2026-01-18 06:41:07 -08:00
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[Unit]
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Description=x-ui Service
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After=network.target
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Wants=network.target
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Bug-label issue sweep: 16 fixes (#6083)
* fix(xray): block private-range egress in default freedom finalRules (#6037)
With domainStrategy AsIs the router never resolves domains, so a domain
with a private A record (e.g. 127-0-0-1.nip.io) sails past the
geoip:private routing block and freedom's allow-all finalRules let it
reach loopback services such as the xray gRPC API and metrics listener.
Prepend a block rule for geoip:private to the default template and add
the FreedomFinalRulesPrivateEgressBlock seeder so existing installs
still carrying the stock allow-only (or legacy private-only-allow)
finalRules are upgraded in place; customized rules are left untouched.
* fix(sub): version-gate unencrypted-outbound drops in outbound subscriptions (#6033)
Commit d38c912d taught CheckXrayConfig to keep unencrypted vless/trojan
outbounds when the running core predates the v26.7.11 rejection, but
filterOutboundsRejectedByCore still consulted the embedded validator
unconditionally, so outbound subscriptions kept silently dropping those
outbounds even on downgraded cores.
Apply the same shouldSkipLegacyUnencryptedOutboundRejection gate when
filtering fetched subscription outbounds.
* fix(xray): resolve geodata assets before building outbound configs (#5928)
Saving routing or template settings validates each outbound through the
embedded config loader, and a freedom outbound whose finalRules
reference geoip:private opens geoip.dat during that build. Unlike
ApplyRoutingConfig, ValidateOutboundConfig and AddOutbound never pointed
the in-process loader at the bin folder, so xray-core resolved the file
relative to the panel executable and saving failed with
'stat /usr/local/x-ui/geoip.dat: no such file or directory'.
Call ensureXrayAssetLocation before both build paths.
* fix(api): use a real i18n key in the client get handler (#5911)
The client fetch endpoint localized its error prefix with the bare key
'get', which exists in no translation file, so every lookup of a deleted
client's email logged 'message "get" not found in language ...' noise
alongside the expected record-not-found warning. Reuse the same
pages.inbounds.toasts.obtain key the sibling list handler uses.
* fix(sub): carry host record Host header and path into Clash/JSON output (#5944)
The raw-link path overrides the host/path share params from a Host
record via applyEndpointHostPath, but the Clash and JSON renderers read
the transport settings object, which applyHostStreamOverrides never
touched — so a Host record's WebSocket Host header (and path) silently
vanished from Clash/Mihomo and JSON subscriptions whenever the inbound's
own ws settings left them empty.
Inject hostHeader/path into the ws/httpupgrade/xhttp settings of the
per-host stream, mirroring the raw-link override.
* fix(metrics): accept Unicode outbound tags in the observatory (#5972)
The observatory validator whitelisted ASCII word characters, so any
outbound whose tag carries a flag emoji or other non-ASCII text was
silently dropped from the metrics snapshot, delay history, and health
notifications. The history store is an in-process map, so the strict
charset bought nothing.
Validate tags as non-empty, bounded, control-character-free UTF-8
instead, keeping spaces and emoji while still rejecting garbage input on
the query path.
* fix(database): default sqlite to WAL to stop background-job lock storms (#6057, #6068)
With journal_mode=DELETE every write serializes the whole database and
blocks readers, so under normal multi-job load (traffic sampling, node
sync, mtproto reconcile) transactions regularly outwaited the 10s busy
timeout and jobs failed with 'database is locked'.
Move to WAL by default: readers no longer block writers and vice versa,
which removes the observed contention while writer-writer access still
serializes safely. The single-file-at-rest property is preserved where
it matters — Checkpoint() now issues wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE), so panel
and Telegram backups read a complete main file, and sqlite folds the WAL
back into the db on clean shutdown. XUI_DB_JOURNAL_MODE=DELETE restores
the previous behavior for setups that copy the live file directly.
* fix(database): strip finalmask.tcp from REALITY inbounds on upgrade (#6038)
validateFinalMaskRealityCombo blocks saving finalmask.tcp together with
REALITY because that combination crashes Xray-core 26.7.11 on the first
connection (XTLS/Xray-core#6453), but it only runs on add/update. An
inbound saved before the validator existed sailed through the upgrade
untouched and took the core down at boot.
