchanged. * feat(node): allow tokenless mtls nodes in remote do() (TDD) mtls nodes authenticate with a client certificate, so the bearer token becomes optional for them: do() no longer rejects an empty ApiToken when TlsVerifyMode is mtls, and the Authorization header is omitted when no token is set. Every other mode still requires a token (regression kept). * feat(node): authenticate verified client certs in checkAPIAuth (TDD) A completed mTLS handshake (non-empty r.TLS.VerifiedChains) now authenticates an API request, equivalent to a valid bearer token, and sets api_authed so the CSRF middleware lets cert-authed mutations through. Bearer/session/reject paths unchanged. The accept-path assert was mutation-checked (guard flipped -> test red -> reverted). * feat(node): opt-in mTLS on the panel listener (TDD; mutation-checked) web.go now applies VerifyClientCertIfGiven + ClientCAs to the HTTPS listener when a node trust CA is configured, and wires the master client cert provider for outbound mtls calls. With no CA the listener is byte-identical to before (browsers unaffected). applyNodeMtls is covered end-to-end: no-cert client handshakes (browsers keep working), a CA-signed client cert verifies, a foreign-CA cert is rejected at the handshake. Mutation-checked: - RequireAndVerifyClientCert -> no-cert client rejected (red) -> reverted - drop ClientCAs -> master cert no longer trusted (red) -> reverted * feat(node): accept mtls verify-mode + CA reveal endpoint (TDD) - model.Node.TlsVerifyMode validator now accepts 'mtls' - normalize() preserves mtls and requires the node scheme to be https (fail closed), instead of clamping mtls back to verify - NodeService.NodeMtlsCaCert + POST /panel/api/nodes/mtls/ca return this panel's node-auth CA cert (public) to paste into a node, minting the CA + master client cert on first call - endpoints.ts documents the new route (doc-sync test) No model column added (enum is a string), so no migration/codegen. * feat(node): node mTLS UI + trust-CA setter (TDD) Backend: - NodeService.SetNodeMtlsTrustCA + POST /panel/api/nodes/mtls/trustCA store the CA this panel trusts for incoming node-API client certs (validates PEM, empty clears); applied on next restart - endpoints.ts + regenerated openapi.json document both mtls routes Frontend: - node form: 'mtls' TLS-verify option + setup hint (zod enum updated) - Nodes page 'Node mTLS' card: copy this panel's CA, and paste/save the trusted parent CA - en-US i18n keys (other locales fall back to en-US) Gates green: go build (native+windows), vet, go test ./...; frontend typecheck, lint, vitest (541). * style(node): gofmt web_mtls_test doc comment * feat(node): hashed+zstd reconcile transport (TDD, negotiated, mixed-version safe) Adds an integrity + compression envelope to node config pushes: - internal/util/wirecodec: shared zstd codec (bomb-capped decode) + SHA-256 hashing + the header/capability constants - Remote.do(): always attaches X-Config-Sha256 of the uncompressed body; zstd-compresses only when the node advertised support (learned from its X-3x-Node-Caps response header) and the body is >=1KiB - ConfigEnvelopeMiddleware on /panel/api: advertises the cap, decompresses and verifies the hash (handler not invoked on mismatch) before binding Mixed-version safe: old nodes never advertise the cap -> plain bodies; the hash header is verify-if-present so any panel/node mix interoperates (existing reconcile tests stay green). klauspost/compress promoted to a direct dep. Hash-mismatch reject was mutation-checked (compare defeated -> test red -> reverted). * feat(node): per-node network throughput metrics (TDD) The node status response already carries gopsutil netIO.up/down (summed non-virtual interfaces), so no node-side change is needed: - probe() parses netIO.up/down into HeartbeatPatch.NetUp/NetDown - Node gains net_up/net_down columns (AutoMigrate); UpdateHeartbeat persists them and appends netUp/netDown to the per-node metric history - NodeMetricKeys whitelists netUp/netDown so the history endpoint serves them - NodeHistoryPanel renders Net Up/Down sparklines (KB/s, no 0-100 clamp) - regenerated frontend types + openapi.json for the new Node fields * feat(node): move node mTLS controls into a toolbar button + modal The Node mTLS panel was an always-visible card cluttering the nodes page. Replace it with a 'Node mTLS' button beside 'Add node' that opens a modal with the same copy-CA + trusted-parent-CA controls; the modal closes on a successful save. No backend/i18n changes. * i18n(node): translate mTLS + net-metrics keys for all locales Adds the node mTLS strings (tlsMtls, mtlsFormHint, mtls.