fix(inbounds): reject missing TLS certificates before saving (#6429)
An inbound could be saved with security "tls" and a certificate row carrying
neither a file path nor inline content. Nothing rejected it, so the row reached
xray-core, whose readFileOrString fails with "both file and bytes are empty"
and takes the whole config build down with it — every other inbound included.
Validate the credentials on both sides of the wire. validateInboundTLSCertificates
follows xray's file-over-inline precedence, requires a private key for every
non-verify certificate and insists on at least one server certificate, so a
verify-only CA list no longer passes as a server config. The inbound form's Zod
schema enforces the same rules per field and serializes only the editor mode the
operator actually used, and a failed save jumps to the Security tab naming the
certificate row that broke.
On update the guard is scoped to a real TLS edit. A row already stored
incomplete is grandfathered: it stays editable, and only a save that breaks a
previously valid block is refused.
A sub-node stores whatever the master pushes, and Remote.UpdateInbound falls
back to AddInbound when the node does not yet hold the tag, so a grandfathered
row could otherwise never be deployed or re-seeded — the rejection is swallowed
to a logger.Debug line and the node stays on a stale config while the panel
shows the client as cut off. The controller now marks a node-sync request (mTLS
or a node-sync token) on a per-request copy of InboundService, and the guard
steps aside for it on both add and update: the row was judged where the
operator acted, and a node that refuses it only falls out of sync. Operator and
admin-token saves are held to the guard as before.
The security union is parameterised on its tlsSettings branch instead of copied,
and tlsCertUsesFiles is the one file-vs-inline inference shared by the form
schema and the adapter, so the mode the editor opens in and the pair of fields
the save serializes cannot drift apart.
2026-09-08 08:47:12 -07:00
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package controller
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import (
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"net/url"
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"path/filepath"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database"
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2026-09-26 18:04:50 -07:00
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database/dbtest"
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fix(inbounds): reject missing TLS certificates before saving (#6429)
An inbound could be saved with security "tls" and a certificate row carrying
neither a file path nor inline content. Nothing rejected it, so the row reached
xray-core, whose readFileOrString fails with "both file and bytes are empty"
and takes the whole config build down with it — every other inbound included.
Validate the credentials on both sides of the wire. validateInboundTLSCertificates
follows xray's file-over-inline precedence, requires a private key for every
non-verify certificate and insists on at least one server certificate, so a
verify-only CA list no longer passes as a server config. The inbound form's Zod
schema enforces the same rules per field and serializes only the editor mode the
operator actually used, and a failed save jumps to the Security tab naming the
certificate row that broke.
On update the guard is scoped to a real TLS edit. A row already stored
incomplete is grandfathered: it stays editable, and only a save that breaks a
previously valid block is refused.
A sub-node stores whatever the master pushes, and Remote.UpdateInbound falls
back to AddInbound when the node does not yet hold the tag, so a grandfathered
row could otherwise never be deployed or re-seeded — the rejection is swallowed
to a logger.Debug line and the node stays on a stale config while the panel
shows the client as cut off. The controller now marks a node-sync request (mTLS
or a node-sync token) on a per-request copy of InboundService, and the guard
steps aside for it on both add and update: the row was judged where the
operator acted, and a node that refuses it only falls out of sync. Operator and
admin-token saves are held to the guard as before.
The security union is parameterised on its tlsSettings branch instead of copied,
and tlsCertUsesFiles is the one file-vs-inline inference shared by the form
schema and the adapter, so the mode the editor opens in and the pair of fields
the save serializes cannot drift apart.
2026-09-08 08:47:12 -07:00
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database/model"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/util/crypto"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/web/runtime"
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)
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// A sub-node stores whatever the master pushes. A master row whose certificate
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// predates the TLS guard must still land, or the node silently falls out of sync.
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func TestNodeSyncPushSkipsOperatorTLSGuard(t *testing.T) {
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gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
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dbDir := t.TempDir()
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t.Setenv("XUI_DB_FOLDER", dbDir)
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2026-09-26 18:04:50 -07:00
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dbtest.InitDB(t, filepath.Join(dbDir, "x-ui.db"))
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fix(inbounds): reject missing TLS certificates before saving (#6429)
An inbound could be saved with security "tls" and a certificate row carrying
neither a file path nor inline content. Nothing rejected it, so the row reached
xray-core, whose readFileOrString fails with "both file and bytes are empty"
and takes the whole config build down with it — every other inbound included.