Add the InboundRealityFinalmaskTcpStrip seeder: one-time scan that
removes finalmask.tcp from REALITY inbounds (other finalmask transports
survive), so upgraded panels start cleanly.
* fix(xray): stop deleting hand-written direct routing rules on save (#6056)
The DNS allow-rule sync recognized 'its' rules purely by shape
(type=field, ip, port, outboundTag=direct, nothing else), so any manual
rule of that shape — e.g. routing a LAN CIDR to a NAS port over direct —
was silently stripped on every settings save.
Mark managed rules with ruleTag=xui-dns-allow (round-tripped untouched
by both xray-core and the Routing tab editor) and only strip rules that
carry the tag. Untagged legacy managed rules are adopted when their
exact ip-set/port matches a currently configured private DNS endpoint;
anything else is left alone. A stale pre-tag managed rule whose DNS
server was removed now lingers until deleted manually — the safe side of
the trade against eating user rules.
* fix(clients): resolve email lookups through client_inbounds after a move (#6059)
GetClientInboundByEmail trusted the client_traffics.inbound_id pointer
whenever that inbound still existed, but a client moved between inbounds
leaves the row pointing at its old (still existing) inbound. The lookup
then searched the wrong inbound's clients and failed with 'Client Not
Found In Inbound For Email', which broke the Telegram bot's link and QR
generation for moved clients.
When the pointed-at inbound no longer carries the email, re-resolve
through the authoritative client_inbounds link to the inbound that
actually hosts the client.
* fix(nodes): replicate inbound fallbacks to nodes (#5963)
Fallbacks live in the inbound_fallbacks table and were only merged into
settings by the master's local config builder; the runtime inbound
pushed to nodes rebuilt settings without them, and the reconcile job
additionally fingerprinted the raw DB row, so fallback edits neither
reached nodes nor triggered a re-push.
Inject settings.fallbacks in buildRuntimeInboundForAPI (mirroring the
local builder, gated on inboundCanHostFallbacks) and make ReconcileNode
push and fingerprint that same runtime-built payload, aligning the
interactive and reconcile paths.
* fix(database): survive PostgreSQL outages without a runaway restart loop (#6023)
A PostgreSQL that was down or still starting made InitDB fail instantly;
the process exited with a generic startup error and systemd restarted it
every 5s forever, flooding the journal.
Retry the initial postgres connection with backoff (~70s total) and log
the real driver error on every attempt, and cap the systemd units with
StartLimitIntervalSec/StartLimitBurst so a persistently unreachable
database stops the unit instead of looping indefinitely.
* fix(xray): force a full restart when REALITY stream settings change (#6010)
A changed inbound is normally hot-swapped over gRPC as RemoveInbound +
AddInbound, but xray-core does not reliably rebuild a REALITY listener's
authenticator on a runtime re-add — key or shortId edits appeared
applied yet clients kept authenticating against the old parameters until
someone restarted the core manually, on nodes in particular.
Treat any non-client change to an inbound that uses (or starts using)
REALITY as not hot-appliable so the panel restarts the core instead.
Client-only edits on REALITY inbounds keep flowing through the per-user
AlterInbound path and still avoid restarts.
* feat(sub): allow insecure TLS for outbound subscription fetches (#6067)
An outbound subscription served over HTTPS with a self-signed or
private-CA certificate could never be fetched: the fetch client had no
TLS options, so refreshes died with 'x509: certificate signed by unknown
authority' and there was nothing the admin could toggle.
Add a per-subscription 'Allow insecure' switch (persisted as
allow_insecure, default off) that sets InsecureSkipVerify on the fetch
transport — including when the fetch is routed through the panel egress
proxy. The SSRF-guarded dialer and redirect re-validation stay in force
either way.
* fix(reality): send PROXY protocol header in the target scanner when xver is set (#6082)
The REALITY target scanner always probed with a plain TLS handshake, so
a target fronted by an Nginx listener that requires the PROXY protocol
(matching the inbound's xver>=1) reset the connection and the panel
reported a false 'TLS handshake failed'.
Thread the inbound's xver into the scan request and, when it is >=1,
lead with the matching PROXY protocol header (v1 for xver 1, binary v2
for xver 2) built from the dialed connection's own address pair. Batch
candidate scans against public sites are unaffected (xver 0).