* dialog + the saveMtls toast) and the netUp/netDown chart labels to all 12 non-English catalogs (ar, es, fa, id, ja, pt, ru, tr, uk, vi, zh-CN, zh-TW), matching each catalog's existing terminology. Technical tokens (mTLS/TLS/CA/API/ KB/s) kept verbatim. * fix(node): address Copilot review on node-hardening PR - setting_mtls: fail closed on a half-present CA/master-cert pair instead of silently regenerating (which would rotate the CA and break fleet trust). - config_envelope: reject non-zstd Content-Encoding on the envelope path rather than hashing/forwarding a still-encoded body to the handler. - node mTLS: support tokenless mTLS end-to-end — apiToken is now required_unless tlsVerifyMode=mtls (model) with matching conditional validation in NodeFormSchema, so the runtime allowance is actually reachable. - NodesPage: add a catch block to onSaveTrustCa so save failures surface.
2026-06-16 03:19:33 -07:00
)
// SetMasterClientCertProvider installs the provider used to obtain the master
// client certificate for mtls nodes. Passing nil disables it.
func SetMasterClientCertProvider(p MasterClientCertProvider) {
masterClientCertMu.Lock()
defer masterClientCertMu.Unlock()
masterClientCert = p
}
func getMasterClientCert() (tls.Certificate, error) {
masterClientCertMu.RLock()
p := masterClientCert
masterClientCertMu.RUnlock()
if p == nil {
return tls.Certificate{}, common.NewError("mtls: master client certificate provider not configured")
}
return p()
}
// InvalidateMasterClientConnections advances the client-credential generation.
// Every cached mTLS transport observes the generation before its next request,
// replaces its TLS transport, and closes the old idle pool. Requests already
// in flight are not interrupted; no request that starts after invalidation can
// reuse a connection authenticated with the previous leaf.
func InvalidateMasterClientConnections() {
masterCertEpoch.Add(1)
}
// ReloadMasterClientConnections validates that the currently configured
// provider can load the master credential, then invalidates every cached mTLS
// transport. Operators that rotate the credential outside the process (for
// example by restoring settings) can call this without restarting the panel.
func ReloadMasterClientConnections() error {
if _, err := getMasterClientCert(); err != nil {
return err
}
InvalidateMasterClientConnections()
return nil
}
type idleClosingRoundTripper interface {
http.RoundTripper
CloseIdleConnections()
}
type credentialRotatingTransport struct {
mu sync.Mutex
generation uint64
current idleClosingRoundTripper
build func() (idleClosingRoundTripper, error)
}
func buildStableCredentialTransport(build func() (idleClosingRoundTripper, error)) (idleClosingRoundTripper, uint64, error) {
for {
before := masterCertEpoch.Load()
current, err := build()
if err != nil {
return nil, 0, err
}
after := masterCertEpoch.Load()
if before == after {
return current, after, nil
}
current.CloseIdleConnections()
}
}
func newCredentialRotatingTransport(build func() (idleClosingRoundTripper, error)) (*credentialRotatingTransport, error) {
current, generation, err := buildStableCredentialTransport(build)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &credentialRotatingTransport{
generation: generation,
current: current,
build: build,
}, nil
}
func (t *credentialRotatingTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
t.mu.Lock()
if masterCertEpoch.Load() != t.generation {
next, generation, err := buildStableCredentialTransport(t.build)
if err != nil {
t.mu.Unlock()
return nil, err
}
previous := t.current
t.current = next
t.generation = generation
previous.CloseIdleConnections()
}
current := t.current
t.mu.Unlock()
return current.RoundTrip(req)
}
func (t *credentialRotatingTransport) CloseIdleConnections() {
t.mu.Lock()
current := t.current
t.mu.Unlock()
current.CloseIdleConnections()
}
// defaultNodeHTTPClient reaches nodes trusting the system CA store ("verify"
// mode or plain http); shared so connections pool across nodes.