Validate the credentials on both sides of the wire. validateInboundTLSCertificates
follows xray's file-over-inline precedence, requires a private key for every
non-verify certificate and insists on at least one server certificate, so a
verify-only CA list no longer passes as a server config. The inbound form's Zod
schema enforces the same rules per field and serializes only the editor mode the
operator actually used, and a failed save jumps to the Security tab naming the
certificate row that broke.
On update the guard is scoped to a real TLS edit. A row already stored
incomplete is grandfathered: it stays editable, and only a save that breaks a
previously valid block is refused.
A sub-node stores whatever the master pushes, and Remote.UpdateInbound falls
back to AddInbound when the node does not yet hold the tag, so a grandfathered
row could otherwise never be deployed or re-seeded — the rejection is swallowed
to a logger.Debug line and the node stays on a stale config while the panel
shows the client as cut off. The controller now marks a node-sync request (mTLS
or a node-sync token) on a per-request copy of InboundService, and the guard
steps aside for it on both add and update: the row was judged where the
operator acted, and a node that refuses it only falls out of sync. Operator and
admin-token saves are held to the guard as before.
The security union is parameterised on its tlsSettings branch instead of copied,
and tlsCertUsesFiles is the one file-vs-inline inference shared by the form
schema and the adapter, so the mode the editor opens in and the pair of fields
the save serializes cannot drift apart.
2026-09-08 08:47:12 -07:00
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prev := runtime.GetManager()
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runtime.SetManager(runtime.NewManager(runtime.LocalDeps{APIPort: func() int { return 0 }, SetNeedRestart: func() {}}))
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t.Cleanup(func() { runtime.SetManager(prev) })
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for name, scope := range map[string]string{"node-sync": model.ApiScopeNodeSync, "admin": model.ApiScopeAdmin} {
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row := &model.ApiToken{Name: name, Token: crypto.HashTokenSHA256(name + "-token"), Enabled: true, Scope: scope}
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if err := database.GetDB().Create(row).Error; err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("seed %s token: %v", name, err)
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}
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}
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engine := gin.New()
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a := &APIController{}
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api := engine.Group("/panel/api")
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api.Use(a.checkAPIAuth, a.enforceTokenScope)
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NewInboundController(api.Group("/inbounds"))
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const legacyStream = `{"network":"tcp","security":"tls","tlsSettings":{"certificates":[{"certificateFile":"","keyFile":"","certificate":[],"key":[]}]}}`
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add := func(t *testing.T, token string, port int) string {
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t.Helper()
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form := url.Values{
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"protocol": {"vless"},
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"port": {strconv.Itoa(port)},
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"tag": {"tls-legacy-" + strconv.Itoa(port)},
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"enable": {"true"},
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"settings": {`{"clients":[]}`},
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"streamSettings": {legacyStream},
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}
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/panel/api/inbounds/add", strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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engine.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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return w.Body.String()
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}
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rows := func(t *testing.T, tag string) int64 {
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t.Helper()
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var n int64
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if err := database.GetDB().Model(&model.Inbound{}).Where("tag = ?", tag).Count(&n).Error; err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("count %s: %v", tag, err)
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}
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return n
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}
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t.Run("a master push lands on the node", func(t *testing.T) {
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body := add(t, "node-sync-token", 45001)
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if !strings.Contains(body, `"success":true`) {
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t.Fatalf("node-sync add rejected: %s", body)
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}
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if got := rows(t, "tls-legacy-45001"); got != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("stored rows = %d, want 1", got)
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}
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})
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t.Run("an operator token is still held to the guard", func(t *testing.T) {
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body := add(t, "admin-token", 45002)
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if !strings.Contains(body, `"success":false`) || !strings.Contains(body, "TLS") {
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t.Fatalf("admin add should fail on TLS, got: %s", body)
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}
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if got := rows(t, "tls-legacy-45002"); got != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("stored rows = %d, want 0", got)
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}
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})
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}
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