* fix(frontend): default sockopt fields when editing a stored inbound (#5956)
Opening an existing inbound ran rawInboundToFormValues over the raw DB
row, and only xhttpSettings was re-parsed through its Zod schema to fill
defaults. A sockopt object saved before the TProxy control existed has
no tproxy key, so the Select rendered blank; picking Off didn't help
because the wire normalizer drops tproxy=off, recreating the missing
key on the next edit.
Re-parse streamSettings.sockopt through SockoptStreamSettingsSchema on
load, mirroring the xhttpSettings handling, so absent keys (tproxy,
tcpcongestion, …) get their schema defaults every time the form opens.
2026-07-23 06:34:42 -07:00
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StartLimitIntervalSec=180
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StartLimitBurst=10
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2026-01-18 06:41:07 -08:00
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[Service]
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EnvironmentFile=-/etc/conf.d/x-ui
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Environment="XRAY_VMESS_AEAD_FORCED=false"
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Type=simple
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2026-05-10 08:17:33 -07:00
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WorkingDirectory=/usr/local/x-ui/
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ExecStart=/usr/local/x-ui/x-ui
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2026-06-12 03:09:48 -07:00
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ExecReload=/bin/kill -USR1 $MAINPID
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2026-01-18 06:41:07 -08:00
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Restart=on-failure
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RestartSec=5s
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fix(systemd): harden shipped x-ui unit files (#6718)
* fix(systemd): harden shipped x-ui unit files
The units ran the panel as root with no sandboxing: systemd-analyze
security rates them 9.6 UNSAFE.
Add NoNewPrivileges, ProtectSystem=full with ReadWritePaths for the
default XUI_DB_FOLDER/XUI_BIN_FOLDER/XUI_LOG_FOLDER stores, kernel and
clock protections, UMask=0077, RestrictAddressFamilies, a
CapabilityBoundingSet with NET_ADMIN/NET_BIND_SERVICE/NET_RAW and
SystemCallFilter=@system-service.
PrivateTmp is deliberately omitted: the web updater hands a path inside
the system temp directory to a systemd-run transient unit, which does not
share the service's private tmpfs. ProtectHome stays read-only because
installs keep TLS certificates under the root home directory.
Fixes #6605
* fix(systemd): ship ReadWriteDirectories= alias for systemd < 231
ReadWritePaths= only exists since systemd 231; install.sh still supports
CentOS 7 (systemd 219), where the directive is ignored and ProtectSystem=full
would leave the panel state directory read-only, breaking its database.
* fix(systemd): keep root's DAC bits and regenerate the write paths
Two follow-ups to the hardening, both reported by review on #6718.
CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH were dropped from the bounding set.
Root holds them normally, and a bounding set is subtracted from root too: the
panel could no longer read a private key it does not own (a Caddy-issued
certificate under its own state dir, an acme.sh home, any 0600 file owned by
another account). That fails quietly for TLS -- the panel listener logs the
tls.LoadX509KeyPair error and keeps serving plain HTTP, and Xray inbounds using
that key stop -- so both bits stay.
ProtectSystem=full plus a hard-coded ReadWritePaths list broke installs whose
XUI_DB_FOLDER/XUI_LOG_FOLDER/XUI_BIN_FOLDER live outside the defaults, and the
workaround of editing the unit did not survive an update, because install.sh and
update.sh reinstall the unit from the release tarball. The folders actually in
use are now resolved from the same env file the unit passes to the panel and
regenerated into x-ui.service.d/10-xui-write-paths.conf on every install and
update, so a relocated store stays writable and the list is not reset. The unit
keeps the plain-install defaults plus XUI_SERVICE, which the in-panel updater
needs when systemd-run is unavailable and it falls back to a child process that
inherits this sandbox while update.sh lands the unit again. Uninstall removes
the drop-in with the unit.