var defaultNodeHTTPClient = &http.Client{
Transport: &http.Transport{
MaxIdleConns: 64,
MaxIdleConnsPerHost: 4,
IdleConnTimeout: 60 * time.Second,
DialContext: netsafe.SSRFGuardedDialContext,
},
}
func HTTPClientForNode(n *model.Node, proxyURL string) (*http.Client, error) {
mode := n.TlsVerifyMode
if mode == "" {
mode = "verify"
}
if proxyURL != "" {
if mode == "mtls" && n.Scheme != "http" {
timeout := remoteHTTPTimeout
build := func() (idleClosingRoundTripper, error) {
client, err := netproxy.NewHTTPClient(proxyURL, remoteHTTPTimeout)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
transport, ok := client.Transport.(*http.Transport)
if !ok {
return nil, common.NewError("mtls proxy client transport does not support credential rotation")
}
tlsCfg, err := tlsConfigForNode(n)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
transport.TLSClientConfig = tlsCfg
return transport, nil
}
transport, err := newCredentialRotatingTransport(build)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &http.Client{Transport: transport, Timeout: timeout}, nil
}
client, err := netproxy.NewHTTPClient(proxyURL, remoteHTTPTimeout)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if mode == "verify" || n.Scheme == "http" {
return client, nil
}
transport, ok := client.Transport.(*http.Transport)
if !ok {
return client, nil
}
tlsCfg, err := tlsConfigForNode(n)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
transport.TLSClientConfig = tlsCfg
return client, nil
}
if mode == "verify" || n.Scheme == "http" {
return defaultNodeHTTPClient, nil
}
if mode == "mtls" {
build := func() (idleClosingRoundTripper, error) {
tlsCfg, err := tlsConfigForNode(n)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &http.Transport{
MaxIdleConns: 64,
MaxIdleConnsPerHost: 4,
IdleConnTimeout: 60 * time.Second,
DialContext: netsafe.SSRFGuardedDialContext,
TLSClientConfig: tlsCfg,
}, nil
}
transport, err := newCredentialRotatingTransport(build)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &http.Client{Transport: transport}, nil
}
tlsCfg, err := tlsConfigForNode(n)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &http.Client{
Transport: &http.Transport{
MaxIdleConns: 64,
MaxIdleConnsPerHost: 4,
IdleConnTimeout: 60 * time.Second,
DialContext: netsafe.SSRFGuardedDialContext,
TLSClientConfig: tlsCfg,
},
}, nil
}
func tlsConfigForNode(n *model.Node) (*tls.Config, error) {
feat(node): node hardening — mTLS, hashed+zstd reconcile transport, per-node net metrics (#5382) * fix(api-docs): document clientIpsByGuid route Restores a green `go test ./...` baseline: TestAPIRoutesDocumented flagged POST /panel/api/clients/clientIpsByGuid (added in 9385b6c6) as undocumented in endpoints.ts. * test(node): characterize current node TLS + API auth behavior Phase 0 regression net for the mTLS work. These pass on unchanged production code and lock the pre-mTLS contracts so later phases can be proven additive: - tlsConfigForNode: skip -> InsecureSkipVerify (no VerifyConnection); pin -> VerifyConnection installed. - checkAPIAuth: bearer match -> Next + api_authed; unauthenticated -> 401 (XHR) / 404; valid session -> Next. - panel HTTPS listener with no ClientAuth accepts a client that presents no client certificate (the browsers-keep-working invariant). * feat(crypto): node-auth CA + client-cert minting (TDD) Stdlib-only ECDSA P-256 helpers for the node mTLS work: - GenerateNodeCA: self-signed CA (IsCA, CertSign, path len 0) - IssueClientCert: client-auth leaf (ExtKeyUsageClientAuth) signed by CA - LoadCAFromPEM: parse a CA cert+key for issuing / trust-pool building Tests assert the contract (leaf verifies against the issuing CA with ExtKeyUsageClientAuth), seen failing on the assertion before impl. * feat(node): lazy node mTLS CA + client cert in settings (TDD) SettingService gains opt-in mTLS material, all stored as Setting rows with empty defaults and kept out of entity.AllSetting (so private keys never reach the settings UI/export): - EnsureNodeMtlsCA: mint+persist the node-auth CA once, reuse thereafter - EnsureMasterClientCert: issue the master client cert from the CA, idempotent - NodeMtlsClientCAPool: ClientCAs trust pool for the listener; nil when unconfigured so the no-mTLS path is unchanged Tests assert idempotency and that the client cert verifies against the CA for client auth; seen failing on the assertion before impl. * feat(node): mtls client TLS config + master-cert provider (TDD) tlsConfigForNode gains an 'mtls' branch that presents the master client certificate and verifies the node server against system roots (no InsecureSkipVerify, no custom RootCAs). The cert is supplied via an injected MasterClientCertProvider so runtime need not import service; it fails closed when unconfigured. skip/pin contracts unchanged. * feat(node): allow tokenless mtls nodes in remote do() (TDD) mtls nodes authenticate with a client certificate, so the bearer token becomes optional for them: do() no longer rejects an empty ApiToken when TlsVerifyMode is mtls, and the Authorization header is omitted when no token is set. Every other mode still requires a token (regression kept). * feat(node): authenticate verified client certs in checkAPIAuth (TDD) A completed mTLS handshake (non-empty r.TLS.VerifiedChains) now authenticates an API request, equivalent to a valid bearer token, and sets api_authed so the CSRF middleware lets cert-authed mutations through. Bearer/session/reject paths unchanged. The accept-path assert was mutation-checked (guard flipped -> test red -> reverted). * feat(node): opt-in mTLS on the panel listener (TDD; mutation-checked) web.go now applies VerifyClientCertIfGiven + ClientCAs to the HTTPS listener when a node trust CA is configured, and wires the master client cert provider for outbound mtls calls. With no CA the listener is byte-identical to before (browsers unaffected). applyNodeMtls is covered end-to-end: no-cert client handshakes (browsers keep working), a CA-signed client cert verifies, a foreign-CA cert is rejected at the handshake. Mutation-checked: - RequireAndVerifyClientCert -> no-cert client rejected (red) -> reverted - drop ClientCAs -> master cert no longer trusted (red) -> reverted * feat(node): accept mtls verify-mode + CA reveal endpoint (TDD) - model.Node.TlsVerifyMode validator now accepts 'mtls' - normalize() preserves mtls and requires the node scheme to be https (fail closed), instead of clamping mtls back to verify - NodeService.NodeMtlsCaCert + POST /panel/api/nodes/mtls/ca return this panel's node-auth CA cert (public) to paste into a node, minting the CA + master client cert on first call - endpoints.ts documents the new route (doc-sync test) No model column added (enum is a string), so no migration/codegen. * feat(node): node mTLS UI + trust-CA setter (TDD) Backend: - NodeService.SetNodeMtlsTrustCA + POST /panel/api/nodes/mtls/trustCA store the CA this panel trusts for incoming node-API client certs (validates PEM, empty clears); applied on next restart - endpoints.ts + regenerated openapi.json document both mtls routes Frontend: - node form: 'mtls' TLS-verify option + setup hint (zod enum updated) - Nodes page 'Node mTLS' card: copy this panel's CA, and paste/save the trusted parent CA - en-US i18n keys (other locales fall back to en-US) Gates green: go build (native+windows), vet, go test ./...; frontend typecheck, lint, vitest (541). * style(node): gofmt web_mtls_test doc comment * feat(node): hashed+zstd reconcile transport (TDD, negotiated, mixed-version safe) Adds an integrity + compression envelope to node config pushes: - internal/util/wirecodec: shared zstd codec (bomb-capped decode) + SHA-256 hashing + the header/capability constants - Remote.do(): always attaches X-Config-Sha256 of the uncompressed body; zstd-compresses only when the node advertised support (learned from its X-3x-Node-Caps response header) and the body is >=1KiB - ConfigEnvelopeMiddleware on /panel/api: advertises the cap, decompresses and verifies the hash (handler not invoked on mismatch) before binding Mixed-version safe: old nodes never