* fix(systemd): keep the seccomp whitelist off old systemd, tighten the rest
Review of the previous head found that SystemCallFilter=@system-service plus
SystemCallErrorNumber=EPERM is a hard regression on the platforms this PR means
to keep working. @-named filter groups exist from systemd 239 on, and older
systemd does not ignore an unknown group name: on <231 the name fails to resolve
and the filter stays the built-in whitelist of execve/exit/exit_group/
rt_sigreturn/sigreturn, on 231..238 it degrades to @default. Either way the panel
then gets EPERM on read/openat/mmap/clone and cannot start -- a CentOS 7 or
Ubuntu 18.04 install would come up dead after this update. The two directives now
live in the generated drop-in and are written only when "systemctl --version"
reports 239 or newer, so old hosts keep the rest of the hardening and simply go
without seccomp.
The same review listed three more items, all addressed here:
- a comment claiming ProtectSystem=full "keeps everything outside /var, /run and
the listed ReadWritePaths read-only" -- that is `strict`; `full` locks down
/usr, /boot, /efi and /etc;
- /etc/systemd/system was granted writable for the in-panel updater's fallback,
but that fallback cannot work under this sandbox at all: update.sh also stages
the release archive beside the main folder, replaces /usr/bin/x-ui and calls
the package manager. The entry is gone and update.sh now stops up front with
one clear message when the directories it needs are read-only, instead of
failing halfway with "Failed to download x-ui";
- CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH is redundant next to CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, so the bounding set
keeps just the latter.
Relocating a store by editing the env file alone is documented in the unit and
in the generated drop-in: the drop-in is only written by install/update, so one
of those has to be re-run afterwards.
Verified with a local harness (9 checks: plain defaults, relocated store read
from the env file, the same list produced by update.sh, duplicate collapse,
seccomp present at systemd 249 and absent at 238, read-only guard) and bash -n
on install.sh, update.sh, x-ui.sh. systemd-analyze is not available here, so the
unit files themselves are unverified by a parser.
* fix(systemd): actually wire the read-only guard, drop the superseded drop-in
Re-review of the previous head caught two leftovers from that commit:
- require_writable_update_paths was defined but never called, so the guard the
unit comments, the commit message and the PR comment promise did not exist at
all. It is now called at the top level, before install_base, i.e. before
anything with a side effect: a sandboxed fallback run stops with one clear
message instead of failing halfway, which on a relocated main folder meant the
old install removed and the service folder rewritten before dying on /usr/bin.
- the drop-in this branch replaced (10-xui-write-paths.conf) is no longer written
or referenced, but nothing removed it either. Whoever installed the build that
wrote it keeps its wider list, including the writable service folder, until it
is deleted by hand. Both generators now remove it.
Harness extended to 11 checks: the superseded file is gone after a run, the guard
is actually called, plus the previous nine (defaults, env-file relocation, same
list from update.sh, dedupe, seccomp at 249 / absent at 238, read-only guard) and
bash -n on the three scripts.
* fix(systemd): correct two comments and keep spaces out of the path list
Second-opinion review of the previous head (two models, both asked to state
platforms and versions) produced three actionable items: a wrong comment kept
from the earlier commits, a wrong generalisation about the filter groups, and a
path-list case that would leave the panel unable to start.
- the ProtectSystem= comment claimed strict leaves /var and /run writable. It
does not: strict mounts the whole hierarchy read-only and only the kernel API
filesystems stay as they are. The sentence was already wrong before this
branch and moving it to ProtectSystem=full did not fix it.
- "the @-named filter groups need systemd >= 239" is the wrong generalisation:
named groups exist since 231, it is @system-service that arrived in 239. The
unit files, both script comments and the drop-in body now name the group.
- a folder containing whitespace (XUI_DB_FOLDER="/srv/panel data") was written
into ReadWritePaths= verbatim. That directive is a whitespace-separated list,
so the entry splits into "-/srv/panel" and "data", and systemd rejects the
whole drop-in: the panel then does not start at all. Such folders are left
out and reported to the operator instead; the other paths are still written.
Harness extended with three checks for the whitespace case (folder left out,
remaining paths intact, warning emitted) and the duplicate-store case now reads
its own env file instead of the previous one, so it tests what it claims.
14 checks plus bash -n on the three scripts, all passing.
* fix(systemd): act on the independent review of the drop-in generator
A read-only review of the branch head (another model, given the diff and the
sources, asked to cite only verified lines) confirmed the earlier work and
turned up four items that are fixed here:
- a folder name carrying a literal % went into ReadWritePaths= as it was, and
systemd expands %-specifiers in unit files: with XUI_DB_FOLDER=/srv/x%-ui the
entry no longer named the directory the panel writes to and the panel could
not write its database. The path is now emitted as %%; the duplicate check
keeps comparing the unescaped value.
- systemd older than 229/242/244 does not know NoNewPrivileges, ProtectClock,
ProtectHostname and ProtectKernelLogs. It logs them and carries on, so
CentOS 7 (systemd 219, which install.sh explicitly supports) runs with less
hardening than the unit lists. install.sh and update.sh now print which
protections need a newer systemd, which ones still apply, and that upgrading
systemd is what changes it.
- the updater's writability guard asked [[ -w ]] about the parent directories.
It creates and removes a probe file instead, so an immutable attribute or a
full filesystem is caught as well (a read-only mount was already caught).
- the generator's comment claimed to resolve the folders the service actually
uses, while the shipped unit hard-codes WorkingDirectory= and ExecStart= under
/usr/local/x-ui. The comment now states what XUI_MAIN_FOLDER really feeds --
the location install.sh/update.sh install into and the base for a relative
XUI_BIN_FOLDER -- and that a relocated main folder needs the unit edited too.
Rejected from the same review, with the evidence: that [[ -w ]] cannot see a
read-only mount (access(W_OK)/faccessat consults __mnt_is_readonly before the
mode bits), and that the /etc ReadWritePaths entry is an exception granted for
/etc rather than a default store already in the list.
Harness extended: 19 checks (escaped %, the old-systemd note, whitespace and
duplicate folders, seccomp gating, the read-only guard) plus bash -n on the
three scripts, all passing.
* fix(systemd): name the hardening old systemd really ignores
The old-systemd note fired only below 239 and listed wrong versions:
RHEL 8 (239) and Debian 10 (241) silently lose ProtectHostname and
RestrictSUIDSGID (242), ProtectKernelLogs (244) and ProtectClock (245)
with no note, while CentOS 7 was told NoNewPrivileges (187) and
ProtectHome=read-only (214) were not applied although both are. The
note is now built from a directive/version table taken from
systemd.exec(5) and lists only what the running systemd lacks.
Also drop the removal of 10-xui-write-paths.conf: only an intermediate
commit of this branch wrote that file, no release ever shipped it.
---------
Co-authored-by: Кот <kot@zeroclaw.local>
Co-authored-by: Sanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com>
2026-10-05 09:47:10 -07:00
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# The panel intentionally stays root: it supervises the Xray child processes,
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# edits netfilter state and reads TLS private keys. These settings only bound
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# what a panel-level flaw can reach.
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#
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# PrivateTmp=yes is deliberately absent: the web updater writes its script into
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# /tmp and hands the absolute path to a "systemd-run" transient unit, which
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# does not share this service's private /tmp (the download would vanish).
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NoNewPrivileges=yes
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ProtectSystem=full
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# Default stores: DB/update status/node-token in XUI_DB_FOLDER (/etc/x-ui),
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# xray binary/config/geo in XUI_BIN_FOLDER under /usr/local/x-ui, logs in
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# XUI_LOG_FOLDER (/var/log/x-ui). These are the plain-install defaults and the
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# floor, not the whole list: install.sh and update.sh regenerate a drop-in
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# (x-ui.service.d/10-xui-sandbox.conf) with the folders resolved from the XUI_*
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# variables, so a relocated XUI_DB_FOLDER or XUI_LOG_FOLDER stays writable and
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# the list survives an update instead of being reset to these defaults. Changing
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# one of those variables in the env file is not enough by itself: the drop-in has
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# to be refreshed as well, i.e. install or update the panel again.
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# Add local extras in your own drop-in (e.g. 20-local.conf).
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# The leading '-' keeps the unit startable if a path does not exist yet.
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# What ProtectSystem=full covers, precisely: /usr, /boot, /efi and /etc become
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# read-only, everything else stays writable. So this list matters for stores
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# under those trees -- the default main folder under /usr/local is one.
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#
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# The in-panel updater is expected to leave this sandbox: it runs update.sh
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# through a transient systemd-run unit, which does not inherit these settings.
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# Its plain-child fallback (taken when systemd-run is unavailable) cannot work
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# here -- update.sh stages the release archive beside the main folder, replaces
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# /usr/bin/x-ui and calls the package manager -- so it stops with one clear
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# message instead of failing halfway, and the sandbox deliberately does not
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# grant /usr or /etc to accommodate it.