advertise the cap -> plain bodies; the hash header is verify-if-present so any panel/node mix interoperates (existing reconcile tests stay green). klauspost/compress promoted to a direct dep. Hash-mismatch reject was mutation-checked (compare defeated -> test red -> reverted). * feat(node): per-node network throughput metrics (TDD) The node status response already carries gopsutil netIO.up/down (summed non-virtual interfaces), so no node-side change is needed: - probe() parses netIO.up/down into HeartbeatPatch.NetUp/NetDown - Node gains net_up/net_down columns (AutoMigrate); UpdateHeartbeat persists them and appends netUp/netDown to the per-node metric history - NodeMetricKeys whitelists netUp/netDown so the history endpoint serves them - NodeHistoryPanel renders Net Up/Down sparklines (KB/s, no 0-100 clamp) - regenerated frontend types + openapi.json for the new Node fields * feat(node): move node mTLS controls into a toolbar button + modal The Node mTLS panel was an always-visible card cluttering the nodes page. Replace it with a 'Node mTLS' button beside 'Add node' that opens a modal with the same copy-CA + trusted-parent-CA controls; the modal closes on a successful save. No backend/i18n changes. * i18n(node): translate mTLS + net-metrics keys for all locales Adds the node mTLS strings (tlsMtls, mtlsFormHint, mtls.* dialog + the saveMtls toast) and the netUp/netDown chart labels to all 12 non-English catalogs (ar, es, fa, id, ja, pt, ru, tr, uk, vi, zh-CN, zh-TW), matching each catalog's existing terminology. Technical tokens (mTLS/TLS/CA/API/ KB/s) kept verbatim. * fix(node): address Copilot review on node-hardening PR - setting_mtls: fail closed on a half-present CA/master-cert pair instead of silently regenerating (which would rotate the CA and break fleet trust). - config_envelope: reject non-zstd Content-Encoding on the envelope path rather than hashing/forwarding a still-encoded body to the handler. - node mTLS: support tokenless mTLS end-to-end — apiToken is now required_unless tlsVerifyMode=mtls (model) with matching conditional validation in NodeFormSchema, so the runtime allowance is actually reachable. - NodesPage: add a catch block to onSaveTrustCa so save failures surface.
2026-06-16 03:19:33 -07:00
if n.TlsVerifyMode == "mtls" {
// Present the master client cert; verify the node's server cert against
// the system roots (no InsecureSkipVerify). mtls authenticates the
// caller — it does not change how the node's server identity is checked.
cert, err := getMasterClientCert()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &tls.Config{
Certificates: []tls.Certificate{cert},
MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
}, nil
}
tlsCfg := &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true} // lgtm[go/disabled-certificate-check]
if n.TlsVerifyMode == "pin" {
want, err := DecodeCertPin(n.PinnedCertSha256)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
tlsCfg.VerifyConnection = func(cs tls.ConnectionState) error {
if len(cs.PeerCertificates) == 0 {
return common.NewError("node presented no certificate")
}
sum := sha256.Sum256(cs.PeerCertificates[0].Raw)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(sum[:], want) != 1 {
return common.NewError("node certificate does not match pinned SHA-256")
}
return nil
}
}
return tlsCfg, nil
}
// DecodeCertPin decodes a SHA-256 cert pin given as base64 (Xray's
// pinnedPeerCertSha256 form) or hex with optional colons into 32 raw bytes.
func DecodeCertPin(s string) ([]byte, error) {
s = strings.TrimSpace(s)
if s == "" {
return nil, common.NewError("certificate pin is empty")
}
if b, err := hex.DecodeString(strings.ReplaceAll(s, ":", "")); err == nil && len(b) == sha256.Size {
return b, nil
}
for _, enc := range []*base64.Encoding{base64.StdEncoding, base64.RawStdEncoding, base64.URLEncoding, base64.RawURLEncoding} {
if b, err := enc.DecodeString(s); err == nil && len(b) == sha256.Size {
return b, nil
}
}
return nil, common.NewError("certificate pin must be a SHA-256 hash (base64 or hex)")
}