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# ReadWritePaths= requires systemd >= 231; ReadWriteDirectories= is the deprecated
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# alias for older systemd, needed so ProtectSystem=full keeps /etc/x-ui writable.
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ReadWritePaths=-/etc/x-ui -/usr/local/x-ui -/var/log/x-ui
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ReadWriteDirectories=-/etc/x-ui -/usr/local/x-ui -/var/log/x-ui
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2026-10-12 08:52:21 -07:00
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# A kernel-TUN WireGuard outbound zeroes net.ipv{4,6}.conf.*.rp_filter as Xray starts
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# (#6796). Reopen only /proc/sys/net: kernel.* (core_pattern among them) stays read-only.
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# No ReadWriteDirectories alias needed: ProtectKernelTunables itself requires systemd 232.
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ReadWritePaths=-/proc/sys/net
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fix(systemd): harden shipped x-ui unit files (#6718)
* fix(systemd): harden shipped x-ui unit files
The units ran the panel as root with no sandboxing: systemd-analyze
security rates them 9.6 UNSAFE.
Add NoNewPrivileges, ProtectSystem=full with ReadWritePaths for the
default XUI_DB_FOLDER/XUI_BIN_FOLDER/XUI_LOG_FOLDER stores, kernel and
clock protections, UMask=0077, RestrictAddressFamilies, a
CapabilityBoundingSet with NET_ADMIN/NET_BIND_SERVICE/NET_RAW and
SystemCallFilter=@system-service.
PrivateTmp is deliberately omitted: the web updater hands a path inside
the system temp directory to a systemd-run transient unit, which does not
share the service's private tmpfs. ProtectHome stays read-only because
installs keep TLS certificates under the root home directory.
Fixes #6605
* fix(systemd): ship ReadWriteDirectories= alias for systemd < 231
ReadWritePaths= only exists since systemd 231; install.sh still supports
CentOS 7 (systemd 219), where the directive is ignored and ProtectSystem=full
would leave the panel state directory read-only, breaking its database.
* fix(systemd): keep root's DAC bits and regenerate the write paths
Two follow-ups to the hardening, both reported by review on #6718.
CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH were dropped from the bounding set.
Root holds them normally, and a bounding set is subtracted from root too: the
panel could no longer read a private key it does not own (a Caddy-issued
certificate under its own state dir, an acme.sh home, any 0600 file owned by
another account). That fails quietly for TLS -- the panel listener logs the
tls.LoadX509KeyPair error and keeps serving plain HTTP, and Xray inbounds using
that key stop -- so both bits stay.
ProtectSystem=full plus a hard-coded ReadWritePaths list broke installs whose
XUI_DB_FOLDER/XUI_LOG_FOLDER/XUI_BIN_FOLDER live outside the defaults, and the
workaround of editing the unit did not survive an update, because install.sh and
update.sh reinstall the unit from the release tarball. The folders actually in
use are now resolved from the same env file the unit passes to the panel and
regenerated into x-ui.service.d/10-xui-write-paths.conf on every install and
update, so a relocated store stays writable and the list is not reset. The unit
keeps the plain-install defaults plus XUI_SERVICE, which the in-panel updater
needs when systemd-run is unavailable and it falls back to a child process that
inherits this sandbox while update.sh lands the unit again. Uninstall removes
the drop-in with the unit.
* fix(systemd): keep the seccomp whitelist off old systemd, tighten the rest
Review of the previous head found that SystemCallFilter=@system-service plus
SystemCallErrorNumber=EPERM is a hard regression on the platforms this PR means
to keep working. @-named filter groups exist from systemd 239 on, and older
systemd does not ignore an unknown group name: on <231 the name fails to resolve
and the filter stays the built-in whitelist of execve/exit/exit_group/
rt_sigreturn/sigreturn, on 231..238 it degrades to @default. Either way the panel
then gets EPERM on read/openat/mmap/clone and cannot start -- a CentOS 7 or
Ubuntu 18.04 install would come up dead after this update. The two directives now
live in the generated drop-in and are written only when "systemctl --version"
reports 239 or newer, so old hosts keep the rest of the hardening and simply go
without seccomp.
The same review listed three more items, all addressed here:
- a comment claiming ProtectSystem=full "keeps everything outside /var, /run and
the listed ReadWritePaths read-only" -- that is `strict`; `full` locks down
/usr, /boot, /efi and /etc;
- /etc/systemd/system was granted writable for the in-panel updater's fallback,
but that fallback cannot work under this sandbox at all: update.sh also stages
the release archive beside the main folder, replaces /usr/bin/x-ui and calls
the package manager. The entry is gone and update.sh now stops up front with
one clear message when the directories it needs are read-only, instead of
failing halfway with "Failed to download x-ui";
- CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH is redundant next to CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, so the bounding set
keeps just the latter.
Relocating a store by editing the env file alone is documented in the unit and
in the generated drop-in: the drop-in is only written by install/update, so one
of those has to be re-run afterwards.
Verified with a local harness (9 checks: plain defaults, relocated store read
from the env file, the same list produced by update.sh, duplicate collapse,
seccomp present at systemd 249 and absent at 238, read-only guard) and bash -n
on install.sh, update.sh, x-ui.sh. systemd-analyze is not available here, so the
unit files themselves are unverified by a parser.
* fix(systemd): actually wire the read-only guard, drop the superseded drop-in
Re-review of the previous head caught two leftovers from that commit:
- require_writable_update_paths was defined but never called, so the guard the
unit comments, the commit message and the PR comment promise did not exist at
all. It is now called at the top level, before install_base, i.e. before
anything with a side effect: a sandboxed fallback run stops with one clear
message instead of failing halfway, which on a relocated main folder meant the
old install removed and the service folder rewritten before dying on /usr/bin.
- the drop-in this branch replaced (10-xui-write-paths.conf) is no longer written
or referenced, but nothing removed it either. Whoever installed the build that
wrote it keeps its wider list, including the writable service folder, until it
is deleted by hand. Both generators now remove it.
Harness extended to 11 checks: the superseded file is gone after a run, the guard
is actually called, plus the previous nine (defaults, env-file relocation, same
list from update.sh, dedupe, seccomp at 249 / absent at 238, read-only guard) and
bash -n on the three scripts.
* fix(systemd): correct two comments and keep spaces out of the path list
Second-opinion review of the previous head (two models, both asked to state
platforms and versions) produced three actionable items: a wrong comment kept
from the earlier commits, a wrong generalisation about the filter groups, and a
path-list case that would leave the panel unable to start.
- the ProtectSystem= comment claimed strict leaves /var and /run writable. It
does not: strict mounts the whole hierarchy read-only and only the kernel API
filesystems stay as they are. The sentence was already wrong before this
branch and moving it to ProtectSystem=full did not fix it.
- "the @-named filter groups need systemd >= 239" is the wrong generalisation:
named groups exist since 231, it is @system-service that arrived in 239. The
unit files, both script comments and the drop-in body now name the group.
- a folder containing whitespace (XUI_DB_FOLDER="/srv/panel data") was written
into ReadWritePaths= verbatim. That directive is a whitespace-separated list,
so the entry splits into "-/srv/panel" and "data", and systemd rejects the
whole drop-in: the panel then does not start at all. Such folders are left
out and reported to the operator instead; the other paths are still written.
Harness extended with three checks for the whitespace case (folder left out,
remaining paths intact, warning emitted) and the duplicate-store case now reads
its own env file instead of the previous one, so it tests what it claims.
14 checks plus bash -n on the three scripts, all passing.
* fix(systemd): act on the independent review of the drop-in generator
A read-only review of the branch head (another model, given the diff and the
sources, asked to cite only verified lines) confirmed the earlier work and
turned up four items that are fixed here:
- a folder name carrying a literal % went into ReadWritePaths= as it was, and
systemd expands %-specifiers in unit files: with XUI_DB_FOLDER=/srv/x%-ui the
entry no longer named the directory the panel writes to and the panel could
not write its database. The path is now emitted as %%; the duplicate check
keeps comparing the unescaped value.
- systemd older than 229/242/244 does not know NoNewPrivileges, ProtectClock,
ProtectHostname and ProtectKernelLogs. It logs them and carries on, so
CentOS 7 (systemd 219, which install.sh explicitly supports) runs with less
hardening than the unit lists. install.sh and update.sh now print which
protections need a newer systemd, which ones still apply, and that upgrading
systemd is what changes it.
- the updater's writability guard asked [[ -w ]] about the parent directories.
It creates and removes a probe file instead, so an immutable attribute or a
full filesystem is caught as well (a read-only mount was already caught).
- the generator's comment claimed to resolve the folders the service actually
uses, while the shipped unit hard-codes WorkingDirectory= and ExecStart= under
/usr/local/x-ui. The comment now states what XUI_MAIN_FOLDER really feeds --
the location install.sh/update.sh install into and the base for a relative
XUI_BIN_FOLDER -- and that a relocated main folder needs the unit edited too.
Rejected from the same review, with the evidence: that [[ -w ]] cannot see a
read-only mount (access(W_OK)/faccessat consults __mnt_is_readonly before the
mode bits), and that the /etc ReadWritePaths entry is an exception granted for
/etc rather than a default store already in the list.
Harness extended: 19 checks (escaped %, the old-systemd note, whitespace and
duplicate folders, seccomp gating, the read-only guard) plus bash -n on the
three scripts, all passing.
* fix(systemd): name the hardening old systemd really ignores
The old-systemd note fired only below 239 and listed wrong versions:
RHEL 8 (239) and Debian 10 (241) silently lose ProtectHostname and
RestrictSUIDSGID (242), ProtectKernelLogs (244) and ProtectClock (245)
with no note, while CentOS 7 was told NoNewPrivileges (187) and
ProtectHome=read-only (214) were not applied although both are. The
note is now built from a directive/version table taken from
systemd.exec(5) and lists only what the running systemd lacks.
Also drop the removal of 10-xui-write-paths.conf: only an intermediate
commit of this branch wrote that file, no release ever shipped it.
---------
Co-authored-by: Кот <kot@zeroclaw.local>
Co-authored-by: Sanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com>
2026-10-05 09:47:10 -07:00
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ProtectKernelTunables=yes
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ProtectKernelModules=yes
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ProtectKernelLogs=yes
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ProtectClock=yes
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ProtectHostname=yes
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# read-only rather than yes: installs keep TLS certs under /root/cert, and the
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# panel must still be able to read them.
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ProtectHome=read-only
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LockPersonality=yes
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RestrictRealtime=yes
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RestrictSUIDSGID=yes
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RestrictNamespaces=yes
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UMask=0077
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# AF_NETLINK for interface/route lookups and the ip(8) child used by the
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# AmneziaWG IPv6-alias feature.
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RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX AF_NETLINK
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# NET_ADMIN for ip(8)/tproxy, NET_BIND_SERVICE for ports below 1024, NET_RAW
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# for raw sockets and SO_BINDTODEVICE.
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#
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# DAC_OVERRIDE has to stay. The panel runs as root, but a bounding set is
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# subtracted from root's own privileges too: without it root can only read a
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# file when the owner/group/other bits let uid 0 through, and any TLS private
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# key belonging to another account becomes unreadable -- a certificate issued to
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# Caddy, an acme.sh home, any 0600 file that root does not own. TLS then fails
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# quietly: the panel listener catches the tls.LoadX509KeyPair error, logs it and
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# keeps serving plain HTTP, and every Xray inbound using that key stops. Those
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# reads worked before the sandbox because the panel is root.
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# DAC_READ_SEARCH is deliberately absent: directory search is already covered by
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# DAC_OVERRIDE, so it would only widen the set without adding anything.
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CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE CAP_NET_RAW
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SystemCallArchitectures=native
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# No seccomp whitelist here on purpose. @system-service needs systemd >= 239
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# (other @-named groups exist since 231), and older systemd does not ignore an
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# unknown group name gracefully: on
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# <231 the name fails to resolve and the filter stays the built-in whitelist of
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# execve/exit/exit_group/rt_sigreturn/sigreturn, on 231..238 it degrades to
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# @default -- either way the panel then gets EPERM on read/openat/mmap/clone and
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# cannot start. install.sh and update.sh add SystemCallFilter=@system-service and
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# SystemCallErrorNumber=EPERM to the generated drop-in, but only when
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# "systemctl --version" reports 239 or newer.
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2026-01-18 06:41:07 -08:00
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[Install]
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WantedBy=multi-user.target
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